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WILLY E. RICE' 
INTRODUCTION 
A careful review of either privately or publicly assembled economic 
data discloses two "economic truths": (1) Persistent unemployment is 
likely to develop among members of any racial or socioeconomic group 
when members of that group are regularly and systematically denied 
access to capital and credit;1 and, (2) small businesses--the primary 
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of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Postdoctoral Fellow 1977, The Johns Hopkins 
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scores of legal academicians, senior scholars at various legal foundations, practicing 
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over the Internet and evaluated the merits of the arguments and statistical procedures 
outlined in this paper. To be sure, the author has attempted to address all legitimate 
questions and tried to incorporate many priceless recommendations into the Article. 
Nevertheless, the views expressed as well as errors or omissions are the author's alone. 
I. See generally Gregory D. Squires & Sally O'Connor, Do Lenders Who Redline 
Make More Money Than Lenders Who Don't?, 21 REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON. 83-107 
(1993); TIMOTHY BATES, BANKING ON BLACK ENTERPRISE: THE POTENTIAL OF 
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creators of jobs and economic opportunity-are likely to fold or abandon 
any geographic area if they are unable to secure working capital or 
credit from banks or other lenders. To be sure, this latter problem 
increases the likelihood of long-term unemployment, blight, and even 
more disinvestment in capital-starved neighborhoods and communities.2 
Twenty years ago, congressional hearings revealed that commercial 
and savings banks, private-mortgage companies, and savings and loans 
institutions hinder job creation and stable communities when those 
institutions refuse to extend credit to legitimate consumers and small 
businesses.3 More disturbing, Congress discovered that, all too often, 
lenders were denying credit and loans to consumers on the basis of 
gender, race, color, national origin, marital status, religion, and age. To 
help eradicate such unwarranted lending practices, Congress passed the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA).4 
Three years later, a different set of congressional hearings disclosed 
another disturbing phenomenon: Federally insured financial institutions' 
lending decisions contributed to long-term unemployment, social decay, 
and other pathologies in both urban and rural communities when lenders 
failed to serve the credit needs of communities in which they were 
chartered.5 Some called this scheme "redlining"6-the practice of 
EMERGING FIRMS FOR REVITALIZING URBAN ECONOMIES (1993). See also Judith B. 
Hen!}', Comment, Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, 12 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 203 (1977) ("But for the availability of credit, it would be impossible for most 
Americans to ... own a home .... "). 
2. See, e.g., Lucinda Harper, The Job-Creating Prowess of Small Business Is a 
Myth, a New Study Says, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1993, at Al ("Economists ... often 
assert that small businesses account for most new jobs, so entrepreneurs should get more 
access to credit, tax incentives and other perks from the federal government. [ And 
research shows that] smaller firms do exhibit sharply higher gross job-creation rates . 
. . . ") (emphasis added). 
3. See generally Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 
Stat. 1500 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 1691-1691f (1994)). See also Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994)). 
4. l 5 U.S.C. § l69l(a) (1996). See also iefra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. 
5. See generally Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, Title 
VIII,§ 802, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977). See also Griffith L. Garwood & Dolores S. Smith, The 
Community Reinvestment Act: Evolution and Current Issues, 79 FED. REs. BULL. 251 
( 1993): 
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In the mid- l 970s, a prevalent view among some members of the Congress was 
that many financial institutions accepted deposits from households and small 
businesses in inner cities while lending and investing those deposits primarily 
elsewhere. They believed that, given this disinvestment, or "redlining," credit 
needs for urban areas in decline were not being met by the private sector .... 
6. See 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977): 
By redlining ... I am talking about the fact that banks and savings and loans 
will take their deposits from a community and instead of reinvesting them in 
that community, they will invest them elsewhere, and they will actually or 
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"systematic[ally] refus[ing] to lend to many minority [and] low-income 
people,"7 To help address these anti-consumer and anti-business 
practices, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 
(CRA),8 
Unfortunately, several post-enactment studies show that the ECOA and 
CRA have not achieved their stated goals, In fact, pro-consumer 
activists, women's groups and civil-rights organizations continue to 
accuse banks, thrifts and other federally insured financial institutions of 
intentionally violating the ECOA. From their perspectives, lenders 
continue to deny loans to creditworthy consumers and practice gender9 
figuratively draw a red line on a map around the areas of their city, sometimes 
in the inner city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods, sometimes ethnic and 
sometimes black, but often encompassing a great area of their neighborhood. 
Id. (statement of Sen. Proxmire), quoted in Jonathan P. Tomes, The "Community" in the 
Community Reinvestment Act: A Term in Search ofa Definition, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING 
L. 225, 227 n.9 (1991). See also Joan Kane, The Constitutionality of Redlining: The 
Potential For Holding Banks Liable As State Actors, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 527, 
528-29 (1993) (presenting several definitions of "redlining" and outlining historical 
developments surrounding the practice). 
7. Albert R. Karr, Effort to Fight Loan Bias Gets Coriflicting Reviews, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 25, I 993, at B6. 
8. 12 u.s.c. § 2901 (1996). 
9. See, e.g., Constance Mitchell, Businesswomen Say Credit Firms Still 
Discriminate on Basis of Sex, WALL ST. J., June 26, I 986, at 33: 
[A married female] was awarded $3.8 million in contracts .... But the 
Chicago-based entrepreneur [ could not] seem to build a relationship with her 
banker. She was rejected recently for a $100,000 line of credit. Under current 
law, the bank wasn't required to explain why ... It has been I I years since the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) made it easier for millions of working 
women to get loans and credit cards by making it illegal for lenders to 
discriminate on the basis of sex. 
Id. But problems persist. Women business owners often complain about rules that 
exempt commercial lending from some of the ECOA's provisions. More importantly, 
the Federal Trade Commission says that individual violations of the ECOA still occur. 
Id. See also Bonnie Souleles, Here's How! Taking Mystery Out of Getting Credit, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, I 985, at 30: 
In spite of laws in recent years making it illegal to discriminate against women 
who are applying for credit, there are still some hurdles to overcome .... 
Today, more than IO years later, ... women are still often discriminated 
against in the credit arena. A married woman in California is entitled to have 
credit in her own name, and because this is a community property state, her 
spouse cannot be required to co-sign. 
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and spousal 10 discrimination because the political will to stop such 
practices does not exit. 
Consumer activists also point out that banks and thrifts continue to 
violate the CRA when they "redline" various communities on the basis 
of race or the geographic location of applicants' neighborhoods.11 
Moreover, activists assert that the Community Reinvestment Act has not 
solved a more egregious development: The nation's top mortgage lenders 
are actually unregulated private firms. 12 Yet, these institutions 
I 0. See Minda Zetlin, The Chilling News About Male Chauvinism, COSMOPOLITAN, 
Sept. 1989, at 266: 
Since 1974, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) has made it illegal for 
banks to discriminate against women customers. But that hasn't always 
stopped them . . . . Until this year, ECOA's enforcement rules did not cover 
commercial credit, which is why banks still routinely ask businesswomen 
seeking loans to have a husband, father---0r any other responsible 
male--<:osign their applications. One woman reported being asked for her 
husband's signature even though she was earning ten times what he was. 
Id.; Susan S. Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and Its Effects, 1981 
WIS. L. REV. 655, 689-90 (1981): 
A post-ECOA survey ... disclosed that ... [o]ne-third of those persons 
surveyed who had been refused credit indicated that they thought age, sex, 
race, national origin, or marital status was involved in the creditor's decision 
to deny them credit. . . . In his 1978 report to Congress ... the Attorney 
General addressed the tendency of creditors to alter credit standards so as to 
grant credit to rejected applicants . . . thereby allowing the underlying 
discrimination to continue. 
Id. See also infra notes 400-22 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., Yi-Hsin Chang, Mortgage Denial Rate for Blacks in '93 Was Double 
the Level for Whites, Asians, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1994, at A2 ("The rate of mortgage 
loan denials to blacks decreased last year, but remained more than twice as high as for 
whites or Asians, a government agency reported."); Peter Pae, Home Equity: The 
Community Reinvestment Act Hasn't Been Much Help to Inner-City Businesses. That 
May Change., WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1993, at Rl4 ("Sixteen years later, most black 
entrepreneurs agree: For them, the law has been pretty much of a dud."); Thomas, 
Persistent Gap: Blacks Can Face a Host of Trying Conditions in Getting Mortgages, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Paulette Thomas, Persistent Gap]: 
According to an extensive government survey of 1991 lending, members of 
most minority groups continue to be much more likely to have their mortgage 
applications rejected than whites of similar income. . . . President-elect 
Clinton's team is calling for improved enforcement of the Community 
Reinvestment Act, which requires banks and savings and loans to lend in all 
areas in which they take deposits. 
Id.; Paulette Thomas, Boston Fed Finds Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Lending is 
Still Widespread, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1992, at A3 ("A ground breaking government 
study found systematic racial discrimination in mortgage lending, even after taking 
account of applicants' credit histories and other lending criteria."). 
12. See Ralph T. King Jr., Skewed Marketing: Some Mortgage Firms Neglect Black 
Areas More Than Banks Do, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1994, at Al: 
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Of the nation's top 100 mortgage lenders in terms of applications, 63 had less 
penetration in largely black areas than they did overall and, in most cases, 
significantly less. . . . The other lenders--banks and thrift institutions, two 
groups subject to fair-lending regulations---had a comparatively good record, 
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regularly discriminate on the basis of geographic location and race.13 
Consequently, mortgage bankers, rather than savings and loans, are 
significantly more likely to undermine the quality of life and the 
economic health of both urban and rural communities. 14 
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the economic health of a 
local economy depends in part on the availability15 and affordability16 
suggesting that they have been unfairly accused of discrimination. But many 
mortgage bankers doing little inner-city lending are banks • and thrifts· 
unregulated subsidiaries. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
13. See Mortgage Banks Said to be Worst in Minority Lending, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
21, 1994, at BIO ("A disproportionately high number of mortgage bankers rank among 
the 52 'worst lenders' to minorities, according to a report by the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition, which includes advocacy groups for low-income minorities."). 
See also Mortgage Bankers in Pact to Spur Minority Lending, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 
1994, at AS: 
The Mortgage Bankers Association reached an accord with the government 
aimed at spurring lending in low-income, minority neighborhoods . 
. . . [T]he agreement is voluntary .... 
. . . [And it] builds on increased fair-lending efforts announced by the 
Mortgage Bankers group a year ago, which some minority-advocacy groups 
saw as an effort to ward off any congressional moves to extend the [Communi-
ty] Reinvestment Act to mortgage-banking firms. 
14. See King, supra note 12, at Al, A6. 
While commercial banks and thrift institutions have been accused ofredlining, 
an analysis of Federal Reserve Board and Census Bureau data ... shows that 
the biggest group of homes lenders---the fast-growing mortgage bankers, which 
don't take deposits as banks and thrifts do--includes many of the institutions 
that have most assiduously avoided black areas. 
Mortgage bankers, although around for decades, mushroomed during the 
S&L debacle and the recent refinancing boom and last year made more than 
half of all home loans. Yet they are barely visible; they get most of their 
business through intermediaries such as real-estate brokers. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
15. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Legislation Targets Insurance Redlining, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 2, 1993, at E3 ("A major impediment to home ownership in central city 
neighborhoods [is] the lack of available property insurance .... "); Albert B. Crenshaw, 
Insurers Face New Claims of Urban Area 'Redlining:• At Hill Hearing. Industry Denies 
A/legations of Bias, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at H3: 
Owning a home is a major investment, the biggest one most people ever 
make. It can be very rewarding, both emotionally and financially. But a 
home is also something that wants protecting, and that means insurance. 
But what if you can't get insurance? 
Well ... you probably couldn't buy the home in the first place, because 
most mortgage lenders require you to have insurance .... 
. . . [I]nsurance plays a key role in the American dream. 
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of commercial-liability, property and casualty, mortgage and 
homeowners' insurance. In recent years, grassroots organizations,17 state 
insurance commissioners,18 and members of Congress19 have accused 
the insurance industry of discriminating against historically, economical-
ly deprived consumers--women,20 unmarried persons,21 inner-city 
16. Cf H. Jane Lehman, Insurance Study Finds Racial Disparity: Group Says 
Urban Blacks Pay More for Coverage than Suburban Whites, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1993, 
at Fl ("Lower-income and minority home buyers in urban settings pay more for 
homeowners insurance, find it harder to obtain a policy and receive substandard coverage 
compared with their more affluent, suburban white counterparts .... "). 
17. Cf Crenshaw, supra note 15, at H3: 
[ A J number of groups and experts have accused the insurance industry of 
writing off entire neighborhoods based on the race and income of the residents. 
This "redlining," they charge, is an important contributor to the decay of many 
inner cities and other predominantly minority areas around the country. 
Residents of these areas cannot get insurance protection for their homes and 
cars, and small businesses cannot get protection for their stores, offices and 
factories, according to the charges. 
Such accusations have surfaced periodically since the I 960s .... [V]arious 
academic and government studies lent credence to [the accusations]. Less 
attention has been paid to the issue recently, but [recently J ... the Association 
of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) rekindled the debate 
with a study of 14 cities that shows that redlining continues. 
18. See, e.g., Stuart Eskenazi, State Accuses Insurers of Redlining, AUSTIN AM.· 
STATESMAN, Aug. 30, 1994, at Bl: 
[A] study by the Office of Public Insurance Counsel, a [Texas] state agency 
representing insurance consumers. concludes that insurers are engaging in 
redlining. 
. . . The Office of Public Insurance defines redlining as any business 
practice that, intentionally or unintentionally, results in certain geographic 
areas being denied access to affordable insurance. The office's use of the 
term goes beyond the ordinary definition of redlining, which means an 
insurance company has denied coverage altogether in a deteriorating 
neighborhood. 
Id. ( emphasis added); Susan Pulliam, State Regulators Plan Drive to Curb Insurer 
Redlining, WALL ST. J., Jun. I 0, 1992, at A5 ("California insurance commissioner .. . 
calls initially for a group of regulators to study insurance in the inner city, where .. . 
redlining, or discriminating against residents of certain areas, is alleged to occur."). 
19. See, e.g., Albert R. Karr, House Panel Clears Antibias Measure Aimed at 
Insurers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1993, at A 7 ("The House Banking Committee voted to 
force insurers to give the federal government data showing who their customers are and 
where they live. The legislation seeks to discourage insurance 'redlining,' or discrimina-
tion against low-income or minority persons .... "); Albert R. Karr, House Panel Clears 
Measure Targeting Bias in Insurance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1993, at A24 ("The House 
Energy and Commerce Committee voted to require insurance companies to report sales 
information an auto and homeowners' policies to help regulators spot possible 
discrimination."). 
20. See, e.g., Albert B. Crenshaw, Maryland Judge Rejects Equal Insurance Rates 
for Sexes: Decision Quashes Regulator's Recent Order on Premiums; Women's Group 
Says it Will Appeal, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1993, at Fl: 
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Martha Davis of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund .... 
. . . said federal law forbids differential pricing based on sex in group 
insurance provided through employers. 
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businesses,22 low socioeconomic applicants,23 racial minorities,24 and 
The issue of "gender-based" rates has attracted widespread attention in 
recent years. Women's groups, such as the National Organization for Women, 
argue that using sex as a criterion for setting insurance prices discriminates 
against women. Although women pay less than men for life and auto 
coverage, that is more than offset by higher premiums for health and disability 
insurance . ... 
Id.; T. R. Reid, Montana Implements Policy of 'Unisex· Insurance, WASH. POST, Oct. 
l, 1985, at Al: 
[In Montana,] insurers may not discriminate on the basis of sex ... in the 
issuance or operation of any type of insurance . . . . It comes after a furious 
struggle pitting state and national women's groups against state and national 
insurance firms .... 
Montana is the first state to establish a unisex insurance requirement across 
the board. . . . [ A ]n insurance company may not charge male and female 
Montanans different rates or pay them different premiums on life, annuity, 
auto, medical or disability policies. 
The unisex insurance issue has been a significant battleground of the 
"feminist revolution" because it involves a clash of fundamental principles. 
The insurance business is based on the "actuarial" method devised by Sir 
Edmund Halley, the mathematician who computed the orbit of the comet that 
bears his name. Under this method, rates and premiums for individual policies 
are based on wide group experience. But feminists argue that a woman 
applying for insurance should be treated as an individual, not as part of a 
larger statistical universe. 
21. See, e.g., Eskenazi, supra note 18, at B 1: 
[The Texas Office of Public Insurance Counsel's] ... reports revealed that 
some insurers consider factors such as age, nationality and marital status 
before deciding to write a policy. 
In May, [Texas] Insurance Commissioner J. Robert Hunter levied a record 
$850,000 fine against Allstate Insurance Group for refusing to offer its choice 
auto insurance policies to urunarried people. 
22. See, e.g., Pulliam, supra note 18, at AS: 
Since the Los Angeles riots ended last month, the insurance industty has 
been under fire for redlining. In the aftermath of the riots, many business 
owners have been left without insurance to cover damage to their businesses. 
Other business owners are finding that their insurance policies provide 
inadequate coverage or subject them to lengthy delays, Mr. Garamendi said. 
23. See, e.g., Albert R. Karr, GEICO is Accused of Discriminating Against Blacks, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1993, at Al 1: 
At yesterday's news conference, Charles Beckwith, a former GEICO sales 
trainer and underwriter, said he got several raises and promotions until he 
began complaining that he had to teach associates "how to discriminate." He 
was then criticized and soon fired .... 
The company's underwriting guidelines ... rank customer prospects by 
occupation, with Group I including architects and scientists. The less-regarded 
Group 5 includes clerks, laborers and truck drivers. Because blacks are more 
likely to fall into Group 5, they're less likely to get GEICO auto policies, 
regardless of driving records .... 
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residents of low-income neighborhoods.25 Specifically, consumer 
advocates assert that the nation's property and casualty companies---like 
commercial and savings banks, thrifts, and private mortgage bank-
ers---have an extended history of "redlining" low socioeconomic and 
heavily minority communities.26 Quite simply, grassroots activists 
24. See, e.g., Albert R. Karr, Complaints That Some Insurers Are Redlining 
Minority Homeowners Get U.S., State Attention, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1994, at A22 
[hereinafter Karr, Complaints]: 
Analyses in Chicago and Milwaukee ... show that race is a determining 
factor in whether applicants get home insurance, says Gregory Squires, an 
urban-studies expert at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee. 
Mr. Squires cites a 1988 directive by a sales manager with American Family 
Insurance Mutual ... to agents with the firm that said, in part, "I think you 
write too many blacks . . . You gotta sell good, solid premium-paying white 
people." A lawyer with American Family says the official was removed from 
his management job after writing the memo, but kept on as an agent. 
Id.; Albert R. Karr, Advocacy Group Accuses Allstate of Bias in Low-Income and 
Minority Markets, WALL Sr. J., Sep. 1, 1993, at A7 [hereinafter Karr, Allstate]: 
Acom said that in a recent stock-offering prospectus, Allstate said that after 
recent rapid market growth, it must reduce business in less-profitable areas, 
which Acom contended means inner cites. The Acom report showed that in 
Minnesota, Allstate's homeowner policies declined 9% in integrated and 
minority zip codes between 1987 and 1993, but rose 11 % in mostly white zip 
codes. 
Id.; Lehman, supra note 16, at FI: 
Lower-income and minority home buyers in urban settings pay more for 
homeowners insurance, find it harder to obtain a policy and receive substan-
dard coverage compared with their more affiuent, suburban white counterparts, 
a study concludes. 
The disparities were uncovered in a two-part survey conducted by the 
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a 
community activist group. 
25. See, e.g., Karr, Allstate, supra note 24, at A 7: 
Testing by ... the Association of Community Organization for Reform 
Now, or Acom, in 14 cities and analysis of Allstate sales offices in 17 cities 
showed the insurer as "blatantly violating fair housing and insurance laws". 
In its new report, Acom said test calls to Allstate agents in 14 cities showed 
"a consistent pattern of discrimination" against low-income and minority 
homeowners .... 
Coverage that was offered was often only for substandard policies, and was 
consistently at much higher rates than those charged in upper-income locations 
In Philadelphia, for instance, no test caller could obtain an Allstate quote on 
any kind of insurance in the city's low-income areas. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
26. See, e.g., Bias Seen In Homeowners' Insurance Rates, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
Feb. 5, 1993, at 2E ("The practice of 'redlining'--by which banks and other mortgage 
lenders designate inner-city neighborhoods as high risk and refuse to grant loans 
there--also appears to be used in the property insurance industry, according to ACORN 
.... "). 
590 
(VOL. 33: 583, 1996] Consumers 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
adopt the view that women,27 low-to-moderate income consumers,28 
singles,29 and racial "[m]inorities face double jeopardy with banks and 
insurance companies . . . . If these consumers cannot insure their 
property, their loan application will be rejected."30 
Expectedly, financial institutions and the insurance industry have their 
defenders and opposing arguments. For example, those supporting 
creditors and lenders maintain that commercial bankers, managers of 
savings and loans as well as private mortgage bankers are neither 
27. See, e.g., H. Jane Lehman, Insurer Not Exempt From Housing Law: High 
Court Lets Stand Ruling on Redlining, WASH. POST, May 22, 1993, at EI, ("[T]he 
insurance industry is fighting the fair housing mantle because the federal law opens the 
door to higher penalties, stiffer accountability in many states and greater liability not 
only for acts of racial discrimination, but also those involving gender, religious 
affiliation, national origin and family composition.") (emphasis added). 
28. See, e.g., Scott Minerbrook, Home Ownership Anchors the Middle Class: But 
Lending Games Sink Many Prospective Owners, EMERGE, October I 993, at 42, 44, 46: 
Buying a home is not only part of the American Dream, it is essential to 
grasping it. But study after study reveals that those in the middle class are 
restricted in their choice of where to live and what to buy. They are treated 
differently by lending and insurance institutions simply because of the color 
of their skin .... 
In general, scholars are finding that these patterns of disparity and limitation 
of economic opportunity can be laid at the doorstep of racial discrimination by 
the real estate, banking and insurance industries .... 
29. Cf David Tuller, Gay, Straight Couples Claim Bias Standing Up for 'Singles' 
Rights, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 1990, at Al, Al2 ("[A] task force convened by the Los 
Angeles city attorney's office documented what it called 'widespread' discrimination 
against singles and unmarried couples in such diverse areas as housing, credit, insurance, 
membership groups and medical services."). 
30. James Rowley, Urban Blacks Seen Facing Homes Insurance Bias, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1993, at 58. See also, Lehman, supra note 27, at El ("Robert Hunter, 
president of the National Insurance Consumer Organization, said the lower court decision 
in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. American 
Family Mutual Insurance Co. is proper. 'No hazard insurance, no mortgage. No 
mortgage, no house. The linkage is clear.' ... "); Jesse Jackson Forms Group to Fight 
Bias by Financial Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1993, at A3: 
The Rainbow Commission for Fairness in the Financial Services Industry 
will press financial firms to invest in urban areas ... and end redlining, the 
practice of discriminating against minorities in the sale of mortgage loans and 
insurance policies .... 
Central to its effort will be a system to rate companies based on standards 
established by the commission. The group will issue the ratings based on 
answers to questionnaires now being sent to banks, brokerage firms, insurance 
companies and pension funds. 
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racist,31 sexist nor class conscious. Instead, defenders assert that lenders 
are prudent business people who are genuinely concerned about the 
"safety and soundness" of financial institutions. 32 
Moreover, representatives of the finance community stressed that 
"[e]veryone who wants or needs credit cannot obtain it . . . . The 
decision to grant or deny credit is usually based on an evaluation of the 
applicant's creditworthiness, a process which generally involves 
evaluating a person's ability and willingness to repay the creditor."33 
Finally, those who defend depository institutions' and mortgage bankers' 
lending and redlining practices remind Americans that "credit is 
available ... as a privilege, not as a legal right."34 
31. See, e.g., Carolyn M. Brown, How to Fight Mortgage Discrimination ... and 
Win!!! African-Americans Join Forces to End Racist Lending Practices, BLACK 
ENTERPRISE, July 1993, at 48, 56-57: 
Conservative theorists dismiss such cases [of discrimination) .... Gary S. 
Becker, the 1992 Nobel Laureate for Economics, wrote in Business Week, 
"The flaw in all studies of discrimination by banks in applications for 
mortgages is that they have not determined the profitability of loans to 
different groups . . . A valid study of discrimination would calculate default 
rates, late payments, interest rates and other determinants of the profitability 
of loans." 
32. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community 
Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 319-20 (1993): 
Advocates of the CRA often claim that depository institutions should not 
object to their obligations under the Act because they can lend to low-income 
and moderate-income neighborhoods and still make a profit. The thesis is that 
the banking industry has failed to recognize the numerous profit opportunities 
available in these communities. Thus, in this view, the CRA is not inconsis-
tent with the safety and soundness of the banking industry because a CRA loan 
is not an unsafe or unsound loan .... 
There is undoubtedly truth to the argument that profitable loan opportunities 
exist in low-income and moderate-income neighborhoods, and that some of 
these loans would not be made if it were not for the CRA .... 
[But it) is quite evident that, despite the occasional profitable CRA loan, the 
general effect of the CRA is to reduce depository institution safety and 
soundness. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
33. Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Specificity 
Requirement: Judgmemal and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 73, 74 
(1980). 
34. Id. at 73. See also Richard A. Givens, The "Antiredlining" Issue: Can Banks 
be Forced to Lend?, 95 BANKING L.J. SIS, 517 (1978): 
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The dangers of the antiredlining movement surface where the pressure to 
stop the practice in the strict sense (restriction of credit based solely on 
geography without regard to creditworthiness) shades into pressure to force 
private lenders and investors to contribute to the rehabilitation of blighted 
areas--to reinvest on the basis of geography even where risk may be 
somewhat greater or return lower. 
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To be sure, representatives of the insurance industry make similar 
arguments. First, the industry's spokespersons assert that insurers do not 
permit any single factor-such as race, gender, marital status, or 
socioeconomic status--to determine whether applicants will be 
insured.35 For instance, "[i]nsurers insist that what may seem like 
discrimination against low-income blacks is no more than cutting loss 
exposure in areas of high theft, vandalism [and] arson .... "36 Or 
stated differently, the decision "to offer a policy [at a certain price is] 
based solely on the perceived risk of the potential policyholder."37 
35. See, e.g., Tim W. Ferguson, Hard-Luck Insurer is Directed to Community 
Chest, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1994, at A23: 
When the California Department of Insurance granted 20th Century 
Industries a minor premium boost for its auto policies .... 
. . . 20th Century was told where it should do part of its investing, 
advertising and philanthropy. This will spread across the nation .... It means 
utility-type scrutiny and obligations for insurance and other financial services. 
On the federal level, the primary vehicle in the Community Reinvestment 
Act for banks. Now there's talk of extending that to securities vehicles that 
are substitute banks, and to insurance .... 
In the 20th Century matter, the lead intervenor was the Economic Empower-
ment Foundation of Oakland and its founder, Selwyn Whitehead. . . . Ms. 
Whitehead, 39 and black, is the consummate advocate . ... 
[She} is skilled in framing financial questions in terms of "institutional 
racism or c/assism " .... 
. . . She argues that inner-city involvement could profit insurers, but they 
should be there anyway. 
This increasingly powe,ful woman and others like her are laying ground-
work in the states, as well as with Congress and the White House, for a new 
day in the financial sector. Those who'd rather not see ii dawn had better join 
the battle. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
36. Karr, Complaints, supra note 24, at A22. "'A reluctance to write policies in 
an area where you know you're going to have losses' is prudent business, not redlining, 
says ... a vice president of ITT Hartford." Id. 
37. Eskenazi, supra note 18, at Bl. A spokesman for the Farmers Insurance group 
stated that "'(i]njecting the issue of race into the sale and purchase of insurance is totally 
inappropriate."' Id. And a regional vice president of the Insurance Information Institute 
added, "'We as a business do not arbitrarily turn down good business' .... 'We try as 
best we can to base our decisions on the level of risk that is posed by a home or 
business or a consumer's driving record."' Id. 
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Insurers and their defenders also vehemently deny that the industry 
practices invidious discrimination on the basis of gender38 or marital 
status.39 They assert that sound actuarial differences exist between men 
and women which create different types of risks; consequently, men and 
women should pay different rates.40 In addition, insurers maintain that 
discrimination on the basis of marital status "is a sound business practice 
justified by statistical data."41 They also declare that state laws allow 
38. See Crenshaw, supra note 20, at F 1: 
A state court judge in Baltimore has thrown out a Maryland regulation 
requiring insurance companies to charge the same rates for men and women . 
. . . Circuit Judge Robert Hammerman .... 
. . . found that Equitable had been able to justify differentiating between 
men and women and he ruled that regulators exceeded their authority in 
requiring equality of rates. 
An Equitable spokesman in New York applauded the decision, saying: "Our 
rates are fair. They are fair to men and to women and they reflect our 
experience." 
Id. See also Susan Schmidt, Maryland Tells Insurer To Stop Setting Rates According to 
Sex, WASH. POST, May I, 1986, at Bl: 
Insurance companies commonly have set different insurance rates for men 
and women. 
[ An attorney for the company] said Equitable had argued that its disability 
rates for women were higher because women file more claims than men. 
Some clerical and other low-paid workers are unable to obtain disability 
insurance because carriers conclude they would be more likely to file claims 
with the intent of getting more money in benefits than they do in wages .... 
Id. But see Reid, supra note 20, at A I: 
Montana initiates a practical test of a major policy goal of the feminist 
movement today when it becomes the first state to implement "unisex" 
insurance legislation requiring that prices and benefits for all forms of 
insurance be the same for men and women .... 
The industry explains that because women, on average, live longer than men, 
insurance companies can invest a woman's premium payments longer and earn 
the same profit from a lower premium. 
Yet, women receive lower monthly payments than men on lifetime annuity 
policies; because the average woman lives longer, the total payout tends to 
equalize. 
39. See, e.g., Donna K. H. Walters, Garamendi Urged to Fight Bias on Marital 
Status, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at DI, D2: 
Insurers commonly refuse to issue joint policies to unmarried couples for 
health, rental and auto coverage. . . . [I]nsurers say that not only is it 
Jegal--at this point--to set different rates and in other ways discriminate 
against unmarried policy buyers, but that it is a sound business practice 
justified by statistical data. 
Not so, insists ... a Los Angeles attorney who headed the working group 
on marital status . . . . Coleman ... says he has been fighting "pervasive" 
discrimination against unmarried people for 20 years, [ and argues] that the 
insurance companies have yet to provide the statistics on which they base 
higher rates for the unmarried or discounts for married persons. 
40. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 20, at Fl. 
41. Walters, supra note 39, at D2. 
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insurance companies to set different rates and discriminate against 
unmarried or single consumers.42 
Assuredly, the debate surrounding redlining and discriminatory access 
to loans, credit, and insurance will continue. But this Article is not 
written to heighten that debate. Even a cursory examination of law 
reviews and journals uncovers an excessive number of articles either 
supporting or condemning lenders'43 and insurers'44 allegedly discrim-
42. Id. 
43. Compare Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic 
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive 
Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1470-72 (1994) (critiquing the relevance of the 
Community Reinvestment and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts and concluding that new 
strategies are required to end financial discrimination) and Richard Marsico, A Guide to 
Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 239 (1993) 
(accepting the view that "'it is time to move beyond debating about whether unequal 
treatment may be taking place to discussing efforts to ensure that minorities have equal 
access to credit."') and Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the labyrinth: A Proposal to 
Simplify Federal Mortgage lending Discrimination laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
527, 560 (1993) ('Trying to eliminate lending discrimination with a piecemeal system 
is not a sensible approach. A single law that amalgamates all prohibitions and 
requirements relating to mortgage-lending discrimination would be immensely simpler 
and more efficient.") and Joan Kane, The Constitutionality of Redlining: The Potential 
for Holding Banks liable as State Actors, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 527, 563 ( 1993) 
(arguing that "[by] holding banks to a constitutional standard of equal protection, the 
process of mortgage lending will change") and Glenn B. Canner et al., Race, Default 
Risk and Mortgage Lending: A Study of the FHA and Conventional Loan Markets, 58 
S. ECON. J. 249,251 (1991) (finding that "after controlling for household and locational 
default risk, ... minority households are somewhat less likely to obtain conventional 
financing than whites") and Stephen A. Fuchs, Discriminatory Lending Practices: Recent 
Developments, Causes and Solutions, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 461, 475 (1991) 
(reporting that "banks use 'a variety of methods in discouraging and disqualifying 
individuals for loans,' including: failure to advertise in black communities, on black 
radio, and in black newspapers") and Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit 
Decisions: The Community Reinvestment Act One Decade later, 18 PAC. L.J. 1071, 1081 
(1987) ("Geographic discrimination takes a wide variety of forms, the most obvious of 
which is outright refusal to consider applications for mortgage loans in particular areas. 
Other forms include imposition of more stringent credit terms for loans in some areas 
than would be required for similar loan elsewhere.") and Page Mailliard & Ken 
Anderson, Women's Banks and Women's Access to Credit: Competition Between 
Marketplace and Regulatory Solutions to Gender Discrimination, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
771 (1987) ("During the 1970's, as more women entered the work force as managers, 
laborers and entrepreneurs, women's credit and financing needs intensified. Yet banks 
and other financial institutions persisted in discriminating against women in extending 
credit.") and John H. Matheson, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: A Functional 
Failure, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371, 373 (1984) ("Credit has become a functional 
substitute for cash in our economy, and consequently credit decisions can greatly 
influence an individual's economic choices.") and Susan S. Blakely, Credit Opportunity 
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for Women: The ECOA and its Effects, 198 I WIS. L. REV. 655, 656 (stressing that 
creditors rationally have engaged in numerous discriminatory acts against women 
applicants) with Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment 
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 295 (1993) (arguing that legitimate 
African-American consumers and the NAACP use the Community Reinvestment Act to 
force banks and other lenders to adopt "hiring quotas" and "charitable giving, ... 
especially gifts that fit within certain 'politically correct' categories") and David E. 
Cohn, The Community Reinvestment Act-Asset or Liability?, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 599, 
619 (1992) ("[T]he mortgage gap between African Americans and whites is alarming 
because home ownership is a principal method of increasing wealth in the United States. 
Consequently, barriers to home ownership as well as to funds for commercial 
development only serve to prevent upward economic mobility for African Americans.") 
and Margaret S. Pfunder, The Legality of Redlining Under Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. 
U. L. REv. 463, 469 (1976) ("Racial discrimination ... does not emerge as the sole 
reason for the problems blacks and other minorities encounter in obtaining conventional 
financing. Economic and business considerations which are difficult to disentangle from 
racial motivations have ... played a role in lending decisions."). 
44. Compare Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race 
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 983 
(1993) (arguing that "[t]he weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that race 
affects whites' discretionary decision making in areas as diverse as hiring and 
performance evaluations in employment settings; mortgage lending, [ and] insurance 
redlining") and Peter Dreier, American's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 
N.C. L. REV. 1351, 1381 (1993) (arguing that "redlining ... by banks and insurance 
companies leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy of urban neighborhood decline.") and Gary 
Williams, "The Wrong Side of the Track": Territorial Rating and the Setting of 
Automobile Liability Insurance Rates in California, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 861 
(1992) ("Territorial rating, as practiced by the insurance industry in California, clearly 
fits the definition of redlining. Insurers refuse to insure residents in low-income and 
predominantly minority areas of the state.") and Gregory D. Squires & William Velez, 
Insurance Redlining and the Transformation of an Urban Metropolis, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 
63 (1987) (reporting that an analysis of the "distribution of homeowners insurance 
policies [revealed that] a strong bias in favor of suburban and white neighborhoods and 
against inner-city and minority communities was found.") and Leah Wortham, The 
Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 4 7 
Omo ST. L.J. 835, 837-38 (1986) (reaffirming the notion that territorial redlining is not 
simply "a neutral, scientific process based on statistical differences") and Anne C. 
Cicero, Strategies for the Elimination of Sex Discrimination in Private Insurance, 20 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 211, 217 (1985) (arguing that "[u]sing sex in underwriting 
often results in sex redlining ... [because] some companies refuse to provide casualty 
insurance to divorced women on the theory that they are unstable or prone to family 
trouble, increasing the likelihood of accidents") and Robert H. Jerry & Kyle B. 
Mansfield, Justifying Unisex Insurance: Another Perspective, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 329, 
367 n.141 (1985) (arguing that "[i]nsurers can circumvent race-neutral rating tables in 
property and liability insurance by 'red-lining"') and Regina Austin, The Insurance 
Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 525-26 (1983) (arguing that insurers 
dump "residents of certain geographic areas" into the public markets because those 
consumers are "not considered desirable risks") and David I. Badain, Insurance 
Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. !, 13-14 
(1980) (arguing that property insurers exclude communities with certain zip codes and 
exclude buildings over 40 years old) and Ruthanne DeWolfe et al., Civil Rights 
Implications of Insurance Redlining, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 318 n.26 ( 1980) and 
Kevin J. Byrne, Comment, Application of Title VIII to Insurance Redlining, 75 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 472 (1980) with Martin J. Katz, Insurance and the Limits of Rational 
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inatory conduct. This Article, however, will attempt to explain how state 
and federal courts have tried to resolve disputes involving redlining, 
unequal access to capital, and insurance discrimination during the period 
between 1950 and 1995. 
As we will see, painstaking analyses of access-to-capital, access-to-
insurance, and redlining debates reveal two incontrovertible conclusions: 
1) Extremely complicated legal issues surround these heated disputes; 
and 2) prolonged media coverage of these contentions will produce a 
"litigation wave. "45 Of course, lenders and insurers will settle many 
claims; but litigants will ask federal and state courts to resolve an 
inordinately large number46 of complaints. In fact, over the past forty-
five years, a fairly large number of consumers have asked courts to 
resolve fair-lending, access-to-insurance, and geographic-redlining 
claims. But aggrieved consumers and their advocates as well as lenders, 
insurers, and their supporters either refuse to accept, fail to appreciate, 
or continue to disregard an unsettling truth: Federal and state courts are 
financially unequipped and overburdened; therefore, they are ineffective 
and impractical arenas for resolving a wave of highly intricate and 
emotionally charged disputes involving mortgage redlining, insurance 
redlining, and discriminatory access to capital and insurance. Quite 
simply, all interested parties should be encouraged to uncover and use 
Discrimination, 8 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 436,437,444 (1990) (arguing that insurance 
redlining is simply "rational discrimination," and that "[to) maximize profits, ... 
insurers will rationally discriminate, charging higher rates for black entrepreneurs than 
for similar white entrepreneurs.") and Christopher P. McCormack, Business Necessity 
in Title VIII: Importing an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing 
Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 597-98 (I 986) ("Many of the justifications for redlining 
are credible. Factors present in the urban environment may objectively put repayment 
and collateral sufficiency at risk."). 
45. Cf Tim W. Ferguson, The Next Lender Litigation Wave: Mortgage Bias, WALL 
ST. J., May 25, 1993, at Al5 ("[The) Justice [Department] last year forced a $1 million 
settlement by Decatur Savings in the Atlanta area for failures to lend to minorities. The 
agency has been quiet since, but the banking world fears a slew of cases are in the 
offing. Also, class-actions filings have commenced.") 
46. See, e.g., Suzanne A. Ryan & John R. Wilke, Banking on Publicity, Mr. Marks 
Got Fleet to Lend Billions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1994, at Al, A5 ("A Georgia class-
action suit with 14,000 plaintiffs alleging predatory lending is scheduled for trial later 
this month.") (emphasis added); "Redlining" Ruling Left Intact, CHI. TR!B., May 17, 
1993, at I ("The Supreme Court Monday let stand a precedent-setting ruling that 
expanded the protections under the federal fair housing law to cover racial discrimination 
in the sale of homeowners ' insurance. . . . The class-action suit alleged that American 
Family Mutual Insurance [Company] engaged in redlining in the Milwaukee area.") 
( emphasis added). 
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forums which are more efficient and less expensive than federal and 
state courts. 
Furthermore, even if courts are able to handle a new wave of 
litigation, evidence reported in this Article reveals that these tribunals are 
still inferior arenas because they are likely to practice race and gender 
discrimination themselves. Or stated differently, state and federal courts 
are likely to allow impermissible and prejudicial factors to influence 
their procedural and substantive rulings. For example, findings reported 
in this paper suggest that courts often permit consumers' race, ethnicity, 
gender, and class status to influence whether procedural questions are 
decided in favor of aggrieved consumers, insurers, or lenders. 
There is more. Many insurance companies sell insurance and make 
loans47 and many regulated lending institutions make loans and sell 
insurance.48 These dual practices, therefore, produce major substantive 
and procedural questions for state and federal courts: Are lenders who 
sell insurance products engaged in the "business of insurance?',49 May 
47. See. e.g., Mitchell Pacelle, Banks and Insurers Step Up Bulk Sales of Soured 
Real-Estate Loans and Assets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1994, at A2 ("[I]nsurance 
companies are now flooding the market with pools of soured real-estate loans and 
properties, trying to take advantage of ... a seller's market."); Delinquencies on 
Mortgages Held by Life Insurers Fell, WALL Sr. J., Sept. 2, 1993, at B8 ("[I]nsurance 
profits continue to be dragged down by soured mortgages. . . . Insurance companies 
hold $206.72 billion of mortgage loans, $12.69 billion of which are delinquent."); Linda 
Parham, Commercial Developers, Seeking New Use for Skills, Tum to Asset Manage-
ment, WASH. Posr, Sept. 14, 1992 at FIO ("[L]ife insurance companies ... made loans 
to Washington area developers with an eye toward long-range investments."). 
48. See, e.g., G. Bruce Knecht & Leslie Scism, State-Chartered Banks in New York 
are Given the Right to Sell Annuities, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 31, I 994, at A2 ("In an 
important victory for banks, New York's highest court gave state-chartered institutions 
the right to sell annuities, one of the insurance industry's fastest-growing products."); 
Jerry Knight, Misplaced Punctuation Didn't Void 1916 Law: Justices Uphold Banks' 
Right to Sell Insurance, WASH. POST, June 8, 1993, at DI: 
Putting a pair of quotation marks in the wrong place in a law is sloppy 
punctuation, but a "simple scrivener's error" doesn't mean a statute letting 
small-town banks sell insurance was accidentally repealed, the Supreme Court 
ruled yesterday. 
Facing the threat that more than I 00 banks that had been selling insurance 
for decades would have to stop, bankers, insurance agents and federal banking 
regulators rushed to the Supreme Court for clarification. 
id.; Joel G. Brenner, Va. Bill Lets Banks, S&Ls Sell insurance; Legislation Must be 
Signed by Wilder, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1991, at Fl ("The Virginia General Assembly 
gave a boon to state-chartered banks, credit unions and savings and loans this week 
when it passed a bitterly contested measure that allows the institutions to sell 
insurance."). 
49. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text. Under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, only state insurance commissioners have authority to regulate 
insurance companies and the "business of insurance." Insurance commissioners also 
have authority to eradicate "insurance redlining" and other forms of insurance 
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state insurance commissioners commence actions against commercial 
banks, savings banks, and thrifts that practice "insurance redlining?" 
And, if regulated lending institutions are engaged in the "business of 
insurance" and are practicing impermissible discrimination, may 
consumers and consumer advocates initiate private actions against 
insurance companies under federal fair housing laws? 
Quite simply, as of this writing, courts are seriously grappling with 
these and other complex questions. More important, both federal and 
state courts' access-to-credit, access-to-insurance, mortgage-redlining, 
and insurance-redlining decisions are despairingly strained, contradictory, 
divisive, and unintelligible. Once again, the purpose of this Article is to 
highlight the severity of these multifarious legal issues and to encourage 
litigants to avoid these tribunals if they cannot settle their disputes. 
Part I presents a brief overview of federal and state fair-lending and 
anti-mortgage "redlining" statutes. Part II briefly reviews federal and 
state statutes that prohibit insurance discrimination and redlining. But an 
exhaustive analysis of both federal and state administrative enforcement 
activities appears in Part III. This latter section stresses that the Federal 
Reserve Board (Fed), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) are authorized to 
enforce federal fair-lending laws. Yet these federal agencies have not 
eliminated nor significantly reduced mortgage redlining and the 
discriminatory access to loans and credit. 
Part III also reports that states' insurance superintendents, finance 
commissioners, and human- and civil-rights commissions are responsible 
for enforcing states' anti-redlining and equal-access-to-credit laws. But 
state agencies and commissions---like their federal counterparts---are not 
effective. Briefly stated, research findings reveal that states have not 
been able to prevent or eradicate either insurance or mortgage redlining. 
Parts IV and V examine judicial enforcement of fair-lending, access-
to-insurance, and redlining laws. Specifically, Part IV discusses the 
discrimination under state insurance law. Generally, private actions are not allowed. On 
the other hand, the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 explicitly prohibits 
"insurance redlining," which is clearly a derivative of the "business of insurance." But 
the latter act permits disgruntled insurance consumers to initiate private suits in federal 
courts to eliminate the practice. Which body of law is superior-----state insurance laws or 
federal fair-housing laws? 
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disposition of cases when federal and state agencies commence anti-
redlining, access-to-capital, and access-to-insurance litigation in federal 
and state courts. And Part V outlines the private enforcement of anti-
redlining and fair-lending laws in federal courts. The reported findings 
in those parts support the basic theme of this Article: Federal and state 
judicial proceedings are truly inferior settings for addressing these types 
of consumers' complaints. 
Finally, Part VI presents a case study of aggrieved consumers who 
sued lenders and insurance companies in federal and state courts between 
1950 and 1995. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE FAIR-LENDING AND 
MORTGAGE-REDLINING STATUTES 
A. Federal Fair-Lending and Mortgage-Redlining Statutes 
1) Title VIII of The Civil Rights Act of 1968 
Generally, Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act50----the "Fair 
Housing Act of 1968"---outlaws housing discrimination. More specifical-
ly, Title VIII prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin."51 Also, the Fair Housing Act forbids discriminatory 
"residential real-estate related transactions";52 and it prohibits discrimi-
50. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 states: "It is the policy of the United States to provide, 
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." Also, 
the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 became effective on March 13, 1989. Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 7(b)(l)(D), 102 Stat. 1619 
(1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1988). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (1988). This section states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes 
engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against 
any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or 
conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin. ( emphasis added). 
Please note: Pub. L. No. 100-430 completely revised 42 U.S.C. § 3605. The revision 
substituted "Discrimination in residential real estate-related transactions" for 
"Discrimination in the .financing of housing" as the section heading. The modification 
also added provisions governing a whole range of residential real estate-related 
transactions, including the making or purchasing of loans, the providing of other 
financial assistance, and the selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property. 
The earlier provisions only concerned the origination of real-estate loans or other 
financial assistance. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1622. 
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natory brokerage services.53 To help achieve the Act's pwpose, an 
aggrieved individual may commence a private action54 in any appropri-
ate United States district court. The Attorney General also may 
commence a civil action to prevent a pattern of discrimination in 
residential real estate-related transactions.55 
It is quite evident that the Fair Housing Act---as enacted in 1965 and 
as amended in 198856---prevents insurance companies as well as 
regulated and unregulated lending institutions from engaging in unfair 
lending practices. On the other hand, whether Title VIII prohibits 
insurers and lenders from "redlining" certain geographical areas is 
unclear.57 Some commentators argue that Title VIII "afford[s] the 
53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b) the term "residential real estate-related transaction" 
means any of the following: "(I) The making or purchasing of loans or providing other 
financial assistance----(A) for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or 
maintaining a dwelling; or (B) secured by residential real estate; [and] (2) The selling, 
brokering, or appraising of residential real property." 
42 U.S.C. § 3605(b) (I 988). 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(])(A) (1988). This section states: 
An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United 
States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the occurrence 
or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice, or the breach 
of a conciliation agreement entered into under this subchapter, whichever 
occurs last, to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory 
housing practice or breach. 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (1988). This part states: 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any 
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to 
the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any 
group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter 
and such denial raises an issue of general public importance, the Attorney 
General may commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district 
court. 
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), amended by Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. I 00-430, § 6(a), I 02 Stat. I 620 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 3605, amended by, Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(c), 102 Stat. 1622 (1988). 
57. See, e.g., Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to Simplify 
Federal Mortgage Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 527, 545-46 
(1993): 
There also is uncertainty as to whether the mortgage insurance decision is a 
"residential real estate-related transaction" within the meaning of the Fair 
Housing Act. Other concepts related to discrimination in housing finance ... 
such as pre-screening, redlining, foreclosure practices, and the effects test, are 
not clearly addressed in the Act. ( emphasis added). 
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logical basis for a suit challenging redlining practices."58 But, as 
reported and discussed in Part V, this latter issue has produced sharp 
divisions among the federal courts of appeals. 
2) The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 does not prevent lenders from 
discriminating on the basis of age and marital status. Therefore, twenty-
one years ago, Congress amended Title VII of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act and established the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 
of 1974.59 Congress enacted ECOA to insure that lending institutions 
offer credit responsibly, fairly, and without regard to an applicant's 
gender or marital status.60 In 1976, Congress expanded ECOA's scope 
of protection to include additional classes of financial consumers.61 
The Act presently states: "It shall be unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate against any applicant . . . on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex[,] . . . marital status, or age . . .. "62 
Furthermore, lenders and creditors cannot discriminate against applicants 
who receive public assistance.63 
Several federal agencies64-including the Federal Trade Commis-
58. Margaret S. Pfunder, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 
25 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 474 (1976); see also James J. Hartnett, Affordable Housing. 
Exclusionary Zoning, and American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide 
Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 131 (1993): 
The Fair Housing Act prohibits both direct discrimination and practices with 
significant discriminatory effects. For example, ... courts have construed the 
phrase "otherwise make unavailable or deny" in subsection [3604](a) to 
encompass mortgage "redlining, " insurance redlining, racial steering, 
exclusionary zoning decisions and other actions by individuals or governmental 
units which directly affect the availability of housing to minorities .... 
Id. at 131 (emphasis added) (quoting South-Suburban Housing Center v. Board of 
Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 882 (7th Cir. 199 J )). 
59. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 169!-1691f (1994)). 
60. Section 502 of Pub. L. No. 93-495 stated: "The Congress finds that there is a 
need to insure that the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the 
extensions of credit exercise their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, 
impartiality, and without discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status .... " 
61. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 
Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994)). 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1619(a)(l) (1994). 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 169l(a)(2) (1994). 
64. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.14(a)(l) (1996), which states in pertinent part: 
[The] administrative enforcement of the Act and this regulation ... is assigned 
to the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Office of Thrift Supervision [acting directly or through the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation], National Credit Union Administration, 
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sion65-are responsible for enforcing the Act administratively. But, "[i]f 
an agency ... is unable to obtain compliance with the act or [the 
regulations], it may refer the matter to the Attorney General of the 
United States.''66 The Attorney General may commence an action to 
secure injunctive relief and damages, if she believes creditors are 
engaged in a pattern of discrimination.67 Additionally, an aggrieved 
consumer may file a civil suit in federal court to recover damages.68 
3) The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 
In 1975, Congress found that "some depository institutions [failed] . 
to provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable 
terms and conditions."69 From congressional members' perspective, 
such neglect "contributed to the [economic] decline of certain geographic 
areas."70 To help address the problem, Congress passed the Home 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Secretary of Agriculture, Farm Credit 
Administration, Securities and Exchange Commission, Small Business 
Administration, and Secretary of Transportation. 
65. See 12 C.F.R § 202.14(a)(2) (1996) ("Except to the extent that administrative 
enforcement is specifically assigned to other authorities, compliance with the 
requirements imposed under the act and this regulation is enforced by the Federal Trade 
Commission."). 
66. 12 C.F.R § 202.14(b)(3) (1996). This part also states: 
[I]fthe Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, or the National Credit Union 
Administration has reason to believe that one or more creditors [are] engaged 
in a pattern or practice of discouraging or denying applications in violation of 
the act or this part, the agency shall refer the matter to the Attorney General. 
Furthermore, the agency may refer a matter to the Attorney General if the 
agency has reason to believe that one or more creditors violated section 701(a) 
of the act. 
67. See 12 C.F.R § 202.14(b)(4) (1996): 
On referral, or whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that one 
or more creditors [are] engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of the act 
or this regulation, the Attorney General may bring a civil action for such relief 
as may be appropriate, including actual and punitive damages and injunctive 
relief. 
68. See 12 C.F.R § 202.14(b)(2) (1996), which states in relevant part: 
[A] civil action under the Act or this regulation may be brought in the 
appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in 
controversy or in any other court of competent jurisdiction within two years 
after the date of the occurrence of the violation, or within one year after the 
commencement of an administrative enforcement proceeding .... 
69. 12 U.S.C. § 280l{a) (1994). 
70. Id. 
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Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).71 HMDA's purpose is simple: To 
generate reliable information, so that consumers and federal officials can 
determine whether federally insured lenders72 are serving the credit 
needs of communities in which they are doing business.73 The 
regulations require lenders to collect a variety of socioeconomic 
data-including applicants' race, national origin, gender, and in-
come74-and forward the information to appropriate agencies. 75 
Unlike the Fair Housing Act or ECOA, the Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act is exceedingly short-less than ten sentences. More important, 
HMDA (1) does not create any new rights for loan and credit applicants; 
(2) does not expand any "access-to-capital" rights, like those outlined in 
the Fair Housing Act and ECOA; and (3) does not allow aggrieved 
consumers or the Attorney General to commence any judicial or 
administrative actions. Yet, in recent years, HMDA-generated data have 
produced much controversy and virulent racial enmity.76 Furthermore, 
71. Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 303, 89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2801--281 I (1994)). 
72. 12 C.F.R. § 203.l(c) (1996) states: 
This regulation applies to certain financial institutions, including banks, saving 
associations, credit unions, and other mortgage lending institutions, as defined 
in§ 203.2(e). It requires an institution to report data to its supervisory agency 
about home purchase and home improvement loans it originates or purchases, 
or for which it receives applications; and to disclose certain data to the public. 
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 280I(b) (1994): It states in pertinent part: "The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide the citizens and public officials of the United States with sufficient 
information to enable them to determine whether depository institutions are filling their 
obligations to serve the housing needs of the communities and neighborhoods in which 
they are located .... ". 
74. 12 C.F.R. § 203(App. A)(IV)(A)(3) (1996) (The appropriate language states: 
"For all of these loans and applications, report the race or national origin, sex, and 
income information, unless your institution is a bank, savings association, or credit union 
with assets of $30 million or less on the preceding December 31. "). 
75. 12 C.F.R. § 203.l(a) (1996) ("This regulation is issued by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System .... "). See also Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, Press Release, available in WESTLAW, Magsplus Database, 1994 
WL 586637 (F.F.I.E.C., Oct. 26, 1994): 
The reports reflect lending activity for approximately 9,650 institutions 
covered by . . . [HMDA) that reported data to member agencies of the 
FFIEC--the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, National Credit Union Administra-
tion, and Federal Reserve System-and to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. 
76. Compare Letters to the Editor: The Black and White Facts of Redlining, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at Al3 (noting that HMDA data revealed that "[m]ore than 95%" 
of Chevy Chase Savings' loans "came from white areas" and asserting that the word 
"'quota' ... is a derisive and divisive term that ... is used to ... discredit civil-rights 
enforcement") (Comments of Assistant Attorney General Deval L. Patrick, Department 
of Justice's Civil Rights Division) with Toward Quota Loans?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 
1994, at Al4 (attacking the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act's "racial paperwork," 
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fairly recent releases of HMDA data have helped to increase the 
"number of mortgage loans extended to blacks and Hispanics."77 On 
the other hand, HMDA's loan-denials and redlining disclosures are 
causing an increasing number of disgruntled consumers to file redlining 
and equal-access-to-credit suits in state and federal courts.78 
4) The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 
In 1977, Congress ratified the Community Reinvestment Act 
( CRA ), 79 after finding that 1) federal law requires "regulated financial 
institutions ... to demonstrate that their deposit facilities [ are serving] 
the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are 
chartered to do business;"80 and 2) federal law compels lenders to act 
affirmatively and "help meet the credit needs of the local communities 
in which they are chartered."81 Although the CRA encourages regulat-
ed financial institutions "to help meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered,"82 it has a proviso: Regulated 
institutions' efforts and lending practices must be "safe and sound."83 
In several ways, the Community Reinvestment Act resembles HMDA: 
The CRA is fairly short and does not create additional rights for 
financial consumers. Moreover, it does not enlarge the Fair Housing 
Act's or the ECOA's fair-lending privileges and does not permit a 
private right of action.84 But, unlike HMDA, the CRA has an adminis-
"Justice Department's Janet Reno and Lani Guinier alternate, Deval Patrick") and 
Jonathan R. Macey, Banking By Quota, WALL Sr. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al4 (criticizing 
HMDA data and the Justice Department's '"unprecedented' lending discrimination case 
against Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank of Chevy Chase, Md."). 
77. Albert R. Karr, Minority Mortgage Loans Rose in 1993, But Denial Rate 
Topped that for Whites, WALL Sr. J., Oct. 27, 1994, at A2. 
78. See generally Holly Bass, Chevy Chase Federal Reaches $11 Million Pact: 
Accord Settles U.S. Charges that S&L Didn't Offer Mortgages to Blacks, WALL Sr. J., 
Aug. 23, 1994, at A2; Fleet Financial Group Unit Settles Lending-Bias Suit, WALL Sr. 
J., Mar. 17, 1994, at A7; Joe Davidson, Two Banks Set Pacts to Settle Bias Charges, 
WALL Sr. J., Jan. 2 I, 1994, at A4; and Tim W. Ferguson, The Next Lender Litigation 
Wave: Mortgage Bias, WALL Sr. J., May 25, 1993, at Al5. 
79. 12 u.s.c. §§ 2901-2907 (1994). 
80. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(l) (1994). 
81. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (1994). 
82. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994). 
83. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994). 
84. See, e.g., Harambee Uhuru School, Inc. v. Kemp, 1992 WL 274545, at *4 
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1992). 
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trative enforcement section.BS Four federal supervisory agen-
ciesB6----the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, or the Office of Thrift Supervision-must examine financial 
records to determine whether lenders are "meeting the credit needs of the 
entire community, including low-and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods."B7 To achieve compliance, the Federal Reserve Board may deny 
a variety of expansion applications------e.g., acquisitions, branch openings, 
mergers, and relocations.BB 
B. State Statutes: Mortgage Discrimination, Financial Redlining and 
Equal Access to Credit and Loans 
A majority of states have passed either an anti-mortgage discrimina-
tion, an anti-financial redlining, or a fair-lending statute. Specifically, 
twenty-threeB9 states have adopted the "residential-real-estate-related-
transaction" language appearing in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Acts 
of 1968 and outlawed racially motivated mortgage loans. Florida's anti-
mortgage discrimination statute fairly represents this group. It reads in 
pertinent part: 
It is unlawful for any person or entity whose business includes engaging in 
residential real estate related transactions to discriminate against any person in 
the granting of any mortgage loan or in making available such a transaction, or 
85. See 12 U.S.C. § 290l(b) (1994) (The relevant part states: "(E]ach appropriate 
Federal financial supervisory agency [must] use its authority when examining financial 
institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local 
communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation 
of such institutions."). 
86. See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(l)(A)-(D) (1994). 
87. Hararnbee Uhurn School. Inc., 1992 WL 274545, at *4. 
88. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 228.1 (1996). 
89. The "residential real estate related transactions" language appears in the 
following state statutes: ALA. CODE § 24-8-6(a)(b) (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 41-1491.20(A)(B) (1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-502(l)(g) (West 1995); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.25(1)(2) (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9.5-5-6(a)(l)(2) 
(West 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.8(A)(3)(a)(b) (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 44-1017(a)(b) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2607(A)(B) (West 1991); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(3)(A)(B) (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 37.2-504(l)(a)(West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 49-2-305(7)(a)(b)(l994); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 20-320 (1)(2) (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 41A-4(a)(l)(2) (1995); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 25, § 1452 (A)(l7)(a)(b) (West 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(8)(i) 
(1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-5.4(A)(B) (1956); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 31-2!-60(A)(B) 
(Law Co-op. 1995); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-21-606(a)(b) (1995); TEX. PROP. CODE 
ANN. § 301.026 (a)(b) (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-6(l)(a)(b) (1995); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 121 l(a)(6) (1995); VA. CODE ANN.§ 36-96.4(A)(B) (Michie 1992); 
W. VA. CODE§ 5-l lA-6(a)(b) (1995). 
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in the terms or conditions of such a loan or transaction, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, [or] sexual orientation .... 90 
In addition, at least thirteen91 states have enacted statutes that 
prohibit banking and other financial institutions from discriminating 
solely on the basis of geographic location. However, the scope of 
consumers' protection under these statutes is mixed. Depending upon the 
state, the protection can be extremely narrow or very broad. For 
example, New York's banking statute is fairly narrow. The applicable 
section states: "No banking institution ... shall refuse to make a prudent 
loan upon the security of real property or otherwise discriminate ... 
because of the geographic location of such property if such property is 
located within the geographic area ordinarily serviced by such bank . 
,,92 
On the other hand, the scope of protection under California's and 
Massachusetts' anti-financial redlining statutes is substantially broader. 
In California, a financial institution may not consider the "conditions, 
characteristics, or trends in [a] neighborhood or geographic area" 
unless the lender demonstrates "that consideration of these conditions in 
the particular case is required to avoid an unsafe and unsound business 
practice."93 Similarly, in Massachusetts, financial institutions may not 
deny loans solely upon the basis that a ''property is located in a specific 
neighborhood or geographical area."94 Instead, lenders must show that 
their lending decisions are based upon "a reasonable analysis of the 
lending risks associated with a residential mortgage transaction."95 
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the distinction between a 
"neighborhood" and a "geographical area" is legally significant. As 
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.25(2)(a)(b) (West 1995). 
91. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 23-32-1804(4)(C)(D)(E) (Michie 1995); CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 35810 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-52c(a) (West 
1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 205, para. 635/3.8(a)(ii) {Smith-Hurd 1995); [LL. ANN. STAT. 
ch. 775, para. 5/4-102(D) (Smith-Hurd 1995); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 12C.6A(l), (4)(e) 
(West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167, § 14 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 183, § 14 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 108.470 (Vernon 1995); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 17:16F-1 (West 1995); N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 9-f{l) (McKinney 1995); Omo 
REV. CODE ANN. § 111 l.03(C) (Anderson 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1055(3)(1) 
(1995); VJ. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 68(a)(5) (I 995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 30.60.010(1) (West 1995). 
92. N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 9-f{l) (McKinney 1995) (emphasis added). 
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 35810(a) (West 1995) (emphasis added). 
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 64 (West 1995) (emphasis added). 
95. Id. 
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reported in Part VI, state courts are less likely to rule against lenders 
who allegedly redlined a large geographical area. Lenders, however, are 
more likely to be liable if they deny loans simply because applicants live 
in a particular lower-, middle- or upper-income neighborhood.96 
To insure that lending institutions offer credit and loans without regard 
to consumers' immutable characteristics and other extralegal factors, 
fifteen97 states have enacted statutes which are either equivalent or 
substantially equivalent to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974. 
Louisiana's,98 Maryland's,99 Nevada's,100 and Virginia's101 Equal 
Credit Opportunity Acts are equivalent to the federal ECOA; therefore, 
under these acts, lenders may not deny credit or loans solely on the basis 
of a consumer's race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or marital 
status. Finally, eight102 states also have passed human- and civil-rights 
96. See discussion of Table 4 infra Part VI. 
97. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-87-104 (Michie I 995) ( outlawing gender and 
marital-status discrimination); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-109 (West 1995) 
(outlawing race, gender and marital-status discrimination); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6-l(a) 
(Michie 1995) (outlawing race, gender and marital-status discrimination); HAW. REV. 
STAT.§ 477E-3(a)(b) (1991) (outlawing marital-status discrimination); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:3583 (West 1995) (outlawing race, gender and marital-status discrimination); 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. II§ 12-305(a) (1990) (outlawing race, gender and madtal-
status discrimination); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.147a(I) (West 1995) (outlawing 
race, gender and marital-status discrimination); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 207.310(1)(2) (1994) 
( outlawing race, gender and marital-status discrimination); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-180( d) 
(1995) (outlawing race, gender and marital-status discrimination); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14A, § 1-109(1) (1995) (outlawing gender and marital-status discrimination); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 34-37-4.3 (1995) (outlawing race, gender and marital-status discrimination); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-802(a) (1995) (outlawing gender and marital-status 
discrimination); VA. CODE ANN.§ 59.1-21.21:1 (Michie 1992) (outlawing race, gender 
and marital-status discrimination); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 121 l(a) (1995) (outlawing 
race, gender and marital-status discrimination); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1302(2) (1995) 
(outlawing gender and marital-status discriminatio~redit cards); and, WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 138.20(1) (West 1995) (outlawing gender and marital-status discrimination). 
98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:3583 (West 1991). 
99. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. II§ 12-704 (1990 & Supp. 1995). 
IOO. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598b (Michie 1994). 
IOI. VA. CODE ANN.§ 59.1-21.21:l(a)(I) (1992). 
102. See ALASKA STAT.§ 18.56.096(a) (1994) ("Human Rights "-----0utlawing on the 
basis of race, gender and familial status discriminatory loans and financial assistance); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (West 1995) ("Human Rights"-----0utlawing on the 
basis of race and gender discriminatory mortgage loans); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.045 
(Vernon 1995) ( "Human Rights "-----0utlawing on the basis of race and gender 
discriminatory commercial real-estate loans and other financial assistance); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 10:5-12(i)(1)(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) ("Civil Rights"-----0utlawing on the 
basis of race, gender and marital status discriminatory loans, credit and financial 
assistance); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-13 (1991 & Supp. 1995) ("Discrimina-
tion "---0utlawing on the basis of race, gender and marital status discriminatory mortgage 
loans and financial assistance); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.02(H)(3) (Baldwin 1995) 
( "Civil Rights "---0utlawing on the basis of race and gender discriminatory mortgage 
loans and financial assistance); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033(2)(A) (Supp. 1994) ("Civil 
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legislation to prevent lenders and creditors from discriminating on the 
basis of race, gender, and marital status. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL INSURANCE LAW AND OF 
STATES' INSURANCE-DISCRIMINATION AND INSURANCE-REDLINING 
STATUTES 
A. The Role of State Insurance Commissioners and Federal Agencies 
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 
Responding to a national crisis in the insurance industry,103 Congress 
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945.104 Stated in the simplest 
terms, the Act allocates the power to regulate the "business of insurance" 
among the states and the federal government. Assuredly, the Act grants 
the greatest amount of regulatory authority to state insurance commis-
sioners and superintendents; 105 however, under some very limited 
circumstances, the McCarran Act allows the Federal Trade Commis-
sion106 to regulate the "business of insurance." Also, some federal 
Rights "----0utlawing on the basis of race, gender and marital status discriminatory 
mortgage loans and financial assistance); and, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-21 
( 1995) ( "Human Rights "----0utlawing on the basis of race and gender discriminatory 
mortgage loans and financial assistance.) 
I 03. See Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance 
Industry: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to 
Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration and Insolvency Statutes With the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 1941-1992, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399, 401 (1994) [hereinafter Rice, 
Federal Courts and the Insurance Industry]. 
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ IOI 1-1015 (1994). 
I 05. The Act's Declaration of Policy states: 
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several 
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on 
the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the 
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States. 
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994) (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1994) ("The 
business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of 
the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business."). 
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b), the "Federal regulation" section. It states: 
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede 
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and 
the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the 
Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as 
609 
courts recently examined the Act and permitted other federal agencies to 
regulate insurance activities within and across states' boundaries. 107 
There is, however, a compelling question: Does the McCarran-
Ferguson Act prevent national and regional insurance companies from 
redlining communities and discriminating on the basis of race, gender 
and marital status? Regrettably, the answer is "no." Although the 
McCarran Act is a federal insurance statute, it neither encourages, 
discourages nor addresses insurance redlining and discrimination. But, 
there is more. In recent years, a few federal courts reviewed the 
McCarran Act and decided that consumers may attack insurance 
redlining and discrimination by invoking the federal Fair Housing Act 
of 1968.ws The courts reached that conclusion notwithstanding the 
Act's clear language: Congress shall not enact any laws that "invalidate, 
impair or supersede"109 states' insurance laws. 
More important, some congressional members have introduced three 
bills 110 to help eradicate insurance redlining and discrimination. As of 
this writing, those federal bills have not been enacted.111 On the other 
hand, many states have enacted statutes to combat the discriminatory 
access to mortgage insurance and insurance redlining. Brief discussions 
of those statutes appear below. 
amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that 
such business is not regulated by State law. 
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). 
107. See Rice, Federal Courts and the Insurance Industry, supra note 103, at 413 
nn.51-52. 
I 08. See infra notes 383-97 and accompanying text. 
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). 
I 10. See Karr, Complaints, supra note 24, at A22 ("Complaints about insurance 
redlining are getting an increasingly sympathetic hearing in Washington and in state 
capitals across the nation. Congress is currently considering three bills that would require 
insurers to disclose new information on their policies so federal and state governments 
could better determine whether systematic redlining is occurring."). See also The 
Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 1993. H.R. 1257, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 
The Anti-Redlining in Insurance Disclosure Act of 1993, H.R. 1188, 103rd Cong., I st 
Sess. ( 1993). 
111. See Albert R. Karr, House Passes Weaker of Two Measures Seeking Data on 
Possible Bias by Insurers, WALL ST. J., July 21, I 994, at A2 ("The House voted to 
require homeowner and auto insurance companies to provide information that could be 
used to show any discriminatory 'redlining' against minorities, but rejected a stronger 
bill."). 
610 
[VOL. 33: 583, 1996] Consumers 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
B. States' Anti-Discrimination Statutes and the Availability of 
Mortgage-Guaranty and Private-Mortgage Insurance 
Simply put, mortgage guaranty112 or private mortgage insurance113 
protects the lender, not the borrower. "It guarantees that, in a default, 
lenders will be paid some portion of the loan balance--typically from 
17%-25%."114 The majority of lending institutions, therefore, force 
borrowers to purchase private mortgage insurance. Furthermore, it is 
exceedingly clear that a strong relationship exists between a borrower's 
ability to secure a mortgage loan and the borrower's access to affordable 
mortgage insurance. As Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit 
correctly observed: "No insurance, no loan; no loan, no house."115 
Of course, securing mortgage insurance is not a problem for most 
prospective homeowners. Recent statistics reveal that private mortgage 
insurers sell this product to millions of consumers and make large 
profits. 116 But, statistical evidence also discloses another disparaging 
truth: Insurers frequently refuse to sell mortgage insurance to a 
disproportionately high percentage of minority and low-income 
consumers. 117 In fact, regardless of where middle- and working-class 
112. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN.§ 21.50(\)(a)(l) (West 1995) ("'Mortgage 
guaranty insurance' means [i]nsurance against financial loss by reason of nonpayment 
of principal, interest and other sums agreed to be paid under the terms of any note or 
bond or other evidence of indebtedness .... "). 
113. See Harlan S. Byrne, MGIC Investment: Not Running Scared, BARRON'S, Mar. 
28, 1994, at 16 ("Private insurance on conventional (non-government-guaranteed) 
mortgages comes into play when buyers want to put down less than 20% of a home's 
price. In such instances, lenders usually require the purchase of mortgage insurance."). 
114. Id. 
115. See NAACP v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287,297 (7th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2335 (1993). Of course, there are other examples of 
situations where consumers must secure insurance before they can consummate other 
real-estate related transactions. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 
374 F. Supp. 564, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("It is a matter of common knowledge and 
experience that in the usual situation, title insurance is indispensable to the occurrence 
of the real estate sale: a seller would be unable to sell his property as its reasonable 
value if no title company was willing to insure title.") (emphasis added). 
116. See Byrne, supra note I I 3, at I 6 ("[Private mortgage insurance) in force, or 
book of new business as it's also called, has climbed sharply the past five years. At year-
end 1993, it totaled almost $86 billion, versus $47 billion in 1988. In [1993) alone, 
insurance in force rose by a hefty $14.6 billion."). 
117. See, e.g., Thomas, Persistent Gap, supra note 11, at AS ('"PM! is a big-time 
pain,' says Antonio Stringfield, a black real-estate agent who works in predominately 
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minorities decide to build or purchase a home, private mortgage 
"insurance is either unavailable or extremely difficult to obtain."118 
Disgruntled consumers and others assert that mortgage insurers 
discriminate against certain socioeconomic classes and ethnic groups 
because insurers are culturally biased. 119 Representatives of the 
insurance industry disagree. They argue that legitimate business and 
actuarial factors affect consumers' differential access to affordable 
private mortgage insurance. 120 
Unquestionably, this cultural-bias debate will continue into the near 
future. But presently, only three states have anti-discrimination statutes 
which are designed to prevent ethnic and cultural prejudice from 
influencing the availability and affordability of private mortgage 
insurance. The laws of Arizona, Kansas, and Texas are similar: An 
insurer may not discriminate in the issuance or extension of property or 
mortgage guaranty insurance on the basis of race, national origin, color, 
gender, creed, or marital status. 121 
minority neighborhoods in Los Angeles. He steers most clients to Great Western 
Financial, which lends heavily in minority neighborhoods but doesn't require private 
mortgage insurance .... "); Bias Seen in Homeowners' Insurance Rates, supra note 26, 
at 2E ("ACORN's analysis of data from Chicago, St. Louis, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. 
Paul and Kansas City, Mo., showed disparities--sometimes wide ones--between the 
insurance coverage for minority and white neighborhoods with comparable median 
incomes. It used state regulatory data on insured homes and census data on incomes.") 
( emphasis added). 
118. See James D. Williams, "Catch-22" Insurance Practices, 100 THE CRISIS 28 
(I 993). Cf Bias Seen In Homeowners' Insurance Rates, supra note 26, at 2E ("Low-
income homeowners in Detroit, ACORN found, pay roughly $35 per $1,000 of coverage 
compared with $4 per $1,000 coverage in suburbs such as Farmington Hills or West 
Bloomfield Township."). 
119. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Hamey, Rules for low-Income Borrowers Relaxed, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at K4: 
Kurt Arehart, vice president for affordable housing of General Electric 
Mortgage Insurance . . . [ observed that] underwriters [are] unfamiliar with 
cultures other than middle-class, white American . 
. . . [They] apply their own cultural biases [to applications]. ... 
But GE's research and statistical data from insuring $1.7 billion worth of 
loans to low-income home buyers-often ethnic or racial minority group 
members--suggest that such preconceptions by underwriters frequently are 
wrong. 
120. Cf Bias Seen in Homeowners' Insurance Rates, supra note 26, at 2E ("'There 
is nothing inherently evil in the fact that insurance prices vary . . . , ' said Marc 
Rosenberg, the ... [Insurance Information Institute's] vice president. 'The cost of 
insurance is supposed to reflect a number of factors such as theft, vandalism, arson, the 
quality of fire service."'). See also Thomas, Persistent Gap, supra note 11, at AS 
("Private mortgage insurers tend to be fussy about the neighborhoods where they will 
put their stamp of approval. If a home buyer is seeking a mortgage in a neighborhood 
deemed to have 'declining values,' for example, it's trouble."). 
121. See ARlZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1548(B) (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-3510(a) (1993); and TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.50(1)(a)(I) (1995). 
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C. The Geographic Location of Consumers' Property and the 
Enforcement of States' Anti-Insurance Redlining Statutes 
As stated earlier, consumers often claim that some insurance compa-
nies systematically redline122 certain geographic areas. In particular, 
urban consumers assert that insurers refuse to sell mortgage or property 
insurance to any person residing in blighted neighborhoods; or compa-
nies refuse to sell affordable insurance to any resident who resides in 
specific zip codes. 123 Consequently, in recent years, consumer advo-
cates have asked state legislatures to answer a fundamental question: 
May mortgage or property insurers discriminate against home buyers or 
homeowners if consumers live or own property in "undesirable" zip 
codes? 
As of this presentation, the majority of states have not settled this 
question satisfactorily. 124 On the other hand, legislators in fourteen 
states and the District of Columbia have spoken more decidedly. The 
results among these latter jurisdictions, however, are mixed. Only the 
122. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
123. See, e.g .. Eskenazi, supra note 18, at Bl: 
[A] report compared the number of homeowners' policies with the number of 
owner-occupied homes in each ZIP code in six Texas cities, including Austin . 
. . . In Austin, the greater the minority population of a ZIP code, the less likely 
that an owner-occupied home in that ZIP code will be covered by standard 
homeowners' insurance . ... 
Id,; Karr, Complaints, supra note 24, at A22 ("[I]n Kansas City, a five-year study by the 
insurance department showed that 59% of the policies sold in postal Zip Code areas with 
mostly low-income minority residents offer[ ed] only limited coverage."). 
124. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Insurers Face New Claims of Urban Area 'Redlining' 
at Hill Hearing, Industry Denies Allegations of Bias, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at H3 
("The insurance industry hotly denies that it redlines ... , In the meantime, however, 
homeowners who cannot get insurance have little recourse beyond the FAIR 
plan--which stands for Fair Access to Insurance Requirements-----which is available in 
29 states, including Maryland[,] . . . Virginia, [ and] the District."). See also Karr, 
Complaints, supra note 24, at A22: 
Insurers note that people who don't qualify for regular policies can usually 
buy a policy in so-called 'FAIR' plans-----industry pools for high-risk insurance 
that many states require the companies to fund. But these policies are sharply 
limited in coverage and usually cost three to four times more than ordinary 
[property or mongage] policies. 
Id. (emphasis added); Pulliam, supra note 18, at A5 ("Currently, various regulations ban 
redlining . . . . [R]oughly one-half of all states have pools, called 'fair plans,' that offer 
property insurance to inner-city residents .... [However,] existing rules have not been 
effective ... , ") ( emphasis added). 
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District of Columbia allows property carriers to practice geographic 
discrimination or insurance redlining. In Firemen s Insurance Co. of 
Washington, D.C. v. Washington, 125 the Federal Court of Appeals cited 
federal law and held that property insurers may discriminate on the basis 
of geographic location in the District of Columbia. The Federal Circuit 
observed that Congress wanted to "assure the availability of basic 
property insurance" in the District.126 Therefore, to achieve this goal, 
insurers could adopt a FAIR Plan127--an "equitable apportionment" 
scheme--and sell insurance only to persons residing in specific 
neighborhoods or geographical areas .128 
Significantly, Georgia129 and Ohio130 also have adopted FAIR 
Plans. But Georgia, Ohio, and Connecticut have refused to import the 
District of Columbia's rule. In these latter jurisdictions the standard is 
clear: Without exception, insurers may not redline certain neighborhoods 
or discriminate solely on the basis of the geographic location of 
125. 483 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2533 (1995) 
("Sale of motor vehicle insurance: It is unlawful discriminatory practice for an insurer 
authorized to sell motor vehicle insurance in the District of Columbia to ... [ discrimi-
nate on the basis of] geographical area [within] the District of Columbia .... "). 
126. Firemen's Insurance, 483 F.2d at 1330. To eliminate the practice of insurance 
redlining 
Congress enacted the District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act to provide 
the FAIR plan for the District. The purposes of the Placement Act ... [are] 
to assure the availability of basic property insurance; ... and ... to provide 
for the equitable distribution among insurers of the responsibility for insuring 
qualified property in the District of Columbia . . . . All District insurers 
participate in FAIR [a fair access to insurance requirements plan] .... 
Id. at 1330-3 l. 
l 27. See Insurance Called Bad Bargain for Poor, Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 
1994, at G3: 
Good property insurance is more expensive, harder to find and harder to 
keep in areas with high minority populations and low incomes .... 
. . . [L]ow-quality policies known as "FAIR" [fair access to insurance 
requirements] plans account for 2.9 percent of policies in low-minority and 
high-income zip codes, but 18.2 percent of policies in high-minority, 
low-income [z]ip codes. FAIR plans, which cost more and cover less, are 
policies of last resort for homeowners who are otherwise unable to obtain 
insurance. ( emphasis added). 
128. Firemen's Insurance, 483 F.2d at 1331. 
129. GA. CODE ANN.§ 33-33-1 (1995) ("All insurers licensed to write and writing 
property insurance in this state on a direct basis are authorized, subject to approval and 
regulation by the Commissioner, to establish and maintain a Fair Access to Insurance 
Requirements (FAIR) Plan .... "). 
130. Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3929.41(E)(F) (Anderson 1995) ("The purpose of 
this statute is to [p ]rovide for the equitable distribution among authorized insurers of the 
responsibility for insuring eligible property, for which basic property insurance cannot 
be obtained through the normal insurance market . . . [and to] [a]uthorize the 
establishment of a fair plan (fair access to insurance requirements) .... ") (emphasis 
added). 
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homeowners' property. 131 Similarly, eleven other jurisdictionsm have 
decided that insurers may not discriminate solely on the basis of the 
geographic location of risks and consumers' property. But these latter 
states also have inserted extremely controversial and ambiguous 
restrictions into their statutes. In each state, insurers may redline various 
geographic areas to achieve a "business purpose,''133 to preserve "the 
solvency of the insurer,"134 or to satisfy "sound underwriting or 
actuarial principles."135 
Again, we ask: May the nation's mortgage and property insurers 
redline communities or discriminate on the basis of geographic location? 
Unfortunately, the answer is "yes." In the majority of states, legislatures 
allow mortgage and property insurers to discriminate against certain 
131. See CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 38a-824 (1995) ("[T]he insurance commissioner shall 
adopt regulations ... to ensure the availability of insurance on real property in the state 
by prohibiting unfair discrimination in the availability or sale of such insurance on the 
basis of location, age or disparity between replacement cost and market value of such 
property."); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-4(b)(8)(A)(iii) (1995) ("(It is unlawful to] permit(] 
any unfair discrimination in the issuance, renewal, or cancellation of any ... insurance 
against direct loss to residential property ... when the discrimination is based solely 
upon the ... geographical location of the property .... "); Omo REV. CooE ANN. 
§ 41 l2.02(H)(4) (Anderson 1995): 
It shall be unlawful .. . 
(f]or any person to .. . 
(d]iscriminate against any person in the terms or conditions of selling ... 
any housing accommodations or in furnishing ... services, or privileges in 
connection with the ownership ... of any housing accommodations, including 
the sale of fire, extended coverage, or homeowners insurance, ... because of 
the racial composition of the neighborhood in which the housing accommoda• 
tions are located .... 
132. See infra notes 132-34. 
133. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 23-66-206(7)(C)(i) (Michie 1995) (outlawing insurance 
redlining or geographic discrimination, unless there is "a business purpose which is not 
a mere pretext for unfair discrimination"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:13-103(a)(7)(c) 
(1993) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/155.22 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (same); Mo. 
ANN. STAT. § 375.936 (I l)(c)(i) (Vernon 1991) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-
210(5) (1995) (same); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 44-1525(7)(c) (1993) (same); R.l. GEN. LAWS 
§ 27-29-4(7)(iii) (1994) (same); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2l.21(4)(7)(c) (West 1990) 
(same); and, VA. CODE ANN.§ 38.2-508(4) (Michie 1994) (same). 
134. See N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 58-63-15(7)c (1995)(outlawing geographic discrimina-
tion "unless ... (t]he refusal ... is for the purpose of preserving the solvency of the 
insurer and is not a mere pretext for unfair discrimination."). 
135. See IND. CODE ANN.§ 27-2-l 7-5(b)(2)(West !995)("This subsection does not 
preclude an insurer from refusing to issue or renew or from canceling a policy based on 
sound underwriting or actuarial principles reasonably related to actual or anticipated loss 
experience or any other sound business purpose."). 
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communities if insurers' redlining activities are ostensibly "actuarially 
sound." But a policy which continues to permit insurers to define 
"actuarially sound" underwriting is likely to generate consumers' outrage 
and undermine states' regulatory authority. As we have discovered, many 
alleged victims of redlining and consumer advocates do not trust 
insurers' judgments. 136 Consequently, advocates and consumers are 
likely to initiate a multitude oflawsuits and ask state courts to determine 
whether insurers' actuarial and business decisions are truly sound. 137 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS: 
FINANCIAL-REDLINING, INSURANCE-REDLINING AND FAIR-LENDING 
STATUTES 
It is important to reiterate that several federal agencies--the Fed, 
OCC, FDIC, FTC, HUD and OTS--are principally responsible for 
enforcing federal fair-lending laws and eradicating all sorts of financial 
redlining. In most states, these responsibilities have been given to 
superintendents and commissioners of banking or finance. Some states 
assigned these tasks to human- and civil-rights commissions. 
As reported above, recent statistics confirm that federal and state 
authorities have failed to reduce the high incidence of mortgage redlining 
and other types of invidious lending practices. 138 Additionally, it 
136. See Karr, Complaints, supra note 24, at A22 ("Many [homeowners] contend 
they've been redlined out of the insurance system as a result of purposeful discrimination 
.. , ."); Insurance Czars See Red, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1995, at Al4 ("[Even members 
of the National Association ofinsurance Commissioners have noticed] that underwriters 
allocate coverage in such a way to favor some geographic or demographic categories of 
consurner[s] and not others .... The commissioners don't think [the calculations of risk] 
is very smart or fair."). 
137. See, e.g., City of Compton v. Bunner, 243 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1988) (ordered not 
to be officially published July 21, 1988). In an action challenging an insurer's redlining 
practices, the court stated: 
[A] discriminatory result [cannot] be accomplished by private insurers under 
the guise of being supposedly based on "actuarially sound" practices or 
because of supposedly being based on actual "loss experience" .... 
We note that our construction of [the statute], despite the legislative intent 
reflected in the legislative history is in accord with the plain meaning of the 
disjunctive language of that statute, which in this part reads: "[N]or shall race, 
language, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, or location within a 
geographic area of itself constitute a condition or risk for which a higher rate, 
premium, or charge may be required of the insured for such insurance." 
Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
I 38. See, e.g., Albert R. Karr, Minority Mortgage Loans Rose in 1993, But Denial 
Rate Topped that for Whites, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1994, at A2 ("[The Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council stated that] 'wide differences in denial rates among 
racial groups persist[.]' ... For conventional loans, the denial rates were 34% for black 
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appears that mortgage redlining and questionable loan denials are likely 
to increase in the near future. Therefore, we are forced to ask: Are 
federal and state agencies truly able to stop banks and other financial 
institutions from discriminating against consumers solely on the basis of 
consumers' race, gender, marital status, and residence? Are regulators 
financially equipped to stop financial redlining? Does a lack of political 
will prevent federal and state regulators from enforcing fair-lending 
Jaws? 
Also, state insurance commissioners and superintendents are chiefly 
responsible for preventing insurance redlining and other forms of 
discrimination. But we know that insurance redlining is widespread. 139 
Moreover, there is little indication that geographic-discrimination 
complaints will decrease in the immediate future. 140 These revelations, 
therefore, generate several additional questions: Are insurance commis-
sioners intentionally ignoring insurers' redlining practices? Do states give 
insurance regulators adequate financial support to stop unwarranted 
applicants, 25.1% for Hispanics, 15.3% for whites and 14.6% for Asians."). 
139. See, e.g., Insurance Access is Criticized: Companies Said to Use "Redlining," 
SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 16, 1994, at 3D ("The Rev. Charles Stith, national president of the 
Organization of a New Equality, ... said data indicate that insurance companies' 
redlining is 'widespread and pervasive. ' He cited a study by the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now, a lobby group based in Washington, D.C . 
. . . ") ( emphasis added); Kimberly Blanton, Kennedy Targets Redlining Insurers, BOSTON 
GLOBE, April l, l 993, at 4 l: 
The issue of a lack of insurance and the high cost of insurance in the nation's 
inner cities has gained visibility .... Consumer groups told the [House 
Banking Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance] there is wide-
spread evidence redlining by the industry is a national problem. 
After the hearing, [Rep.] Kennedy said that .... 
"[ d]ozens of studies, going back 25 years, repeatedly suggest a nationwide 
pattern of redlining" .... 
Id. ( emphasis added). See also Sharman Stein, Group Says Car Insurers Redlined South, 
West Sides, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 199 l, at l ( "Illinois Public Action, the public-interest 
group, contends that Allstate and State Farm are practicing widespread redlining .... 
Illinois Public Action, which conducted its own phone survey of insurance agents by 
using different addresses to request price quotes .... ") ( emphasis added). 
140. Cf. Redlining Rules Tightened, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 23, 1994, at El5: 
Insurance companies will be required to disclose the ZIP codes, ethnicity 
and gender of all applicants rejected for coverage, according to new anti 
redlining regulations. 
However, the new rules . , , will do little to increase the ability of state 
regulators to crack down on companies when discrimination is uncovered, 
officials said .... 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
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insurance discrimination? Do political considerations place constraints 
on insurance commissioners' enforcement activities? In the following 
sections, we will attempt to answer these and other pressing questions. 
A. Federal Administrative Efforts to Eliminate the Financial 
Redlining of Certain Communities and Neighborhoods 
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has been law for nearly 
twenty years. Even so, the Federal Reserve Board and the five regulatory 
agencies have halted neither mortgage redlining nor other discriminatory 
lending practices. 141 Quite frankly, federal regulators' enforcement 
efforts have been exceptionally poor. 142 Among several explanations, 
three are outstanding. First, regulatory agencies refuse to exercise their 
power. 143 To illustrate, since the Community Reinvestment Act's 
141. Much of the analysis in this section applies to the administrative enforcement 
of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1975, for Fed and several other agencies are also 
responsible for enforcing the ECOA. See 12 C.F.R § 202.14(a)(I) (1996): 
[The] administrative enforcement of the [ECOA] and this regulation ... is 
assigned to the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, National Credit Union Administra-
tion, Interstate Commerce Commission, Secretary of Agriculture, Fann Credit 
Administration, Securities and Exchange Commission, Small Business 
Administration, and Secretary of Transportation. 
142. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton Expands Attack on Loan Bias as Data 
Show a Continuing Problem, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1993, at A2 ("[P]rogress has been 
slow. 'We're not encouraged by the 1992 data,' [according to] Andrew Hove, chairman 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. . . . He said it's becoming clear that the process 
will be slow and difficult. 'Changing lending patterns involves sustained, long-term 
commitment by depository institutions [ and] regulators . . .. "); Stephen A. Fuchs, 
Discriminatory Lending Practices: Recent Developments, Causes and Solutions, IO ANN. 
REV. BANKING L. 461,479 (l991) ("Another cause of discriminatory lending practices 
is the lack of enforcement of the existing federal laws by the federal agencies."). 
143. See Jonathan P. Tomes, The "Community" in the Community Reinvestment Act: 
A Term in Search of a Definition, IO ANN. REV. BANKING L. 225, 229 n.16 (1991) 
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1) and describing the effect of Title IV of the FIRREA): 
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The federal financial supervisory authorities are: ... the Comptroller of the 
Currency [ which regulates] national banks; ... the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System [that regulates] State chartered [member] banks ... 
and bank holding companies; ... the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
[ which regulates] State chartered banks and savings banks which are not 
members of the Federal Reserve System ... ; and ... the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board [which regulates] institutions [whose] deposits ... are insured by 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and ... savings and loan 
holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(1) Title IV of FIRREA abolished the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") ... and the 
FHLBB . . . . It also transferred their regulatory functions ... to the Office 
of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). The Director of the OTS now enforces ... the 
CRA with respect to those financial situations that were previously regulated 
by the FHLBB. 
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enactment, banks and bank-holding companies have submitted hundreds 
of applications to the Federal Reserve Board. Usually, the applications 
ask the Fed to approve bank mergers and acquisitions. 144 Surprisingly, 
the Fed has denied only a few requests. 145 This is quite astonishing 
considering that the Federal Reserve Board's and other studies show that 
member banks are consistently redlining certain communities.146 
Id.; Bacon, supra note 142, at A2 ("A HUD official said the agency's authority covers 
lenders that make loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration."). 
144. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: 
It Works, But Strengthened Federal Eeforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 
297 (1993): 
(U]nquestionably the most important feature of the CRA is that it provides 
implicit standing for [grassroots citizens' organizations] to intervene in lender 
expansion application proceedings. Banking law, either by statute or 
regulation, routinely provides opportunities for public comment on pending 
financial institution expansion requests (mergers, acquisitions, branch openings 
and relocations of existing facilities). To reach a final decision, regulators 
have broad discretion in weighing an applicant's record .... 
Id. at 297 (emphasis added); Jonathan R. Macey, Banking by Quota, WALL Sr. J., Sept. 
7, 1994, at Al4 ("Besides facing the litigation costs and bad publicity associated with 
charges of lending bias, banks must obtain government permission to expand, to merge, 
or to open or close branches. Banks, in other words, need regulatory support to survive, 
and their business can be held hostage .... ") (emphasis added); Fed's Shawmut Ruling 
Stiffens Antibias Act, But Sows Uncertainty, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 17, 1993, at AS: 
[S]luggish loan growth and fierce competition are rapidly dividing the banking 
world into two kinds of institutions: those that buy others and those that get 
bought. With suitors circling, a bank denied the opportunity to grow by 
acquisition may find itself with languid stock performance and little choice but 
to submit to takeover overtures .... So far this year, there have been 321 
banking mergers or buyout totaling $20.3 billion .... 
Id. at A8 ( emphasis added). 
145. See, e.g., Fed's Shawmut Ruling Stiffens Antibias Act, But Sows Uncertainty, 
WALL Sr. J., Nov. 17, 1993, at AS(" Over the past 15 years, the Fed has denied a 
handful of merger applications because [banks and bank-holding companies'] failure to 
comply with the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to assess and meet 
the credit needs of their service areas."). 
146. See, e.g., Paulette Thomas, Behind the Figures: Federal Data Detail Pervasive 
Racial Gap in Mortgage Lending, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 31, 1992, at Al: 
This grim summary of racial disparities in lending on a national scale comes 
from data disclosed by the Federal Reserve Board .... It reviewed 6.3 million 
1990 applications for mortgages and other home-related loans at 9,300 
financial institutions. The study, the most extensive the Fed has ever done, 
showed that across the nation, 34% of applications from blacks were turned 
down by lenders, but just 14% of those from whites. 
Id. at Al (emphasis added). But see, Albert R. Karr, Study by Fed Challenges the 
Contention of Minority Bias in Mortgage Lending, WALL Sr. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at A2, 
A4: 
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Second, federal regulators are extremely ineffective because, more 
often than not, they do not adopt common enforcement strategies. For 
example, it is generally accepted that discriminatory lending is difficult 
to detect simply by examining individual loan applications one case at 
a time. 147 But, we also know that "testers"148 can help uncover 
unfair geographic-lending practices. 149 Yet, among regulatory agencies, 
a serious division exists over whether "testers" should be used. Two 
A Federal Reserve Board study challenges a widely held contention that 
banks and other lenders discriminate against minorities by making it harder for 
them to qualify for home loans . 
. . . [T)he study was an examination of the default rates of 220,000 Federal 
Housing Administration mortgage loans from I 98 7 to I 989. It showed that 
blacks defaulted about twice as often as white borrowers, with Hispanic 
defaulting somewhat more frequently than whites. 
The study clashes with one done by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank in 
1992 .... 
John Yinger, professor of economics and public administration at Syracuse 
University, said the . . . study's default-rate approach is "very seriously 
flawed." Mr. Yinger, who has extensively studied the mortgage-discrimination 
issue, said that even if the study were valid, it wouldn't debunk the widely 
reviewed Boston Fed study. 
The study, he said, didn't take into account the attributes of blacks whose 
home-loan applications were rejected .... 
In addition, ... the study examined only loans that resulted in foreclosures. 
Perhaps lenders are more lenient when white borrowers default on their loans 
and more frequently decide against foreclosure . . . . A propensity to foreclose 
on blacks would boost their default rates, and would be a sign of discrimina-
tion .... 
Id. at A I 6 ( emphasis added). 
147. Cf. Albert R. Karr, Banks' Lending Files Will Be Examined For Bias as 
Agency Expands Program, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at B8 ("Heretofore, most 
examinations by the comptroller and other federal financial regulators concentrated on 
whether individual decisions on minority loan applications showed bias. The conclusion 
was usually that no bias was evident .... ") 
148. See Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Fair Housing 
Laws: An Analysis of Some Unexamined Problems that the Fair Housing Amendments 
Act of 1983 Would Eliminate, 27 How. L.J. 227, 263-65 (1984) [hereinafter Rice, Fair 
Housing] ( defining "testing" and providing evidence of the important role that "testers" 
play in ferreting out various forms of discrimination). 
149. See, e.g., Loan Bias: HUD Takes Wider Role in Broad Focus by Regulators 
on loan Bias Concerns, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 29, 1993, at 6-7: 
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"[T]esters" checked the lender's practices over the telephone. One white and 
one minority tester called and asked for loans of $65,000, well above the 
firm's $50,000 minimum, and both applications were processed, apparently 
with no problems. 
The next week ... two testers--again, one white, one minority-called and 
inquired about loans in the amount of $35,000. Both were told that the firm 
[did] not make loans in that amount .... ). 
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agencies----HUD150 and OCC151--endorse the use of "testers." The 
Federal Reserve Board does not. In fact, the Fed "has long resisted 
dispatching its own testers to banks, despite pleas from community 
groups alleging racial bias."152 
Finally, CRA enforcement is flaccid because federal agencies do not 
coordinate their efforts. 153 For instance, "[t]he Federal Reserve Board 
150. See, e.g., Paulette Thomas, U.S., Some Bankers Sharply Boost Use of 'Testers ' 
to Find Racial Bias in Loans, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1992, at Al6 ("[HUD] is going to 
spend $1 million for studies that will send white and minority applicants to lenders .. . 
to determine if those borrowers are treated differently, a HUD official disclosed .... "). 
151. See Kenneth H. Bacon, U.S. to Use 'Tester' in New Campaign on Discrimina-
tion in Mortgage Lending, WALL ST. J, May 6, 1993, at A2 ("The Comptroller of the 
Currency launched a campaign against mortgage discrimination, including using "testers" 
to determine whether banks treat minority and white applicants differently .... The 
comptroller will become the first federal bank regulator to use testers, a move that 
consumer groups have advocated for years."); Paulette Thomas, Fed Study Finds Racial 
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending is Still Widespread, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1992, at 
A3 ("[OCC] said it ... may recommend that ... banks send 'mystery shoppers' to their 
own institutions to test for subtle differences in service for applicants of different 
races."). 
152. See Paulette Thomas, U.S., Some Bankers Sharply Boost Use of 'Testers' to 
Find Racial Bias in Loans, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1992, at Al6 ("Much of the industry 
still resists the use of testers. Some bankers privately say they fear that findings of the 
testers might be used against them in lawsuits by minority borrowers. The American 
Bankers Association is also skeptical that testers can prove something as subtle as racial 
bias .... "). But see, Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good 
Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 290 (1993) 
["The use of matched pair 'tester' (individuals who pose as potential customers) is likely 
to be a valuable tool of enforcement, to support the investigation of individual 
complaints and the use of statistical analysis to detect discrimination."). 
153. See Steve Cocheo, Fair-Lending Pressure Builds, A.B.A. BANKING J., Dec. 
I 994, at 46 ("Federal agencies continue to disagree on details of fair-lending 
enforcement. An addendum to an early 1994 interagency policy on discrimination 
remains mired in disagreements and is running behind schedule."). For a classic example 
of how interagency conflict continues to undermine the effective enforcement of the 
Community Reinvestment Act, see National Urban League v. Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, 78 F.R.D. 543, 544 (D.D.C. I 978). Briefly, the National Urban League 
asserted the following: "(I) Race and sex discrimination ... continues to exist in the 
home mortgage lending operations of institutions supervised by [the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, FDIC, OCC and the Federal Reserve Board][;] (2) [The Fed and OCC] are 
obligated by statute to exercise their ... regulatory powers to ensure against such 
discrimination[;] [and] (3) [These four regulatory agencies] have abdicated this 
responsibility .... " Id. at 544. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the FDIC and the 
OCC entered into an arrangement with complainants and gave assurance that efforts 
would be made to terminate discriminatory mortgage lending. On the other hand, the 
Federal Reserve Board refused to cooperate with either of the other agencies or 
complainants. The Fed "strenuously opposed the suit from the outset" and asserted that 
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recently approved state-chartered Barnett Banks' acquisition of some 
thrift and mortgage-loan operations .... In doing so, the Fed rebuffed 
an apparent Justice Department request to [delay] those approvals 
because of the department's investigation."154 Also, "to encourage fair 
lending practices, [some] regulators . . . proposed having larger banks 
tally their women and minority small-company borrowers and loan 
applicants. The idea has . . . divided bank regulators. The Treasury 
Department's Comptroller of the Currency backs the change. The 
Federal Reserve Bank's Board of Governors doesn't."155 
Given federal regulators' unmentionable enforcement record, 
consumers and their allies have sued the Federal Reserve Board and 
other agencies in federal courts. In their suits, complainants accused 
regulators of failing to enforce community-lending laws. The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has addressed this controversy twice. 
Two district courts have decided this issue once. In each instance, the 
court refused to grant relief. 
The Eleventh Circuit's rulings are illustrative. In Kaimowitz v. Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 156 "the Comptroller of the 
Currency ... [had examined] First Union's national bank subsidiaries 
and found a number of deficiencies in the CRA performance [data]. 
"
157 Nevertheless, the Fed conditionally approved First Union's 
application to acquire Florida National Banks. Kaimowitz, an attorney 
representing minority businesspersons, commenced an action against the 
Federal Reserve Board. The petitioner asked the court to reverse the 
Fed's decision because First Union had a history of redlining certain 
its enforcement activities and supervision were "adequate in all respects." Id. 
154. See Albert R. Karr, Barnett's Thrift Purchase is Approved, But Bank Faces 
Lending-Practice Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1994, at A2. 
155. See Jeanne Saddler & Brent Bowers, Fair Lending Puts Focus on Race, 
Gender of Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at B2: 
One Federal Reserve Board governor, Lawrence Lindsey, says gathering the 
data 'entails a veritable Pandora's box of legal, moral and social questions,' 
which he believes [will not] help end bias in lending. But officials in the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency say collecting the infonnation will 
help lenders track their own practices and make federal examiners more 
effective in conducting fair-lending reviews. 
Id. at B2. 
156. 940 F.2d 610 (11th Cir. 1991). 
157. Id. at 611. 
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neighborhoods. 158 The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the complaint for 
lack of standing. 159 
In Washington v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 160 "First 
Georgia [National Bank] submitted an application to the OCC to merge 
First Savannah [State Bank] into First Georgia .... [T]he OCC approved 
the merger .... " 161 Aggrieved consumers and a group representing 
the banking and credit needs of working- and middle-class individuals 
sued the OCC. Plaintiffs asserted that OCC's decision to approve the 
merger violated the Community Reinvestment Act. They argued, 
therefore, that the court should set aside the merger until First Georgia 
National Bank gave adequate assurances that it would satisfy low- and 
moderate-income communities' credit and banking requirements. 162 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. The court observed: Although the 
CRA encourages the OCC "to help [banks] meet the credit needs of the 
local communities in which they are chartered," the CRA also gives the 
OCC "substantial discretion" to decide whether to approve or disapprove 
bank mergers. 163 Consequently, as long as the OCC or another regula-
tory agency exercises its regulatory authority rationally, the court must 
defer to the agency's expertise. 164 
158. Id. at 612 ("[P]etitioner argues that he is an aggrieved party because his 
reputation is at stake with his primarily clientele, who have been harmed by First 
Union's 'redlining' practices (that is, the practice of denying loans in certain neighbor-
hoods)."). 
159. Id. at 614 (The court observed: "[I]t is apparent ... that petitioner has not 
satisfied the constitutional standing requirement that he personally have suffered or will 
suffer some distinct and palpable injury. This petition is therefore dismissed."). 
160. 856 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1988). 
161. Id. at 1509-10. 
162. Id. at 1510. 
163. Id. (stating that "substantial discretion is granted to the OCC."). 
164. Id. at 1512. See also Corning Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank 
Bd., 571 F. Supp. 396, 403 (E.D. Ark. 1983), ajf'd, 736 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1984) 
( observing that the Board may exercise "its discretion [ and] deny an application due to 
an unsatisfactory CRA evaluation," and "find[ing] as a matter of law that the 
administrative record ... is fully supportive of the Board's compliance with the CRA 
in its decision to approve [a bank's] branch application."). See also Nat'! Urban League 
v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 78 F.R.D. 543, 547 (D.D.C. 1978). 
Complainants alleged that the Federal Reserve Board and OCC failed to enforce the 
CRA and prevent mortgage redlining. The district court dismissed the complaint because 
plaintiffs "failed to satisfy ... Article III requirement of standing." Id. But the court 
implied that the Federal Reserve Board did not abuse its discretion. The district observed 
that even assuming that plaintiffs proved an injury, there was no evidence that the Board 
failed to regulate its members or that forcing the Board to select alternative "regulatory 
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Considering that federal courts are unwilling to force federal 
regulators----the Fed, OTC, OCC, FDIC, and HUD-to stop unfair 
lending practices, we must ask: Are these agencies likely to stop 
bickering among themselves and work to ensure that both regulated and 
umegulated financial institutions serve the legitimate credit needs of 
consumers in all geographic areas? Regrettably, the answer is "probably 
not." Of course, recent evidence suggests that regulatory authorities are 
willing to cooperate165 and adopt "new strategies"166 to combat finan-
techniques" would prevent mortgage redlining. Id. We also should stress that the 
Supreme Court has decided this issue in another context, one not involving mortgage 
redlining. See, e.g., Nationsbank ofN.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 
810, 814 n.2 (1995) (stressing that the Comptroller may exercise his discretion "within 
reasonable bounds."); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (permitting the 
Comptroller to adjudicate matters as long as the "Comptroller's adjudication [is not] 
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'). 
165. See, e.g., Albert R. Karr, Group of Federal Agencies Fashion Concerted Policy 
Against Lending Bias, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1994, at A2: 
A group of federal agencies signaled a stepped-up, concerted attack on 
lending discrimination . 
. . . [T]he Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Justice 
Department ... unveiled a new 'policy statement' designed to fashion a more 
organized approach to enforcing federal credit laws. 
Id. See also Kenneth H. Bacon, Rules to Spur Bank Loans, Investments in Lower-Income 
Areas are Proposed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1993, at A2, AS ("The Clinton administration 
formally proposed rules to prod banks to boost lending, services and investment in low-
and moderate-income areas . . . . Officials from the [OCC], the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp., the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Reserve Board have 
worked on the regulations for months."); Bacon, supra note 142, at A2 ("[T]he Justice 
Department and HUD have launched a joint effort to search for possible lending 
discrimination by independent mortgage companies, bankers that aren't attached to 
banks."). 
166. See, e.g., Gary Putka, Shawmut Unitfor Mortgages is Reorganized, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 3, 1993, at BS: 
Shawmut National Corp. is reorganizing its mortgage unit following a 
Federal Reserve Board['s] determination that the bank failed to meet its 
obligations under the fair-lending laws . 
. . . Shawmut is expected to revamp soon .... The Federal Reserve has 
requested this change, which established more direct federal-bank regulatory 
authority over the mortgage operation. 
Id.; Kenneth H. Bacon & John R. Wilke, Lending Standard: Fed Gives Bias Laws New 
Clout as it Blocks a Bank Acquisition, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1993, at Al: 
With its decision to reject Shawmut National Corp. 's bid to acquire New 
Dartmouth Bank, ... the Federal Reserve Board has put the first real teeth 
into laws aimed at ... racial discrimination .... 
. . . [S]ome observers say the toughness signaled by the Fed's decision to 
reject the acquisition because of concerns over fair-lending practices amounts 
to a kind of new regulatory canon: Lend fair or die. 
Id. (emphasis added); U.S. Probes Bank Records For Race Bias, WALL ST. J., May 19, 
1992, at A2 ("[The] Federal Reserve['s] approval of ... several big bank mergers ... 
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cial redlining and unfair-lending decisions. But, as we are aware, both 
the Community Reinvestment Act of 1973 and the Equal Opportunity 
Credit Act of 1975 are at least twenty years old. Yet, discriminatory 
access to credit and financial redlining are rampant in every region of 
this country. Clearly, these unwarranted practices will continue until 
federal regulators adopt and implement effective enforcement strate-
gies. 167 
was made contingent upon an increase in lending to low-income neighborhoods."); 
Bacon, supra note 151, at A2, A4 ("[T]he Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., which 
regulates about 7,500 banks, said it is bolstering its procedures for monitoring compli-
ance with fair-lending laws."); HUD Seeks Broader Power To Enforce Loan Bias Laws, 
WALL Sr. J., Apr. 15, 1994, at A4 ("[HUD] is seeking broader authority to fine lenders 
who don't comply with laws requiring the reporting of the race, gender and income of 
mortgage applicants .... Extending HUD's authority to impose monetary penalties 'will 
help ensure consistent and effective enforcement' .... ") (emphasis added); Kenneth H. 
Bacon & Dave Kansas, Comptroller's Office to Use Stricter Test in Probing Mortgage 
Discrimination, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at A2 ("[OCC] is using new procedures to 
determine whether [200 of 3,600 national] banks are discriminating against minority 
mortgage applicants by holding them to higher standards than white borrowers.") 
(emphasis added); Albert R. Karr, Banks' Lending Files Will Be Examined For Bias as 
Agency Expands Program, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at A2 ("(OCC] plans to expand 
its bank-examination process to do a better job of ferreting out mortgage-loan 
discrimination .... [E]xaminers will [try to determine] whether bank-loan officers give 
special treatment to white ... [and] minority applicants with comparable records."); 
Kenneth H. Bacon, Reaching Out: Under Strong Pressure, Banks Expand Loans for 
Inner-City Homes, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 23, 1994, at Al: 
The Clinton administration has placed high priority on [policing fair-lending 
laws] .... [T]he Treasury Department's Office of Thrift Supervision rejected 
applications from four thrifts in New Jersey and Ohio to trade their federal 
charters for state licenses. The agency ruled that they hadn't met the provisions 
of the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act .... 
Id. But see, Albert R. Karr, Bank Regulators are Softening a Plan to Boost Lending in 
Low-Income Areas, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1994, at A2: 
Id. 
[The Fed, the OCC and the FDIC], responding to bankers' objections, are 
softening a plan aimed at boosting lending services and investment in low-
income areas. 
. . . [B]anks were to be judged by comparing their share of the lending 
market in low- and moderate-income areas with their market share in their 
overall lending area. 
That requirement has been dropped. 
167. See also White, supra note 152, at 290: 
[T]o the extent that racial or other types of personal discrimination in lending 
is perceived to be the problem, more vigorous enforcement of 
antidiscrimination laws----notably the Equal Opportunity Credit Act of 1975--is 
the best solution. This approach the double advantage of being more direct 
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B. State Banking and Finance Commissioners ' Administrative 
Enforcement of Financial-Redlining and Fair-Lending Laws 
Quite candidly, the majority of state banking and finance commission-
ers have done very little to encourage fair lending or to discourage 
mortgage redlining. Among other reasons, state regulators have been 
inactive because legislatures refuse to enact enabling legislation. 168 
However, among states that have passed equal-access-to-credit laws, 
enforcement efforts are still less than impressive. Some finance 
commissioners have implemented a few marginally successful strategies. 
But the effects of various enforcement activities have been extremely 
mixed. 
For example, commissioners in California, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania have been fairly assiduous and somewhat 
successful. In California, the Real Estate and Savings and Loan 
Commissioners' anti-mortgage redlining efforts have achieved a 
modicum of success. Both commissioners forced mortgage bankers, 
insurance companies, and credit unions to disclose the location of all 
neighborhoods in which they invested capital or made loans. 169 The 
effects of this policy have been positive: "[T]he number of consumer 
Id. 
than the CRA and of covering all lenders, not just ... banks and thrifts. 
Tougher enforcement should be combined with increased education and 
training of lenders' line personnel. 
168. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
169. See Bradley Inman, Law Centers on Lending Practice Discrimination, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 20, 1988, at D7: 
Indeed, community activists concede that incidents of redlining may not be 
as brazen, but they say it still persists. . . . [C]ity/county reinvestment 
coordinator Jim Bliesner says 'the darker the map' the fewer the number of 
home loans .... Bliesner argues that ... [m]any lenders don't blatantly deny 
loan[,J but they aren't encouraging investment in selective neighborhoods 
either .... 
Id. See also Albert R. Karr, Angry Lenders: Federal Drive to Curb Mortgage-Loan Bias 
Stirs Strong Backlash, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at Al, AIO: 
William McDonough, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
... said he is discouraged by continuing reports about 'well-documented cases 
in which loan applications by racial minorities have received rude and 
unfavorable treatment by bankers,' and he urged banks to lend more in low-
income neighborhoods. 
Indeed, some banks are clearly doing just that. In California, top executives 
of BankAmerica Corp., First Interstate Bank, American Savings Bank and 
Home Savings of America all say there's good business to be done in 
neglected low-income areas. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
626 
[VOL. 33: 583, I 996] Consumers 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
complaints about redlining has declined substantially since the late 
'70s."170 Attempting to achieve similar outcomes, the Treasury of 
Pennsylvania has tried to withhold state deposits from financial 
institutions that redlined moderate- to low-income communities; 171 the 
Commissioner of Savings in Illinois petitioned the Legislature to give 
him power to punish lenders who practice invidious discrimination; 172 
the Banking Commissioner of New Jersey-a former banker--severely 
denounced financial institutions for excluding minorities and women 
from ads and promotional materials; 173 and "[t]he New York State 
170. Inman, supra, note 169, at D7. 
171. See Steve Cocheo, Pennsylvania Links Contracts to CRA, 85 AB.A. BANKING 
J., Dec. 1993, at l 0: 
Pennsylvania banks that want to hold state deposits or provide other banking 
services to state agencies must now jump through community reinvestment 
hoops. 
The Office of the State Treasurer will evaluate banks' CRA record .... 
. . . Banks will receive points for various types of community investment 
and related activities. The state [ will emphasize] mortgage lending and 
rehabilitation of low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. 
Banks that receive "Substantial Noncompliance" ratings from the state 
treasury department will be barred from doing business with the state for at 
least two years. 
172. See Mike Dorning, New Questions Raised About Area Mortgages, Cm. TRIB., 
Dec. 18, 1991, at 2: 
[A study] suggests that commercial banks and S&Ls may not be fulfilling their 
legal mandate to help meet the credit needs in all areas, including low- and 
moderate-income and minority neighborhoods .... 
Jack Seymour, Illinois commissioner of savings, used the study results to 
call on the state Legislature to grant him powers to investigate and punish 
mortgage discrimination .... 
173. See Don Stancavish, Harsh Words for N.J. Banks: Commissioner Blasts Bias, 
THE RECORD, Dec. 3, 1993, at DI: 
New Jersey's banking commissioner ... lashed out at banks that ignore 
minorities in their marketing and advertising materials, saying the practice 
could be interpreted as a veiled racial reference. "Banks that never picture 
black or Hispanic people in their advertisements are telling people in those 
categories that they are not welcome as customers," Jeff Connor told the Bank 
Marketing Association of New Jersey .... "The state of New Jersey has a 
large black population, a large Hispanic population, and a large number of 
women in the workplace. The whole state has changed, and banking has to 
change with it." 
Id. (emphasis added). But see Don Stancavish, Last in Low-income Lendin1r26% of 
N.J. Banks Rate Poorly, RECORD, Jan. 7, 1994, at Cl: 
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Banking Department ... propos[ed] changes to its banking rules that 
would strengthen and clarify [the parameters of a program to help 
increase] loans to small businesses in low-income areas."174 
By contrast, commissioners in other states have done very little to 
enforce anti-redlining and fair-lending statutes. In fact, some state 
regulators have been accused of allowing their allegedly "pro-banker 
bias" to undermine the effective enforcement of fair-lending laws. For 
instance, in Massachusetts, consumer advocates demonstrated that a 
history of "pro-banker" commissioners either passively or actively 
discouraged the enforcement of community-investment statutes. 175 
New Jersey banks and thrifts assembled the worst record in the nation in 1993 
when it crune to lending money to low- and moderate-income residents .... 
State Banking Commissioner Jeff Connor said the numbers seemed accurate, 
but doubted that they painted a true picture of the lending record of the state's 
banks and thrifts. "The CRA is so subjective. This could mean a lot of different 
things, but it certainly doesn 't mean that our banks and thrifts are the worst 
in the nation and South Carolina's are the best," he said. (emphasis added). 
174. Peter Pae, Home Equity: The Community Reinvestment Act Hasn't Been Much 
Help to Inner-City Businesses. That May Change, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1993, at R14. 
175. See Mitchell Zuckoff, Officials Hit for Laxity on Minority Loans, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 18, 1991, at 65: 
Affordable housing activists yesterday accused state ... regulators of failing 
to enforce laws that require banks to offer loans in minority and low-income 
neighborhoods. 
[Responding to the study, state banking Commissioner Michael Hanson 
said:] "Too many people view community reinvestment as requiring banks to 
solve the social problems in their communities[.] ... That is not what the act 
says. Whether it should or not is a legislative policy decision." 
Id.; Michael Rezendes & Peter J. Howe, Banks, Regulators Come Under Fire, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1989, at 41: 
Boston banks and the regulatory agencies that oversee them crune under 
harsh attack on several fronts yesterday following a Boston Redevelopment 
Authority study revealing racial disparities in mortgage lending policies . 
. . . [P]olitical leaders and community activists charged that regulators have 
largely failed to enforce fair credit laws .... 
Massachusetts Banking Commissioner Andrew Calamare said the situation 
described in the BRA report "is not good," but defended his office's 
performance. 
Id. ( emphasis added); Steve Marantz, Dukakis to Order Scrutiny of Bank Lending, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1989, at 28: 
The state Division of Banks, under Dukakis, has come under fire for passive 
enforcement of the CRA. Banking Commissioner Andrew J. Calamare has 
approved all of the more than 400 applications for mergers, expansions or 
branch openings that have come before him as part of required CRA review 
in the last two and a half years. In the same period the Mortgage Review 
Board has ruled almost unanimously in favor of banks on denial appeals. 
Id. ( emphasis added); Steve Marantz, Officials Raj:, Regulators on Unfair Lending, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1989, at I: 
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But, in Michigan, a more egregious incident occurred: The Commission-
er of Banking threatened to sue another state agency if that body 
publicized bankers' discriminatory lending patterns. 176 
A passive regulatory approach by the state banking commission is partly 
responsible for the racial pattern of home mortgage lending in Boston 
[ according to] elected officials, city officials and community activists. 
Figures show that the commission's Mortgage Review Board upheld only 
one of 53 appeals on mortgage denials in Boston in 1987 and 1988. During the 
same period, the commission denied none of the roughly 400 community 
reinvestment applications by banks. 
Id. ( emphasis added). But see Steve Marantz, Compromise Seen Possible on Minority 
Lending Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1990, at 25: 
Mayor Flynn's renewed gubernatorial ambitions, and the sinking bottom lines 
of Boston's banks ... may nudge ... a compromise solution ... on a lending 
plan for minority neighborhoods and low- to moderate-income homebuyers . 
At the same time, Flynn's gubernatorial intentions ... give bankers another 
reason to come to terms. The prospect of a Flynn-appointed state banking 
Commissioner regulating Community Reinvestment Act performance is not one 
that bankers relish. 
Id.; Joan Fitzgerald, Eliot Savings Bank Denied Federal Charter, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
6, 1983, at N (Economy section): 
[The] board of state bank regulators ... unanimously denied the application 
of Eliot Savings Bank to convert its state charter to a federal charter, citing the 
bank's record of community service. 
At the same time the Board of Bank Incorporation granted the petitions of 
three other state-chartered mutual savings banks to convert to federal charters. 
These were Mutual Bank for Savings (Boston), Fitchburg Savings Bank, and 
Home Savings Bank (Boston). 
The Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group .... 
. . . noted . . . that the Eliot rejection marked the first time a charter 
conversion request had been denied on the basis of a bank's CRA compliance. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
176. See David Everett & Teresa Blossom, U.S. Report Criticizes Comerica 's Loan 
Policies, DET. FREE PRESS, June 5, I 988, at 1 A: 
Comerica Bank in metropolitan Detroit has been given a "less than 
satisfactory" federal rating for not placing sufficient emphasis on meeting local 
lending needs, confidential records disclosed to the Free Press indicate. 
State banking Commissioner Eugene Kuthy told James Edwards, 
co-chairman of the Detroit Committee for Responsible Banking . . . that 
Comerica's confidential CRA rating was "inadvertently" included in some 
papers the Financial Institutions Bureau sent Edwards. 
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Clearly, more effective administrative remedies are required if states 
intend to stop financial institutions' unfair-lending practices. It appears, 
however, that regulators will not achieve this goal in the near future. All 
too often, political bickering, 177 an unwillingness to support both the 
intent and spirit of community-investment laws,178 and the appearance 
of "pro-banker bias"179 significantly undermine regulators' efforts to 
retard financial redlining. 
C. Insurance Commissioners' Administrative Enforcement of States' 
Anti-Redlining Statutes 
During the greater part of this century, most state commissioners knew 
that national and state insurers systematically redlined low-income and 
The Financial Institutions Bureau is the state agency that works with federal 
agencies in regulating banks and thrift institutions in Michigan. 
The Commissioner asked Edwards to return the report without publicizing 
it and threatened to seek a court injunction against him if he did not. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
177. See, e.g., The Test for Commissioner Mulligan, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1979, 
at EPG: 
Criticism from a departing deputy state banking Commissioner yesterday will 
intensify attention on the first major test of the King administration's 
willingness to enforce a Massachusetts requirement that banks meet the needs 
of low- and moderate-income communities .... 
Among the accusations of outgoing deputy banking Commissioner Earl W. 
Jackson was a charge that his boss, Banking [Commissioner] Gerald Mulligan, 
had discouraged him from seeking bank compliance with "community 
reinvestment" regulations that Mulligan has promulgated. Mulligan responded 
that he was a strong backer of those regulations and that his warnings to 
Jackson were based solely on a fear that Jackson was using his authority for 
political reasons. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
178. Cf Nancy Ross, Plan for Chain Of Banks Gets Stiff Opposition, WASH. POST., 
Aug. 9, 1983, at DI, D4: 
Id. 
Bankers and state banking regulators attacked [a] plan here today when the 
Comptroller of the Currency began a series of hearings on the proposal by 
Dimension Financial Corp. 
A planned Dimension non-bank in Newton, Mass., an affluent suburb of 
Boston, led a representative of the Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment 
Advisory Group to charge the organizers with engaging in "cruel mockery of 
the spirit of the Community Reinvestment Act," which requires banks to serve 
the entire community, rich and poor alike. 
179. Cf Rezendes & Howe, supra note 175, at 41 ("[A] report suggested that some 
regulatory officials may be reluctant to confront banks because they have worked for 
financial institutions in the past or because they plan to work for them in the future."). 
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primarily minority neighborhoods. 180 Yet, regulators refused to 
implement administrative procedures to end the practice. More recently, 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) gathered 
its own "redlining" data. 181 One finding is incontrovertible: 
"[P]roperty owners in inner-city neighborhoods [are denied] equal access 
to homeowner insurance at competitive prices."182 Notwithstanding the 
180. See, e.g., J. Robert Hunter, Insurance Redlining Under Attack in Texas, 
Throughout the Nation, HOUS. POST, May 15, 1994, at C3 (Robert Hunter is the Texas 
Commissioner of Insurance). 
"Communities without insurance are communities without hope." 
This was the conclusion reached a quarter-century ago by a special 
commission appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to investigate the problem 
of insurance discrimination. 
"Without insurance, businesses are left to deteriorate; services, goods and 
jobs diminish .... " 
Did we heed the warning? Have things changed for the better in 25 years? 
They may have gotten worse. 
Id. (emphasis added); L. H. Otis, Regulators Clash Over "Redlining", NAT'L 
UNDERWRJTER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION 3 (June 21, 
1993): 
Rob Schneider, assistant commissioner for consumer services with the Texas 
Department of Insurance, said "there has been a lot of bad mouthing of state 
regulatory insurance agencies ... and for the most part I agree with it. 
As regulators we've known for years that there are problems with insurance 
availability" in urban areas .... Yet while most regulators in [urban] states 
know that problems exist, . . . insurance regulators have not prioritized, 
identif[ied] under-served areas, analyz[ed] the reasons for lack of availability 
[or] propos[ed] ways to address these problems. 
Id. ( emphasis added). See also Thomas S. Mulligan, Pugnacity is Garamendi 's 
Strength-and Weakness, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1994, at Al: 
Brute force has been an element of [John] Garamendi's style ... in his 
dealings with the powerful industry he regulates, and he makes no apologies 
for it. 
"My predecessors kissed the insurance industry's butt here for JOO years, 
and consumers got screwed for it," Garamendi said. "Damn right I'm 
confrontational. I've kicked butt instead of kissed it." 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
181. See, e.g., Susan Harrigan, New York Says Bias lsn 'ta Big Insurance Problem, 
NEWSDA Y, Oct. 28, 1994, at A59: 
[ A report issued] by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
[reveals] that "race matters." ... [The] survey, the first ever conducted on a 
national basis, showed a relationship between race and the availability and cost 
of property insurance. For instance, buildings were less likely to be insured in 
high-minority ZIP codes. Premiums in those areas tended to be higher, and 
policies more limited. 
I 82. See Stephen Kurkjian, Insurance Chief Withholds "Redline" Data Blocks 
Lawmaker Bid to Look for Bias, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1995, at 30: 
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NAIC's discovery or the Association's efforts to stop redlining,183 a 
substantial majority of insurance commissioners continue to ignore 
consumers who experience this perverse form of discrimination. 
Admittedly, some regulators often have neither authority184 nor 
political support or wi11185 to stop insurance redlining. In addition, a 
few commissioners have difficulty deciding whether certain activity is 
insurance redlining or permissible discrimination. 186 Still, other 
Id. 
Insurance companies in 20 states, including Massachusetts, assembled the data 
for a national study on discriminatory practices in the writing of homeowner 
insurance. 
Although the study did not break down the data by state or urban center, 
commissioners in three of the 20 states-Missouri, Oregon, and Texas--... 
agreed to make the statistics public .... 
183. Cf Albert B. Crenshaw, Insurance Commissioner Brings Agency to the 
Forefront, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1994, at 7 (Magazine): 
[The District of Columbia's Insurance Commissioner, Robert M. Willis] has 
benefited greatly from pressures brought on state regulators all over the 
country by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 
Threatened with a federal takeover of insurance regulation, the NAIC has 
devised an accreditation system requiring states to meet certain standards. 
184. See. e.g., Otis, supra note 180, at 3: 
State regulators only enforce existing laws governing insurer activity, and 
the language of those laws usually prohibits "unfairly discriminatory" conduct 
and does not refer to redlining by name, according to Robert Willis, 
superintendent of insurance for the District of Columbia. 
So when they are pressed to investigate and prosecute insurers for redlining 
practices, but don't have redlining statutes, "the regulator has some level of 
discomfort" . . . . 
See also Part Il.C. for a discussion of the influence of political restraint on enforcement 
activities. The District of Columbia, for example, does not have an "anti-redlining" 
statute because courts, the insurance industry and the industry's congressional supporters 
have blocked the District's efforts to enact one. 
185. See, e.g., Kurkjian, supra note 182, at 30: 
State Insurance Commissioner Linda Ruthardt yesterday refused to tum over 
to a powerful legislative authority sensitive data on whether insurance 
companies were discriminating in their sales practices in Boston's minority 
neighborhoods. 
Ruthardt ... says her office is conducting its own investigation .... 
[But] Deputy Attorney General Barbara B. Anthony, who heads [a] Public 
Protection Bureau, questioned Ruthardt's commitment to investigating 
redlining because [Ruthardt] had not supported legislation in the past requiring 
insurance companies to disclose statistics on their sales practices. 
186. See, e.g., Richard Buck, Senn Begins State 'Redlining' Study Insurance Firms 
Reportedly Avoid Inner-City Policies, SEATTLE TlMES, Sept. 18, 1993, at DI: 
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"Redlining is a fairly subtle kind of discrimination," said Jim Stevenson, a 
spokesman for [Washington's Commissioner of Insurance]. "It is illegal ... 
for insurance companies ... to discriminate on the basis of anything except 
differences in risks that you can document." 
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insurance commissioners refuse to acknowledge that redlining is a 
serious problem, even though the NAIC's research suggests otherwise. 
For example, fairly recently, insurance regulators intimated that redlining 
is not a problem in Minnesota because no consumer ever complained 
about the activity. 187 Similarly, "[ u] sing ... arguments of the industry 
it regulates, [New York State's Deputy Insurance Superintendent] told 
federal officials ... that insurance discrimination based on race isn't a 
major problem [in that state]."188 The deputy superintendent's conclu-
sion is truly remarkable, because he admitted: "[T]he department hasn't 
"You cannot refuse to sell someone insurance because of where a person 
lives," although companies may charge higher rates based on geography .... 
[ According to Insurance Commissioner Deborah Seen,] "[ r ]edlining is a very 
generic term . . . . [I]t connotes discrimination. It is not an issue of whether 
people can get coverage but of the quality of coverage and the rates." 
Id. (emphasis added); Otis, supra note 180, at 41: 
[The District of Columbia's Commissioner,] Mr. Willis cautioned against 
relying on ... the use of the term redlining ... , which he said still means 
different things to different people. 
"Insurance is inherently discriminatory, " he said, adding that regulators 
must attempt to define and root out unfair discrimination in urban markets 
rather than focus on the term redlining, which may not properly describe 
consumer coverage problems. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
187. See, e.g., David Shaffer, Bias Against Poor Alleged in Property Insurance, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 5, I 993, at IC: 
Neighborhood activists accused the insurance industry ... of discriminating 
against poor and minority-dominated Twin Cities neighborhoods in the sale of 
homeowners' insurance. 
Earl Krahn, a director of the Twin Cities ACORN, said the organization isn't 
alleging that the insurance industry is breaking the law. But he said the 
industry isn't treating many city dwellers fairly. 
Minnesota Commerce Commissioner Bert McKasy said insurance regulators 
will review the report. But regulators have found no evidence of redlining and 
"we have never had any complaints" about it, said Mel Boynton, director of 
policy analysis for the state Commerce Department. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
188. See, e.g., Harrigan, supra note 181, at A59: 
"Without saying that the insurance industry is without bigots ... we think 
that urban insurance problems are much more a function of red ink rather than 
redlining," Richard Hsia, New York's deputy insurance superintendent, told a 
federal panel .... "Fundamentally, it is not race, but risk, real and perceived, 
that animates or inhibits insurers and their underwriters." 
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done a study to see if redlining in residential insurance exists." 189 
Finally, insurance commissioners "in Maryland and Virginia [reported] 
... that they have not found credible evidence of systematic redlining. 
There have been occasional complaints, according to one Maryland 
official, but when investigated they have proved to be unfounded."190 
On the other hand, insurance commissioners in several large states 
concede that insurance redlining is a serious problem191 and have 
implemented various regulatory schemes to solve it. In recent years, the 
most aggressive efforts have occurred in California. There, the commis-
sioner of insurance has tried to prevent redlining by permitting insurers 
to make larger profit when they sell insurance in underserved areas,192 
189. See Susan Harrigan, Locked Out-Allegations of Discrimination Against 
Property Owners are Dogging the Insurance Industry, NEWSDAY, Aug. 7, 1994, at A80: 
But when the State Legislature recently required a study of automobile 
insurance, the department found that good drivers in urban areas were being 
forced into that industry's equivalent of the FAIR plan. 
In the absence of solid data, the presence of FAIR policies is one way of 
detecting a possible redlining problem .... 
Id. ( emphasis added). See also Henry Gil go ff, Auto Insurers Accused of Redlining, 
NEWSDA Y, July 23, I 992, at 31: 
Many car owners in low-income areas of New York City pay dramatically 
more for auto insurance because they are dumped unfairly into an expensive 
plan intended for high-risk drivers .... 
Consumer Affairs Commissioner Mark Green said the New York Auto 
Insurance Plan ... "has been perverted to penalize clean drivers who happen 
to live in what the industry considers 'high-risk' neighborhoods." 
State regulators [acknowledged] that the overall statistics indicate a problem. 
"We're acknowledging that there are far too many people who have good 
driving records and ought to be getting a better rate," said Kevin Foley, deputy 
insurance superintendent. ... 
190. Albert B. Crenshaw, Insurers Face New Claims of Urban Area 'Redlining,' 
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at H3. See also Nelson Schwartz, NAACP Says GEICO 
Refuses to Insure Blacks in Poor Areas of Baltimore, D.C., BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 24, 
1993, at 3A: 
The Montgomery County chapter of the NAACP charged ... that GEICO, 
the Chevy Chase-based insurance giant, systematically refuses to .... 
. . . [write] auto and homeowner's insurance policies for inner-city residents 
in Baltimore and Washington, a discriminatory practice known as "redlining." 
Jean Bienemann, associate commissioner for property casualty insurance for 
the Maryland Insurance Administration, said no charges against GEICO had 
been filed with the agency. "We don't have any evidence that they redlined," 
she said. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
191. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 190, at H3 (California Insurance Commissioner 
John Garamendi told [a House] hearing, "I'm here to assure you that redlining is real 
and it is practiced day in and day out in California's urban areas."). 
192. See Philip J. Garcia, Plan Would Reward Unbiased Insurers: Garamendi May 
Limit Violators' Profits, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 24, 1991, at El: 
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by forcing deviant insurers to pay large fines193 and by requmng 
carriers to fully disclose the ethnic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
the neighborhoods in which they sell property insurance. 194 
Texas's and Florida's Insurance Departments also have been diligent. 
To help eradicate redlining, Texas's regulators have actively enforced its 
anti-redlining statute, lobbied the legislature for additional enforcement 
powers and educated the public on how to recognize more subtle 
Under proposed "redlining," or anti-discrimination, regulations, Garamendi 
would allow higher rates of return for insurance companies that "demonstrate 
active outreach in certain communities." 
... (C]ompanies must document any significant efforts they make to target 
disadvantaged areas. The information would be included annually on a 
Community Service Statement .... 
[ Also the] Statement would ask for information [on] ... the number and 
location of offices and agents; the number and dollar amount of contracts an 
insurer has with minority- and women-owned businesses; and a breakdown of 
an insurer's agents and employees by ethnicity and the languages they speak. 
I 93. See Insurer Fined $500,000 For Red/inin~Areas in S.F. and L.A. Affected, 
S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 20, 1993, at Bl: 
Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi charged CIG with 252 violations 
for allegedly r~!bsing to sell insurance in specific redlined "portions of San 
Francisco .... 
The company had been charged with discriminating against both minority 
and gay and lesbian communities. 
CIG, which writes commercial, auto and home owners insurance, ... was 
accused of setting illegal insurance rates based on geographic areas ... . 
It agreed to pay $400,000 in fines and give another $100,000 to minority 
and gay and lesbian community groups .... 
"This agreement sends a clear message to the insurance industry that we will 
not condone redlining," said Garamendi in announcing the third-largest fine 
ever handed down by the department. 
Id. (emphasis added). But see Jay Greene, Groups Break with Gillespie, DAILY NEWS 
OF L.A., Aug. 29, 1990, at Bl: 
Several consumer groups walked out of a Department of Insurance hearing 
on redlining ... , charging that Commissioner Roxani Gillespie had no plans 
to abolish what they allege is an ongoing industry practice. 
Proposition 103, the insurance rate reform initiative that voters passed in 
1988, called for the Commissioner to deny rate increases to companies that 
discriminate against customers. 
194. See Mulligan, supra note 180, at A20 ("He recently won approval ofnew anti-
redlining regulations that will require insurers to file annual statements-----1;imilar to those 
filed by lenders---on their inner-city sales practices. Garamendi says the regulations will 
enable him to identify and punish discrimination.") 
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redlining practices. 195 In Florida, the Insurance Commissioner exer-
cised his authority and ordered property and casualty insurers to stop 
redlining certain "high-risk" areas.1% Additionally, insurance commis-
sioners in the District of Columbia,197 Georgia,198 Missouri,199 and 
Washington200 have implemented comparable programs to help uncov-
er or abolish insurance redlining. 
I 95. See Hunter, supra note I 80, at CJ: 
More subtle redlining practices are based on underwriting guidelines or [on] 
a simple understanding among agents or companies . . . which hit 
minorities and rural poor citizens the hardest. 
... [Commissioner Robert Hunter] recently formed a redlining task force 
... [to) develop ways to end redlining tbrough four major avenues: enforce-
ment against companies that redline, the adoption of anti-discrimination rules, 
public education and the development of legislative proposals. 
196. See Redlining Just Won't Do, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5, 1992, at 24A: 
Kudos to Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher for ordering Prudential and 
the Foremost Insurance Group to halt redlining and for challenging restrictions 
that Travelers placed on its Dade and Broward agents. 
Florida, the nation's fourth most populous state, is a burgeoning, profitable 
insurance market. It is also a peninsula and peculiarly susceptible to redlining. 
197. See, e.g., Karr, supra note 24, at A22 ("Robert Willis, the District of Columbia 
insurance commissioner, . . . start[ ed] an investigation of Geico Corp. following 
allegations that the big insurer has discriminated against lower-income minority 
neighborhoods."). 
198. See, e.g., Bill Aimed At Insurance Redlining Passes House Firms Would Report 
Sales Information, ATLANTA CONST., July 22, 1994, at B2: 
Insurance companies would have to document their sales in major urban 
areas to make it easier for the government to uncover discrimination, under a 
bill that passed the U.S. House .... 
The bill reflects similar efforts taken by Georgia's insurance commissioner 
to prevent insurance redlining .... 
The national legislation ... would require the largest insurance companies 
to report on sales of home ... policies in the 25 largest metropolitan areas, 
much as banks and mortgage companies do now on home loans. 
In Georgia, similar rules are expected to take effect in the fall. 
199. See, e.g., Karr, supra note 24, at A22 ("[T]he Missouri insurance department 
has taken enforcement action against Farm Bureau, charging that the firm illegally 
refuse[ d] to sell homeowner insurance in St. Louis in the face of 17 years of state 
urgings."). 
200. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 186, at DI: 
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State Insurance Commissioner Deborah Senn believes companies that sell 
homeowners insurance routinely engage in 'redlining' in ... [Washington] by 
discriminating against people who live in inner-city and rundown neighbor-
hoods. 
But Senn says she can't document the practice-which insurance carriers 
deny-----and has started [ a redlining study] .... 
"Clearly this is a priority issue for this office, and . . . is dramatically 
different from the past," she said. 
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IV. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES' 
SUITS TO ENFORCE REDLINING AND FAIR-LENDING LAWS IN FEDERAL 
AND STATE COURTS 
In the prior discussion, three important observations about the 
administrative enforcement of fair-lending and insurance laws emerged: 
(1) Only a few banking commissioners have tried to stop financial 
redlining and unfair lending practices; (2) the majority of state insurance 
commissioners have shown little interest in reducing insurance redlining; 
and (3) federal administrative enforcement of fair-lending laws has been 
ineffective because regulators have allowed political constraints, inter-
agency conflicts, and other problems to undermine their efforts. 
To help promote greater compliance with fair-lending and equal-
access-to-insurance laws, some state and federal regulators are increas-
ingly asking state and federal courts for assistance. In recent years, the 
Department of Justice, state attorneys general, and state insurance and 
finance commissioners have sued a modest number of lenders and 
insurers to force those businesses to stop discriminating on the basis of 
gender, race, and the geographic location of consumers' residences. In 
the following sections, this Article discusses the effectiveness of judicial 
enforcement, and necessarily, critiques the various legal theories and 
arguments that federal and state officials proffer to obtain favorable 
outcomes. 
A. The Department of Justice :S Mortgage-Redlining and Fair-
Lending Suits 
As discussed earlier, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair 
Housing Act allow the Department of Justice to sue lenders who either 
redline communities or discriminate on the basis of race, gender or 
marital status. The Attorney General may initiate suits if she thinks 
financial institutions are engaged in a pattern of discrimination in 
residential real estate-related or credit transactions.201 Or federal 
regulators may refer mortgage-redlining and unequal-access-to-credit 
cases to the Justice Department for enforcement.202 
201. See supra notes 54, 63-67 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 54, 63-67 and accompanying text. 
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For years, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department showed 
little desire to enforce fair-lending laws.203 But recently, an assistant 
attorney general told "financial regulatory agencies that the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) wants 'a more aggressive enforcement program and the 
development of sound cases for litigation. "'204 More telling, "the 
department's top civil-rights official [has been] prodding bank regulators 
to refer cases to [DOJ] for investigation."205 Quite candidly, the 
needling has produced very few referrals. For example, although the 
Comptroller of the Currency examined more than five hundred banks, 
only "[f]our cases of suspected lending bias have been referred to the 
Justice Department for further investigation."206 More disturbing, the 
203. See, e.g., Blacks Rejected More Often Than Whites for Home Loans, Survey 
Shows, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1989, at 2: 
[Evidence] suggests that ... redlining□ may have grown worse in the 1980s 
as federal regulators decreased enforcement of fair lending laws . 
. . . [S]everal indicators [revealed] that the Reagan Administration weakened 
the regulatory system built up in the 1960s and 1970s to stop redlining. 
The Justice Department's Civil Rights Division . . . reduced the number 
of attorneys and staff dealing with credit cases, and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development quit collecting data on the location of FHA loans. 
204. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, U.S. to Target Bias in Mortgage Lending, L.A. 
TIMES, May 20, I 992, at D3. 
205. See, e.g., L.A. Unrest Focuses on Home-Loan Bias, USA TODAY, May 22, 
1992, at 5B. 
206. See Bacon & Kansas, supra note 166, at A2. 
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Fed,207 FTC,208 FDIC,209 and HUD have referred collectively less 
than fifteen cases to the Department of Justice.210 
207. See, e.g., id. ("The Federal Reserve Board ... has referred at least one case."); 
Jonathan D. Glater, Critics Say Fed is Lax on Fair-Lending Laws: Agency at Odds with 
Other Bank Regulators, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1994, at Di: 
The Clinton administration has declared war on lending discrimination-but 
critics say the ... Federal Reserve(] is a conscientious objector. 
The Fed has earned the enmity of consumer groups and ... other federal 
regulators who say the agency has resisted enforcing both fair-lending laws 
... and the Community Reinvestment Act .... 
. . . Fed Governor Lawrence B. Lindsey said the criticisms were unfounded. 
"We have taken fair lending seriously," he said. "We refer cases to (the Justice 
Department) regularly, we refer cases to (the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development) regularly. " 
But, critics point out, the Fed has questioned a provision of proposed 
community reinvestment regulations . . . and showed little concern for a 
Justice Department fair-lending investigation in approving a recent bank 
acquisition. The failure to show support of the administration's efforts to 
combat lending discrimination and promote community reinvestment has 
created a rift between the Fed and the other bank regulators. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
208. See, e.g., Mitchell Zuckoff, US. Begins Bias Probe of Shawmut, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 9, l 993, at 39: 
The Justice Department has begun investigating ... a pattern of racially 
biased mortgage lending by Shawmut National Corp ... . 
After four years of sustained allegations that discrimination keeps blacks and 
Hispanics from obtaining mortgages, Shawmut has become the first banking 
corporation in New England and only the second in the country to come under 
scrutiny by federal prosecutors. 
The Justice Department, working with the Federal Trade Commission, began 
the probe ... based on a referral from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
209. See, e.g., Christine Dugas, A Matter of Equity-Feds Take Aim at Lending 
Discrimination, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 1994, at A33 ("Earlier this year, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. launched a sweeping probe into lending discrimination based on the 
1992 HMDA data. A number of banks will be selected for an in-depth investigation, 
which could result in a formal enforcement action or referral to the Justice Depart-
ment."); Paulette Thomas, US. Intensifies its Investigation of Lending Bias, WALL ST. 
J., May 15, 1992, at A2 ("[T]he Federal Deposit Insurance Corp .... told a House 
banking subcommittee ... that [it had] referred one discrimination case to the Justice 
Department.") ( emphasis added). 
210. See, e.g., Dugas, supra note 209, at A33 ("In late 1992, the Justice Department 
asked regulators to tag institutions that should be probed for fair lending violations. 
Since then, it has received about a half dozen referrals. Prior to that request, it had 
received only one such referral ever from any regulator.") (emphasis added); Bacon, 
supra note 142, at A2 ("[T]he Justice Department, operating on referrals from bank 
regulators, is investigating about six lenders for possible discrimination."). 
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Certainly, the paucity of referrals has not prevented the Justice 
Department from filing suits against lenders who practice financial 
redlining and unfair lending solely on the basis of gender, race, and 
marital status. For example, in 1992, "the Justice Department ... 
brought and settled its first lending discrimination suit. "211 "[T]he 
Department sued Decatur Federal Savings and Loan of Atlanta [under 
the Fair Housing Act and the ECOA] for allegedly discriminatory 
residential lending. The suit led to a consent decree providing $1 million 
in damages and a promise of changes in the bank's lending practic-
es."212 
A year later, the Department of Justice commenced a similar action 
against Shawmut Mortgage Co., a division of Shawmut Bank in New 
England. The Justice Department alleged that the mortgage company 
violated fair-lending laws213 by permitting race to influence its under-
writing standards.214 Shawmut settled the case with the DOJ, FTC, 
211. See Thomas, Persistent Gap, supra note 11, at A9. 
212. See Brad Kuhn, Barnett Lending Studied Part of National Bias Investigation, 
SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1993, at ID. See also, Thomas, Persistent Gap, supra note 11, 
at A9 ("The suit alleged ... that white applicants who didn't exactly meet credit 
standards often were given special considerations that blacks were not. In 1990, in a city 
that is 26% black, mortgages in white census tracts accounted for fully 97% of 
Decatur['s] home loans."). 
213. See Zuckoff, supra note 208, at 39: 
The Justice Department has begun investigating what federal bank regulators 
call a pattern of racially biased mortgage lending by Shawmut National Corp. 
After four years of sustained allegations that discrimination keeps blacks and 
Hispanics from obtaining mortgages, Shawmut has become the first banking 
corporation in New England and only the second in the country to come under 
scrutiny by federal prosecutors. 
The letter to Shawmut from the Justice Department and the FTC said the 
investigation likely would focus on possible violations of two federal laws, the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the antidiscrimination section of the Fair 
Housing Act. 
214. See Christina M. Gattuso, Fair Lending: Compliance after Chevy 
Chase-Enforcement of Fair Lending Laws Continues to be a Priority for the Federal 
Government, IO REV. BANKING & FIN. SERV. 141 (1994), available in WESTLAW, 
RBFS Database, 1994 WL 2256753: 
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The complaint alleged that between 1990 and 1992, Shawmut's policies and 
practices disadvantaged minorities because minorities were subject to more 
stringent standards than were white applicants, were provided with fewer 
opportunities than white applicants to document their qualifying information 
and were denied loans under underwriting policies and practices that had a 
greater negative impact on their chances for loan approval than the approval 
chances for white applicants .... 
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and the Fed, agreeing to establish a $960,000 compensation fund for the 
disgruntled consumers.215 
During late 1993 and 1994, the Justice Department settled three 
additional unfair-lending suits: The first action was filed against 
Blackpipe State Bank of Martin, South Dakota. The Justice Department 
"alleg[ed] that Blackpipe refused to make loans on Native[-]American 
reservations and set credit requirements that [did not] apply to 
whites."216 To settle the matter, "Blackpipe State Bank ... agreed to 
create a $125,000 fund to pay American Indians who were denied 
secured loans if the collateral was on an Indian reservation."217 The 
second settlement involved the First National Bank of Vicksburg. DOJ 
accused the Mississippi bank of "charging higher interest rates to 
[African-Americans] than [to] whites on unsecured home-improvement 
loans."218 Rather than fighting the charge, First National Bank agreed 
to pay compensatory and punitive damages for "pain and suffering."219 
215. See id.: 
The Shawmut case was interesting because notwithstanding that Shawmut had 
instituted a comprehensive fair lending policy that the DOJ and the FTC found 
to be an industry model, the DOJ and the FTC required Shawmut to enter into 
the consent decree to compensate minorities who had suffered injury in the 
period prior to implementation of Shawmut's fair lending policy. 
216. See Davidson, supra note 78, A4. See also Glater, supra note 207, at DI 
("Blackpipe State Bank of Martin, [South Dakota] ... settled in November 1993 after 
Justice accused the bank of discriminating by failing to accept as adequate collateral 
property located on an Indian reservation."). 
217. See Tony Munroe, Two Small Banks Settle Discrimination Suits, WASH. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 1994, at D8 (At the time, "Blackpipe [was] ... being sold to Stockmens 
National Bank of Nebraska and was told by regulators the sale would not be approved 
if the suit wasn't settled."). 
218. Id. ("[African-Americans] were charged interest rates of 14 percent to 21 
percent, while whites were charged about IO percent. The Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency ruled that the bank violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act and referred the case to the Justice Department."). 
219. Id. 
Under the agreement filed ... in federal court in Jackson, Miss., the bank 
will pay about $4,400 to 170 [African-Americans] who were charged the 
higher rates on loans averaging $2,000 between January 1990 and July 1993 . 
. . . (T]he figure includes punitive damages and compensation for "pain and 
suffering" associated with discrimination. 
First National also agreed to lower interest rates for all [African-Americans] 
who hold loans with discriminatory rates, set a goal to make at least $1 million 
in loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers, train loan officers in the 
principles of fair lending and randomly test employees to make sure minorities 
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DOJ's action against Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank is the most 
widely publicized suit. "[T]he Justice Department accused Chevy Chase 
Federal and its subsidiary B.F. Saul Mortgage Co. of discriminating 
against [African-American] neighborhoods in soliciting business, in its 
branch structure and in its commission system for loan originators."220 
Chevy Chase is an interesting and important case because it "marks the 
first time the Justice Department has brought a racial-discrimination suit 
against a lender for its marketing practices."221 To settle the 
Department's allegations that it violated the Fair Housing Act and the 
ECOA, Chevy Chase agreed to "open three mortgage offices and at least 
one branch in [African-American] areas of Washington. [In addition,] 
[t]he company agreed to advertise its services with real-estate agents 
who serve [African-American] areas."222 
Concluding that the Justice Department has investigated and sued only 
the lenders cited above would be fallacious.223 Furthermore, it would 
be incorrect to infer that lenders accused of violating the Equal Credit 
Opportunity and the Fair Housing Acts are usually willing to settle 
DOJ's complaints. First, as of this writing, "[t]he Justice Department ... 
is investigating possible mortgage-loan discrimination at Barnett Banks 
are treated the same as whites. 
Id. 
220. See Bass, supra note 78, at A2 ("The Justice Department said the company 
hadn't opened any branches in census tracts with a majority of [African-American] ... 
residents, which account for 90% of the district's African-American population."). 
221. Id. See also David Kleinbard, Chevy Chase Case Broadens Redlining to Mean 
Lending Bias Against an Area, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (MEMPHIS), Aug. 23, 1994, 
at B4 ('The Chevy Chase, (Maryland]-based bank denied it meant to discriminate against 
borrowers or that it violated the Fair Housing Act or the Community Reinvestment Act. 
The bank has $5.1 billion in assets and 78 branches in Maryland, Virginia and the 
District of Columbia."). 
222. See Bass, supra note 78, at A2. See also Robert Jackson, Washington Thrift 
Settles Redlining Case Law: Chevy Chase Federal to pay $11 Million, But it Denies it 
Withheld Services in Black Areas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, at D2: 
The settlement is unique because previous anti-discrimination efforts by the 
Justice Department have targeted banks and savings and loans that redlined 
individual loan applicants. The Chevy Chase action charged that the bank 
blocked out entire neighborhoods in which it refused to market its services. 
Under the first-of-its-kind settlement, the bank's $11 million will be used to 
establish a special below-market loan program for residents in areas that were 
allegedly redlined and to open branches and mortgage offices in those 
neighborhoods .... 
223. See, e.g., John R. Wilke, Home-Loan Pricing is Focus of Probe into Racial 
Bias, WALL ST. J., May 1995, at Cl5 ("The Justice Department is probing possible 
racial bias in loan pricing among home-mortgage lenders .... The investigations ... 
continue an expansion of enforcement efforts beyond evaluating racial bias in 
underwriting-that is, who gets a loan-to the actual rates and price or 'points' charged 
on a loan."). 
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Inc., Florida's biggest bank, and [at] Northern Trust Corp., a [large] 
bank in Chicago."224 Second, on several occasions, lenders have 
refused to enter various consent decrees and settle charges levied against 
them; therefore, the Justice Department has asked federal courts for help, 
citing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.225 Expectedly, some courts 
have supported the Attorney General; other tribunals have not. 
Courts in the Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted the 
Justice Department's ECOA arguments and granted appropriate relief. 
For example, in United States v. American Future Systems, Inc.,226 the 
Attorney General sued the corporation, alleging that it was a creditor 
within the meaning of the ECOA and that certain of its business 
practices violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.227 American 
Future asserted that it was not a "creditor" under the Act; therefore, the 
ECOA did not regulate its activities. In addition, American Future 
argued that, assuming it was a "creditor," it never discriminated on the 
basis of impermissible factors.228 The Third Circuit accepted the 
Justice Department's arguments and held that the corporation violated 
the ECOA. The court found that American Future designed and 
administered a credit program on the basis of race, sex, and marital 
224. See Kleinbard, supra note 221, at 84; Kuhn, supra note 212, at ID: 
The Justice Department is investigating minority lending practices at Barnett 
Banks as part of a national investigation of lending bias .... 
Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell ... said the department was 
conducting preliminary and full-fledged investigations of lending practices at 
a handful of banks, which he would not identify. The banks are all in 
metropolitan areas with significant minority populations, Hubbell told a U.S. 
House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs subcommittee. Hubbell said the 
Justice Department intends to file lawsuits against banks found to be 
discriminatory. 
225. See also Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp 489, 491 (S.D. 
Ohio 1976) (There, the Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief and adopted 
complainants' theory under the Civil Rights Act of 1968: Oakley Building & Loan 
Association redlined and refused to make loans in heavily populated minority 
communities.). 
226. 743 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1984). 
227. Id. at 171 ("[DOJ argued that the corporation] violated the ECOA by treating 
minorities, males and married persons less favorably than single white females in their 
credit programs."). 
228. Id. ("[A]ppellants ... argue[d] that the district court erred as a matter of law 
in finding them to be creditors and therefore subject to the terms of the ECOA.") 
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status "which were not related to the social need [the] programs sought 
to address. "229 
A fairly similar outcome appears in United States v. Landmark 
Financial Services, Inc. 230 There, the Attorney General sued Landmark, 
arguing that the lender's credit policies and practices discriminated 
against elderly applicants.231 Landmark asserted that the Justice 
Department had no authority to commence the action. Maryland's district 
court disagreed, stating that the ECOA "allows the FTC and, in tum, the 
Attorney General to bring [the] action" and to seek injunctive relief and 
civil penalties.232 And, in United States v. Blake233 an Oklahoma 
district court accepted the FTC and Justice Department's theory that a 
five-year statute of limitations applies in ECOA cases and permitted the 
action to proceed on the merits.234 
Contrarily, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rebuffed the 
Department's efforts to enforce the ECOA. In United States v. ITT 
Consumer Financial Corp.,235 the government asserted: Lenders who 
extend credit and loans in equal-management, community-property states 
discriminate against married women by requiring wives to obtain their 
husbands' signatures before securing a loan.236 But the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed and held that "a lender [may require a] spouse's signature 
when a married applicant relies on his or her spouse's future earnings to 
establish creditworthiness."237 
Finally, a federal district judge in New Jersey seriously undermined 
the Justice Department's endeavor to stop financial institutions from 
229. Id. at 182. 
230. 612 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1985). 
231. Id. at 624 ("'The government specifically allege[d) that Landmark□ [violated] 
section 70l(a)(l) of the ECOA ... and Section 202.4 of Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 202.4. "'). 
232. Id. at 626. 
233. 751 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Okla. 1990). 
234. Id. at 953 ( concluding that "the two-year statute of limitations applies to 
[ s ]ection 706 and the five-year statute of limitations applies to actions taken by the FTC 
under [ s ]ection 704 of the ECOA''). 
235. 8 I 6 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987). 
236. Id. at 488 ("The government argue[ d] that defendants discriminate[ d] against 
married applicants when they require[d] a spouse's signature in order to count the 
spouse's future earnings toward establishing creditworthiness for a loan."). 
237. Id. at 491. The Ninth Circuit also observed: 
We have stated that "[t]he ECOA makes it unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate with respect to any credit transaction on the basis of marital 
status." However, section 705 of the ECOA provides in part: "Consideration 
or application of State property laws shall not constitute discrimination for 
purposes of this subchapter." 
Id. at 489 ( citation omitted). 
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violating the ECOA. In United States v. Beneficial Corp.,238 DOJ 
argued "that Beneficial had discriminated against credit applicants on the 
basis of marital status and age .... To rectify [the) alleged violations, 
the United States [asked the court to award] injunctive relief [as well as] 
money damages ... for pain and suffering, emotional hann, inconve-
nience, loss of civil rights, and out-of-pocket losses."239 Simply put, 
the district court refused to accept the Justice Department's argument 
and held that the ECOA does not authorize the Attorney General to seek 
money damages.240 
Without doubt, these types of judicial conflicts will become more 
evident as more suits are filed; and it appears that the DOJ will file 
additional actions against lenders.241 And, of course, "lenders are 
counterattacking."242 Therefore, at this point, the following point is 
238. 492 F. Supp. 682 (D.N.J. 1980), ajf'd mem., 673 F.2d 1302 (3d Cir. 1981). 
239. Id. at 683. 
240. Id. at 688 (finding that "15 U.S.C. § 169l(e)-(h) authorizes the Attorney 
General to seek a wide range of equitable remedies, but not legal money damages."). But 
see United States v. Landmark Financial Services Inc., 612 F. Supp. 623,631 (D. Md. 
1985) (acknowledging "that by allowing this matter to proceed under section 704(c) of 
the ECOA[,] [the court] will allow the government to seek those remedies (civil penalties 
and consumer redress) that the Third Circuit has held are unavailable under section 706 
of the same act."). See also Albert R. Karr & Viveca Novak, Stronger Penalties for 
Reinvestment Act are Ruled Illegal by Justice Department, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1994, 
at A6: 
Walter Dellinger, an assistant attorney for the department's office of legal 
counsel, ruled that ... four regulatory agencies ... lacked legal authority, 
under the Community Reinvestment Act, to use the proposed stronger 
sanctions against banks and thrifts that don't meet the credit needs of their 
communities. The proposed rules would have allowed the [OCC, Fed, FDIC, 
and OTS] to levy penalties against the worst offenders .... 
241. See, e.g., Gattuso, supra note 214 ("[I]t appears that the DOJ will continue to 
pursue aggressively alleged fair lending violations, even under theories of liability that 
are untested by the courts .... [T]he DOJ recently announced that it was considering a 
lawsuit against a financial institution for racially discriminating in the risk pricing of 
loans."). 
242. See Albert R. Karr, Federal Drive to Curb Mortgage-Loan Bias Stirs Strong 
Backlash, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at Al, AIO: 
America's Community Bankers, the thrift trade group, has established a 
$100,000 war chest for purposes such as filing amicus briefs ... , drafting 
legal defenses against the federal fair-lending drive and financing public-
relations and advertising campaigns .... 
. . . Bankers "want someone to fight one of these cases, to test government 
theories in court" and to settle issues left unresolved by consent agreements 
such as that involving Chevy Chase. . . . Barnett Bank is a leading candidate 
645 
worth stressing: Lenders' and consumer advocates' failure to appreciate 
the severity of these major substantive and procedural divisions will only 
lead to a piecemeal enforcement of fair-lending laws and to more 
expensive litigation. Clearly these results do not serve the best interests 
of either applicants, borrowers or those who invest in various financial 
institutions. 
B. State Attorney Generals' and Finance Commissioners' Fair-
Lending and Financial-Redlining Suits 
Over the past twenty years, only a few state attorneys general have 
conducted thorough, independent investigations to determine whether 
lenders are violating states' fair-lending laws or practicing mortgage 
redlining. In 1988, Michigan's Attorney General and a special panel 
investigated banks that allegedly practiced mortgage redlining in 
Michigan's urban areas.243 A year later, the Attorney General of New 
York investigated four major banks who allegedly discriminated against 
racial minorities.244 Four years later, "Pennsylvania's attorney general 
... investigat[ed] allegations that Lincoln Savings Bank of Carnegie 
engage[d] in discriminatory lending practices."245 This latter investiga-
tion was significant because (1) it occurred in Pittsburgh, which is often 
presented "as a national model of cooperation between banks and 
for this role. 
Id. at AIO. 
243. See, e.g., David Everett & Teresa Blossom, Panel to Probe Detroit Bank Loan 
Patterns, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 29, 1988, at IA: 
Id. 
Michigan House Speaker Gary Owen appointed a special legislative 
committee ... to investigate bank lending patterns in Detroit and [in] the 
state's other large cities. 
State attorney general Frank Kelley, a frequent critic of banks and their 
powerful lobbyists said, "I would support any reform of ... state laws which 
would enable better enforcement." 
244. See New York Banks Charged with Bias on New Accounts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
15, 1989, available in 1989 WL-WSJ 490431. 
245. See Steve Massey, Lincoln Savings' Loans Probed Community Group Says 
Institution Discriminates Against Black People, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 
1993, at C7: 
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[Lincoln Savings] was targeted because Lincoln failed to attempt to make 
loans in black neighborhoods and is representative of smaller banks and thrifts 
in the region . 
. . . Trent Hargrove, a deputy attorney general heading civil[-]rights 
enforcement, said in a lerter to [the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment 
Group] that he had reviewed its allegations and "that further review is 
warranted to determine if Lincoln Savings is in violation of fair lending laws 
by engaging in an improper difference in treatment based on race." 
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community groups"; and (2) "the largest disparity between loan approval 
rates for black[s] and white[s] ... was not among the poor but among 
middle-income applicants."246 
Georgia's and Massachusetts's Attorneys General also have conducted 
major probes to determine the breadth and severity of mortgage 
redlining. In 1993, the Attorney General of Massachusetts selected "three 
dozen banks ... [and reviewed their} ... residential mortgage lending 
decisions;"247 and Georgia's Attorney General investigated Fleet 
Financial, a major lender in Georgia, to discover whether Fleet violated 
state fair-lending laws.248 
Significantly, although these probes uncovered major violations, most 
state governments refused to file major lawsuits in state courts. "[Ten 
banks] reached a settlement with the Massachusetts Attorney General to 
settle the state's probe of possible discriminatory lending practices."249 
246. Id. 
247. See Mitchell Zuckoff, Bias Inquiry Seen Focusing On 36 Banks, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May I, 1993, at 8 ("Three dozen Massachusetts banks have been targeted by the 
state attorney general for an investigation of alleged mortgage lending discrimination . 
. . . (T)he probe is part of a larger effort by (Attorney General] Harshbarger to hold 
financial institutions accountable for their lending practices."). 
248. See generally Shelley Emling, Fleet Using Print Ads to Boost Image-But 
Favorable Ruling Not End of legal Woes, ATLANTA CONST., Jun. 17, 1993, at D5: 
In an attempt to regain trust lost in months of charges of loan-sharking and 
racketeering, Fleet Finance Inc. is using a win in state Supreme Court to 
launch an aggressive marketing campaign . 
. . . [T)he state's largest second-mortgage lender is telling borrowers "the 
record has been set straight" by the court, which ruled this week that Fleet had 
broken no laws. 
But even the majority opinion of the court took the company to task for 
lending practices that may be "exorbitant, unethical and perhaps even 
immoral." 
Fleet still faces two class-action lawsuits, in Cobb and Richmond counties, 
and an investigation by [Georgia's) Attorney General's Office. 
"We will continue our investigation without letup," said Attorney General 
Michael J. Bowers. 
249. See Gary Putka, Shawmut Unit for Mongages is Reorganized, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 3, I 993, at B5 ("The banks agreed to new practices that could increase their 
lending in low-income areas and to make as much as $2 million in restitution for 130 
minority applicants who were denied mortgages in 1990. "); Massachusetts, Banks Settle 
loan Bias Fight, 3 AM. BANKER'S WASH. WATCH, Dec. 13, 1993, 1993 WL 2772588, 
at 5 ("Mortgage lenders in Massachusetts reached an agreement in principle Dec. 2 with 
the state's attorney general in the nations nastiest batch of lending bias cases to date.") 
(emphasis added). But see Mitchell Zuckoff, SIC To Hear Bias Probe Challenge, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1993, at 31: 
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Similarly, in Georgia, Fleet Financial agreed to settle the case "to 
prevent the Georgia Attorney General from filing unfair-lending charges" 
in state court.250 
Of course, a few state attorneys general have been active in a different 
way. Fairly recently, a small number of state banking, insurance, civil-
rights, and human-rights commissioners referred redlining and unfair-
lending controversies to state attorneys general for further consideration. 
Some attorneys general filed amicus curiae briefs when regulators sued 
insurers and lenders251 in state courts. Others, however, initiated 
actions on behalf of various commissioners to resolve either state-
constitutional or federal-preemption questions. As we have come to 
expect, these latter enforcement initiatives also have produced contradic-
The state's highest court has agreed to consider a challenge to Attorney 
General Scott Harshbarger's investigation of Massachusetts banks for alleged 
mortgage discrimination. 
The state Supreme Judicial Court did not set a date for hearing the case, 
which combines lawsuits filed against Harshbarger by IO banks and the 
Massachusetts Bankers Association. 
The banks claim[ed] Harshbarger's investigation [was] outside his authority 
and [was] more properly the job of the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination. 
250. See Suzanne A. Ryan, Fleet Financial Commits $8.5 Billion to Minorities, 
Low-Income Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1994, at A2. See also Suzanne A. Ryan, 
Fleet Financial Unit in Georgia Settles Complaints, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1993, at A2: 
A unit of Fleet Financial Group Inc. agreed to lend $70 million at reduced 
interest rates and to make up to about $35 million in other concessions to 
settle complaints of unfair lending practices in Georgia. 
Fleet agreed to the Georgia settlement, according to the state's attorney 
general, to prevent charges of unfair lending that otherwise would have been 
filed by the state. 
251. See, e.g., Al Delugach, State Suit Alleges Mortgage Firm 'Red/ined' Blacks, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, I 988, at I (Part 4): 
648 
The state ... sued to revoke the licenses of First Alliance Mortgage Co. for 
alleged racial discrimination in lending, charging that the firm used a list of 
ZIP codes entitled "Never Never Land" to screen out loan applicants in 
predominantly black neighborhoods. 
The Corporations Department said its action is believed to be the first use 
of the state's I I-year-old Holden Act outlawing ... redlining practices. The 
law covers racially discriminatory real estate lending by certain types of 
lenders but does not include banks and savings and loans. 
(VOL. 33: 583, I 996) Consumers 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
tory mortgage- and insurance-redlining rulings among state courts252 
and the federal circuits. 
For example, in Conference of Federal Savings and Loans Ass 'ns v. 
Stein,253 California's Attorney General sued a savings and loan254 on 
252. It is extremely clear that brokers' as well as loan officers' "cultural biases" 
contribute to mortgage redlining and unfair-lending practices. See, e.g., Hamey, supra 
note l 19, at K4 ("New changes to mortgage underwriting rules [are] being distributed 
to lenders . . . . The revisions direct local mortgage companies to take off their middle-
class blinders ... [and] ... ask lenders to take a deeper look, beyond the surface 
stereotypes."); Alan Keyes, Incentives to Fight Racism in Lending, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
23, 1992, at Al 2: 
Mortgage loans are made by human beings, and human beings have a way of 
rationalizing [wrong] decisions .... !fa loan officer is white and doesn't like 
to lend to blacks, it's not going to go down as a racist decision. The loan 
officer is going to look closely enough to find something wrong with the 
application. 
ld. Furthermore, low-minority employment in the banking and mortgage industries is 
likely to decrease women's as well as minorities' access to credit and loans. See, e.g., 
Jerry DeMuth, Lenders Add Programs for Minorities; Industry to Address Hiring, 
Mortgage Policies, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, l 993, at El ("The mortgage banking industry 
... is initiating progtams to increase minority employment, train mortgage bankers to 
encourage minority home buyers and identify minority attitudes toward the home-lending 
application process .... 'Minority staff has historically been relatively low in mortgage 
origination areas."'). Therefore, state finance commissioners and attorney generals have 
tried to prevent lenders from practicing impermissible employment discrimination and 
from allowing cultural stereotypes to influence credit and lending decisions. Some state 
supreme courts have supported these efforts; others, however, have not. Compare Kansas 
Commission on Civil Rights v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 532 P.2d 1263, 1268-71 (Kan. 
1975) (supporting the commissioner's authority to eliminate credit discrimination under 
Kansas Act Against Discrimination, KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1002(h)(i) & 44-
1009(c)(l) (1993)); Hutchinson Human Relations Comm'n v. Midland Credit 
Management, Inc., 517 P.2d 158, 167-69 (Kan. 1973) (recognizing the commissioner's 
authority to prevent discriminatory hiring practices on the basis of race); W. Va. Human 
Rights Comm'n v. Moore, 411 S.E.2d 702, 707 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that the 
commissioner of West Virginia Human Rights Commission has authority to investigate 
a bank's alleged discriminatory practices under W. VA. CODE§ 5-11-10 and "authority 
to issue a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 5-11-8(d)(l)"); and 
Equitable Trust Co. v. State Comm'n on Human Relations, 399 A.2d 908,916 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1979) (upholding the commissioner's authority to investigate alleged racial 
and gender discrimination in financing under MD. ANN. CODE. art. 49B, §§ 8, 13, 15; 
and art. 76A, § 3(b)(i)); with McKibbin v. Michigan Corp. and Sec. Comm'n, 119 
N.W.2d 557, 561 (Mich. 1963) (holding that Michigan's corporation and securities 
commissioner did not have authority under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.3a to revoke a 
broker's license for allegedly discriminating on the basis of race.) 
253. 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), ajf'd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980). 
254. ld. at 1259 ("[The government sued] the West Coast Federal Savings and Loan 
Association in Superior Court of San Mateo County .... The defendant was charged 
with [violating the anti-redlining act] .... [The government] sought statutory damages 
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behalf of the secretary of business. The suit alleged that the lender 
violated California's Housing Financial Discrimination Act of 1977.255 
The Conference Association and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
countersued. They claimed that California's Secretary of Business did 
not have any authority to halt mortgage redlining because federal statutes 
and regulations preempted the Act.256 The Ninth Circuit agreed, 
stating that "the regulatory control of the Bank Board over federal 
savings and loan associations is so pervasive as to leave no room for 
state regulatory control. "257 
The Third Circuit also have undermined state attorneys' general 
attempts to prevent mortgage redlining. In National State Bank v. 
Long,258 several national banks sued New Jersey's Commissioner of 
Banking. The bankers argued that federal laws259 preempt New 
Jersey's anti-redlining statute;260 therefore, the Commissioner could not 
investigate their redlining activities nor issue cease-and-desist orders. The 
federal district court did not accept the bankers' argument. The court 
stated: "[W]e conclude that the state act's prohibitory requirements are 
not pre-empted with respect to ... national banks."261 On appeal, the 
Third Circuit adopted a contrary view: "[We] [are] unable to [accept] the 
district court's determination that state officials have the power to issue 
in the sum of $2500 .... ") (citation omitted). 
255. Id. at 1258-59 ("[The] Act ... prohibit[ed] discrimination in lending 'due .. . 
to the consideration of race, color, religion, ... or ancestry' of the borrower, or 'due .. . 
to the consideration of conditions . . . in the neighborhood or geographic area 
surrounding the housing accommodation' of the borrower, ... commonly known as 'red-
lining."'). 
256. Id. at 1259 ("[T)he Conference ... and certain federal associations ... sought 
a declaration that the Act was pre-empted by federal legislation and regulations. The 
Bank Board filed a cross claim against [the Attorney General], seeking to enjoin him 
from attempting to enforce the provisions of the state act .... "). 
257. Id. at 1260. 
258. 469 F. Supp. 1068 (D.N.J. 1979). 
259. Id. at 1070 ("[T]he following three federal statutes have some impact on the 
issue of pre-emption: the [Home Mortgage Disclosure Act]; the [Community Reinvest-
ment Act]; and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act .... All three statutes appear to have 
... some impact on the practice of redlining .... "). 
260. Id. at 1072: 
[New Jersey's] act's prohibitory requirements are contained in ... N.J. STAT. 
ANN.[§§] 17:16F-3 & F-7 ... [and in] ... N.J. STAT. ANN.(§§] 17:16F-8 to 
F-11. Section 3 ... prohibits depository institutions from discriminating on 
any basis not supported by a reasonable analysis of the lending risks associated 
with an applicant or by the condition of property proposed as security .... 
Under section 8, the [commissioner] has the power to investigate "any matter 
pertaining to this act." .... 
261. Id. at 1078 ("[W]e see nothing to prohibit the defendant from issuing cease and 
desist order for any violations of section 3 that can be discovered through the 
information [the banks] are required to disclose [under] HMDA."). 
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cease and desist order against national banks [that violate New Jersey's 
anti-redlining] statute."262 The circuit court observed that "Congress 
delegated [the] enforcement of statutes and regulations against 
national banks to the Comptroller of the Currency"263 rather than to 
state commissioners or attorneys general. 
A very different conclusion, however, is found in Michigan Savings 
and Loan League v. Francis.264 In 1977, Michigan enacted an anti-
redlining statute, the Michigan Mortgages Lending Act.265 Shortly 
thereafter, "a group of federally chartered savings and loan associations 
... and the Michigan Savings and Loan League [sued for declaratory 
relief, arguing] that they [were] exempt from the provisions of the ... 
Act. "266 The district court dismissed the complaint, stating: "We 
decline to follow the [Ninth Circuit's] decision in Conference . ... [W]e 
have no jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of plaintiffs' complaint 
against the . . . Commissioner. "267 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed, dismissing the fact 
that the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding in 
Conference of Federal Savings and Loans Assn. v. Stein.268 The Sixth 
Circuit held that "[p ]laintiff's assertion of federal preemption was [only] 
a defense to the threatened enforcement of [Michigan's anti-redlining 
act]. Therefore, it could not provide the basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction."269 Obviously, the appellate court's procedural ruling 
262. National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 988 (3d Cir. 1980). 
263. Id. 
264. 490 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
265. Id. at 894. 
The Act prohibits credit granting institutions from discriminating against 
borrowers on the basis of "racial or ethnic characteristics or trends in the 
neighborhood in which the real estate is located." [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 445.1602{l){a)] The Act further provides that when a mortgage loan is 
rejected, the lending institution must furnish the rejected borrower with a 
written statement delineating the reasons for rejection. [MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 445. 1602(2), (5)] 
... "Credit granting institutions" {also are required to] post notices [in 
each of their offices J inform[ing] all persons ... to file complaints concerning 
redlining with the ... Commissioner .... 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
266. Id. at 893. 
267. Id. at 897. 
268. See Stein v. Conference of Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'ns, 445 U.S. 921 (1980). 
269. Michigan Sav. and Loan League v. Francis, 683 F.2d 957,960 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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does not prevent Michigan from enforcing a significant portion of its 
anti-redlining statute. In fact, the decision helps. Quite frankly, after 
Francis, the government may still order '"credit granting institutions' to 
maintain detailed records, file reports, post notices, and inform all [loan 
applicants] to file ... redlining [complaints] with the ... Commission-
er."270 Without doubt, this is a powerful enforcement weapon. 
C. State Attorneys' General and Insurance Commissioners' Equal-
Access and Insurance-Redlining Suits 
Unquestionably, an exceptional number of consumers believe state 
insurance commissioners are not doing enough to end redlining and the 
unequal access to affordable insurance.271 In fact, some consumer 
advocates have accused commissioners of either sanctioning or fostering 
insurance redlining and discrimination.272 Consequently, women and 
low-income minority advocates have sued some commissioners for 
failing to halt discriminatory practices. Surprisingly, state courts have 
ruled consistently in favor of the insurance commissioners.273 
Id. 
270. 490 F. Supp. at 894. 
271. See, e.g., Insurance Czars See Red, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1995, at Al 8: 
As in banking, the supposition by activists is than an industry ignores profit 
opportunities because it holds to false stereotypes about blacks and Hispanics. 
The National Association of Insurance Conunissioners (NAIC) issued a 
report recently tiptoeing around that belief .... 
To what extent is there discrimination? A survey of blacks and Hispanics in 
five big cities ... found that ... many suspected bias .... 
272. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. 
273. See, e.g., City of Compton v. Bunner, 243 Cal. Rptr. 100, 128 (Cal. 1988) 
(ordered not to be officially published July 21, 1988) (dismissing insurance consumers' 
and civil-rights advocates' redlining action against an insurer and California's insurance 
conunissioner because complainants failed to exhaust administrative remedies); County 
of L.A. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 132 Cal. App. 3d 77, 88, 182 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885 (1982) 
(dismissing lower-class minorities' anti-redlining and territorial-classification suit because 
complainants "failed to exhaust the appropriate ... administrative procedures and the 
appropriate judicial method of compelling [California's insurance commissioner] to carry 
out [his] ... duties [respecting] alleged[ly] unlawful practices .... "); Women 
Organized for Employment v. Stein, 114 Cal. App. 3d 133, 140, 170 Cal. Rptr. 176, 181 
(1980) ("A passage in appellants' reply brief suggest that they are charging [the] ... 
[i]nsurance [c]onunissioner ... with abusing his discretion by arbitrarily failing to 
collect [anti-redlining, gender and race discrimination data]. No authority is cited for the 
suggestion .... Perceiving no merit in it, we decline to consider it."); Prospect Area 
Haus. Dev. Fund Co., Inc. v. Schenck, 337 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) 
(dismissing low-income consumers' rates-discrimination action against New York's 
conunissioner of insurance because the complaint failed to state a cognizable cause of 
action). 
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But notwithstanding consumers' perceptions, a small number of state 
attorneys general have sued "deviant" insurers on behalf of various 
commissioners who have tried to prevent race- and gender-based 
discrimination. The majority of these suits were filed in state courts 
during the 1970s. Regrettably, aggrieved consumers did not prevail. For 
example, in 1974, Iowa's district court decided Homesteaders Life 
Insurance Co. v. Iowa State Civil Rights Commission. In Homesteaders, 
a female employee accused her employer/insurer of practicing gender 
discrimination.274 Iowa's Civil-Rights Commission agreed275 and 
ordered the insurer to stop. The insurer refused, thereby forcing the 
attorney general to sue. The district court did not find any impermissible 
discrimination, held for the insurer, and ordered the Commission to 
dismiss the gender-discrimination complaint.276 
Four years later, a lower court in New York also decided against 
female employees and consumers. In Rochester Hospital Service Corp. 
v. Division of Human Rights of the Executive Department of New 
York,277 a female employee filed a complaint with the human-rights 
division, alleging that a health insurer discriminated on the basis of 
marital status.278 The Division investigated the complaint, determined 
274. No. 76241, 1974 WL 2785 at *2-*3 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 5, 1974). 
We are alleging a violation of[IOWA CODE§ 105A (1971)] regarding wages 
and emoluments offered to male employees and fringe benefits offered to 
female employees. The complaining witness was discharged ... because of 
her activities in regard to this [c]omplaint and was discriminated against on the 
basis of sex .... 
. . . [Also,] [u]nder [a] group insurance policy maternity benefits were 
available ... to dependents of male employees but were not available to female 
employees ... . 
275. Id. at *3 ("The Commission found that Homesteaders discriminated in the 
pattern and practice of recruitment, hiring and placement of employees on the basis or 
race and sex, and in the pattern and practice concerning remuneration and promotion on 
the basis of sex .... "). 
276. Id. at *7 ("The findings of the ... Commission ... that Homesteaders 
'discriminates in employment' ... should be set aside and the complaint filed with the 
Commission should be dismissed."). 
277. 401 N.Y.S.2d 413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I 977). 
278. Id. at 415. The complaint alleged that the insurer violated N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§§ 292, subd. 9 & 296, subd. 2(a)(McKinney l 977). The latter subdivision "makes it an 
unlawful discriminatory practice for any person in charge of a 'place of public 
accommodation ... to refuse, withhold from or deny ... any of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities or privileges . . . [because of the] . . . marital status' of any 
person." Id. 
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that it had jurisdiction, found evidence of discrimination and "scheduled 
a formal hearing to adjudicate the charges."279 The insurer balked and 
asked the court for declaratory relief. From the company's perspective, 
only the insurance commissioner had authority "to control the totality of 
[health] insurance within the state."280 The court agreed, stating among 
other things that "[ m ]arital status [was] not listed as an unlawful 
discriminatory rate classification" under New York's insurance code.281 
In 1978, the South Dakota Supreme Court decided South Dakota 
Division of Human Rights v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,282 
whose facts closely resembled those reported in Homesteaders and in 
Rochester. An unmarried, female employee gave birth to a child and 
filed a maternity-benefits claim under her employer's group insurance 
policy.283 Prudential, the insurer, denied the claim. The employee 
"filed a complaint with the Commissioner alleging that ... 'marriage is 
not a prerequisite for pregnancy[;] [therefore, the] policy discriminate[ d] 
against unwed mothers and married women who . . . would not list their 
husbands as dependents. "'284 The Commissioner asserted its jurisdic-
tion over the insurer, accepted the employee's theory of the case and 
ordered Prudential to comply with the terms of South Dakota's human-
rights act. 285 
Prudential appealed the commissioner's decision. The supreme court 
reversed in favor of the insurer. The court held that the human-rights 
statute "only [regulated a business's] employment policies and practices 
279. Id. at 415. 
280. Id. The insurer also asked the court to prevent "the Division from making any 
determinations concerning the validity of such policies and practices or the premium 
rates charged thereof." Id. 
281. Id. at 416. See also New York Comm'n On Human Rights v. Liberty Mutual 
Ins. Co., 352 N.Y.S.2d 466,467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
The proceeding against [Liberty Mutual] alleges that it has engaged in 
discriminatory practices on the basis of race, color and national origin, with 
respect to recruitment and promotion of its personnel. [The insurer claims] 
that [its] budget analyses are privileged memoranda which, if made public, 
could reveal sensitive financial information to competitors and further that they 
provide absolutely no data of employees' race or national origins. We feel that 
the Commissioner has failed to establish the relevancy of the requested budget 
analyses to its inquiry and we therefore reverse this provision of the order . 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
282. 273 N.W.2d 111 (S.D. 1978). 
283. Id. at 112 ("The policy provided certain medical and hospital expense benefits 
to ... employees who [were] covered individuals under the policy's terms."). 
284. Id. Specifically, complainant argued "that [the] denial of maternity benefits 
constituted sex discrimination in employment and public accommodations ... under the 
South Dakota Human Relations Act of 1972 [S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13 
(1972)]." Id. 
285. Id. at 112-13. 
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[rather than an] insurers['] ... insurance policies .... "286 The South 
Dakota Supreme Court also concluded that the maternity-benefits 
provision only discriminated on the basis of marital status; therefore, 
Prudential neither fostered nor practiced impermissible insurance and 
employment discrimination.287 
Finally, at least two insurance commissioners have defended their 
actions against insurers who allegedly practiced insurance discrimination 
on the basis of race. In British Foreign Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Stewart,288 New York's Superintendent of Insurance cited seven 
companies for violating the state's anti-redlining statute.289 According 
to the Superintendent, the property insurers "practiced racial discrimina-
tion [ when they decided to cancel commercial fire-insurance policies] in 
the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant areas of New York City."290 The 
insurers challenged the Superintendent's conclusion in state court, 
arguing that "the cancellation ... was purely a business decision, [as 
defined under New York's insurance code]."291 The court accepted the 
insurers' argument, finding "that the [ s ]uperintendent failed to adduce 
any evidence [ of] ... illegal discrimination."292 The court found that 
the insurers only wanted to reduce their exposure to possible risks; racial 
286. Id. at 114. 
287. Id. at l l 5 ("[W]e hold that the exclusion of single persons . . . from the 
matemity[-]benefits coverage ... does not constitute sex discrimination [under] the Act 
. . .. "). Without doubt, the reasoning in Prndential as well as the holdings in 
Homesteaders and in Rochester are truly incredible. For example, the Prndential court 
correctly observed that "[a]lthough women are the only ones physically capable of 
pregnancy and childbirth, both men and women are legally capable of incurring 
responsibility and liability for bills [associated with the] expense of maternity." Id. But 
single, working parents--who are significantly more likely to be women--also incur 
similar bills and responsibilities. Without doubt, permitting insurers to award maternity 
benefits on the basis of marital status is reprehensible, because the adverse consequences 
associated with this policy are profoundly more likely to harm employed, single women 
and their unborn children rather than employed, married men. 
288. 281 N.E.2d 149 (N.Y. 1972). 
289. See N.Y. INS. LAW§ 40, subd. 10 (Consol. 1970), which provides in pertinent 
part: "[No insurance company] shall make any distinction or discrimination between 
persons because of race, color, creed or national origin, as to the premiums or rates 
charged for insurance policies or in any other manner whatever." 
290. 281 N.E.2d at 150. 
291. Id. But the court observed: "[T]he mere fact that [insurers'] action may serve 
a valid commercial or economic purpose will not, in and of itself, render such action 
permissible, if evidence . . . demonstrate[ s] that [insurers] illegally discriminate[ d] 
against [African-Americans]." Id. at 152 n.4. 
292. Id. at 150. 
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hostility did not influence the insurers' decision to cancel the fire 
policies.293 
A year after British Foreign Marine, a state court undermined 
Maryland's efforts to end insurance discrimination against inner-city 
residents in Baltimore. In Insurance Commissioner of Maryland v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.,294 consumers filed grievances with the insur-
ance commissioner, claiming that insurers were discriminating in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of Maryland's statute.295 
The commissioner ordered the companies to stop canceling policies 
arbitrarily.296 The insurers appealed the commissioner's orders. After 
examining records and citing British Foreign Marine, the Maryland court 
of appeals reversed the commissioner's orders.297 
Id. 
293. Id. at 152. 
[T]he petitioners made a calculated business decision to reduce their fire 
insurance business in New York. Concluding that they were over-committed 
in the sale of fire insurance in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant . . . the 
petitioners decided to cancel certain insurance policies in these two areas. In 
short, it seems that their 'plan of action' was not based on any desire to 
discriminate. 
294. 302 A.2d 200 (Md. 1973) 
295. Id. at 201. See id. at 206 (citing MD. ANN. CODE ART. 48A § 234A(a) (1971)), 
which stated in pertinent part: 
No insurer, agent or broker shall cancel or refuse to underwrite or renew a 
particular insurance risk or class of risk for any reason based in whole or in 
part upon race, color, creed or sex of an applicant or policyholder or for any 
arbitrary, capricious, or unfairly discriminatory reason. In the case of a 
cancellation of or refusal to renew a policy, provided the insured requests of 
the Commissioner that a review be undertaken of the insurer's action prior to 
the effective date of termination of the policy, and provided the Commissioner 
initiates action toward issuance of a finding in accord with § 234C, such 
policy shall remain in effect until such finding is issued. 
296. 302 A.2d at 202 ("The Commissioner [found that] . . . Allstate was in 
violation of Art. 48A, § 234A(a) [when] it 'arbitrarily, capriciously or for unfairly 
discriminatory reasons' issued a notice of intent not to renew the coverages in the 
policy."). 
297. Id. at 207. 
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In both [cases], there was no evidence either before the Commissioner or the 
Baltimore City Court on appeal of any arbitrary, capricious, or unfairly 
discriminatory reason applied by either Allstate or Aetna in declining to renew 
the respective policies, based upon race, color, creed or sex of the policyhold-
ers or any similar reason. The evidence established that each insurer made its 
decision not to renew upon its established underwriting criteria and for no 
other reason. The facts in each case abundantly established this and there was 
no evidence to the contrary. 
Id. 
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V. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-REDLINING AND FAIR-LENDING 
LAWS IN FEDERAL COURTS 
As we have learned, only a few state and federal regulatory agencies 
have tried to stop insurance or mortgage redlining. Even fewer agencies 
have attacked unfair-lending and discriminatory-insurance practices. We 
also know something else: Consumer advocates often report that insurers 
refuse to sell affordable insurance and lenders refuse to extend credit 
solely on the basis of race, gender and marital status. Therefore, given 
state and federal governments' inability or unwillingness to curtail these 
practices, some consumers and their advocates have filed several private 
actions against lenders and insurers.298 But more important, fairly 
298. See, e.g., Armando Acuna, Home Savings Named in Redlining Suit Buyers 
Claim Bias Made Loan for Inner-City Property Less Favorable, L.A. TIMES, Jan. I, 
I 987, at 3 (Part 2) ("San Diego County's director of the office of contract compliance, 
which monitors the hiring of women and minorities, has filed a lawsuit against Home 
Savings of America accusing it of discriminating against him and his wife in a loan to 
buy a duplex in the Golden Hill-Sherman Heights area."); Keith Henderson, Activists 
Charge Insurers with 'Redlining' Poor Areas, CHRJSTIAN Ser. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 1993, 
at I, 4 {"The American Family Mutual Insurance Company is the target of a class-action 
lawsuit in Milwaukee, alleging the firm's sales practices are designed to avoid doing 
business in that city's black neighborhoods."); Business in Brief, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 
26, 1993, at D3: 
Allstate Insurance Co. executives ordered employees to take no action on 
applications from minorities, closed inner-city offices and routinely tacked on 
costly extras to policies with no notice, a former senior manager says in a 
California lawsuit. 
Jeffrey E. Callaway's suit accuses the insurer of systematically evading 
Proposition 103, California's landmark 1989 insurance reform initiative, then 
threatening to ruin his career when he complained. 
Id.; David S. Hilzenrath, Bias Alleged on Loan Insurance: Group Says Policy Hurts 
Minorities, WASH. POST, June 3, I 989, at EI: 
A lawsuit filed in Toledo alleges that a mortgage insurance company has 
discriminated against minorities by refusing to insure mortgages of less than 
$30,000. 
The Toledo Fair Housing Center, a housing advocacy group that is a 
plaintiff in the suit against United Guaranty Residential Insurance Co., said the 
policy has continued to frustrate minority home buyers .... 
Id. See also Lou Cannon, Women Win $157 Million in Bias Suit; State Farm Insurance 
Agrees to Record Civil Rights Settlement, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1992, at Al ("A sex 
discrimination lawsuit filed 13 years ago against State Farm Insurance Companies was 
settled today for $157 million, the largest damage total paid by a defendant in a civil 
rights case .... [T]he suit led to changes in State Farm's national hiring practices that 
improved opportunities for women .... "). 
657 
recent evidence suggests a more disturbing phenomenon: within the near 
future, an even larger number of disgruntled consumers will file private 
actions against all sorts of lenders and insurers who either violate fair-
lending laws or redline communities.299 
Accepting the notion that a wave of unfair-lending, redlining and 
unequal-access-to-insurance cases will inundate state and federal courts, 
all interested parties and litigants should be extremely concerned. Put 
simply, state and federal courts are the worst forums for deciding these 
types of private actions. On the basis of data reported in Part VI, not 
very many of these cases will be decided on the merits. Instead, a 
substantial majority of insurers', lenders', and consumers' financial 
resources will be spent trying to resolve or disentangle some extremely 
complex issues. Below, some of the more pressing procedural and 
substantive questions are discussed. And, as we will see, these issues are 
generating serious splits among the federal courts of appeals. 
A. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Federal Preemption Doc-
trine--Preemption Issues Generated When Defendants' Discriminatory 
Conduct Involves Financial and Insurance-Related Activities 
Obviously, most lenders--savings and commercial banks, finance 
companies, loan associations, mutual funds, and mortgage compa-
nies--make loans and extend credit. But some financial institutions sell 
"credit life, health and accident insurance ... to its loan customers .... 
[Often] [t]he insurance premium [is] added to the loan principal or paid 
... when the loan is made .... "30° Furthermore, some lenders and 
insurance companies enter agreements which allow the insurer to sell 
insurance to lenders' customers. As consideration, lenders receive a 
299. See Warren L. Dennis, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: A New 
Source of Lender Liability, 106 BANKING L.J. 405, 414-15 (1989) (discussing the 
consumers' private right of action and their new weapons to fight redlining and unfair 
lending practices). See also id. at 409: 
Id. 
When growth in government enforcement is combined with new authority for 
"private" attorneys general, ... the formula is set for a new wave of litigation. 
. . . Lawyers who take cases on a contingency basis, and thus are always on 
the lookout for lender liability cases, now have a new tool to use on behalf of 
their clients. 
300. See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank ofLaMarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1259-60 (5th 
Cir. 1980) ("A bank loan officer who is also an insurance agent ... informs the 
customer of the availability of credit life insurance. If the customer desires to obtain 
credit life coverage, an entry is made on a loan disclosure form .... "). "Credit life, 
properly used, confers benefits upon the borrower [and] the bank .... " Id. at 1260 n.2. 
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percentage of the premiums paid to the insurers.301 More important, 
many lenders sell insurance.302 
On the other hand, a vast majority of insurance compa-
nies------commercial, life, property & casualty, title, reinsurers-----only sell 
insurance. But many insurers make all sorts of commercial, real-estate, 
and mortgage loans.303 In fact, some carriers offer premium financing 
as an inducement to get consumers to purchase an assortment of 
insurance products.304 Still other companies require loan applicants to 
purchase credit-life, disability, or life insurance from the insurers-lenders 
before approving loans.305 Therefore, at this point, we must ask: Are 
301. Id. at 1260 ("Each loan officer/insurance agent has a contract with the credit 
life insurance company which entitles him to commissions for the sale of credit life 
insurance. The income accruing under the contract ... inures ... to the bank's officers 
and principal shareholders."). 
302. See, e.g., United States Nat'! Bank of Or. v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 
113 S. Ct. 2173, 2176 (I 993) ("Almost 80 years ago, Congress authorized any national 
bank 'doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five thousand 
inhabitants ... [to] act as the agent for any fire, life, or other insurance company."'); 
Knecht & Scism, supra note 48, at A2 ("The battle over whether banks can offer 
annuities [ as well as more traditional types of insurance J is being fought in several courts 
around the country, and banking industry leaders assert that [the New York Court of 
Appeals] 6-0 decision ... will lead to expanded bank rights in other states."). But see 
Barry A. Abbott et al., Banks and Insurance: An Update, 43 Bus. LAW. 1005, I 024 
(1988) ("To be sure, national banks even today have not been authorized to sell credit-
related property and casualty insurance to protect loan collateral. ... [But] [i]nsurance 
companies are now providing banking services and some insurance companies even own 
banks."). 
303. See, e.g., Mitchell Pacelle, Banks and Insurers Step Up Bulk Sales of Soured 
Real-Estate Loans and Assets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1994, at A2 ("Prudential Life 
Insurance Co. of America, and Kentucky Central Life Insurance Co. are among the 
lenders currently selling large portfolios."); Delinquencies on Mortgages Held by Life 
Insurers Fell, WALL ST. J., Sept. I, 1993, at A5 ("The delinquency rate on mortgages 
held by life insurers fell to its lowest level in a year and a half .... "); EARNINGS, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1992, D4 ("Aetna Life & Casualty said its first-quarter earnings climbed 
51 % on gains from sales of assets and lower losses from real estate investments."); S&P 
Lowers Ratings of Five More Insurers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at D2, D14 ("S&P said 
some life insurers will have to boost their reserves to cover anticipated losses on 
commercial mortgages, real estate and fixed-income investments."). 
304. See, e.g., Premium Fin. Co., Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., Civ. A. No. 
89-1240, 1992 WL 403098, *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 2, 1992) (finding no fraudulent 
inducement involving premium finance agreements). 
305. See, e.g., Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233,234 (2d Cir. 
1975) (discussing an antitrust action which challenged Equitable's requirement that 
plaintiff purchase life insurance as precondition to granting mortgage loans); Addrisi v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 726 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 922 ( 1975) ("Equitable requires as additional security that the prospective borrower 
659 
insurance companies involved in the business of insurance when making 
mortgage and commercial loans? Conversely, are lenders engaged in the 
business of insurance when selling insurance products? 
To be sure, these are relevant questions. Because, under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, states' insurance commissioners are primarily responsible 
for regulating the "business of insurance."306 Among other implica-
tions, this means that aggrieved consumers may not commence private 
actions against institutions whose activities involve the business of 
insurance, even if those activities include mortgage and insurance 
redlining, and impermissible loan and credit discrimination. But a clear 
definition of the phrase "business of insurance" does not exist.307 
This, therefore, has generated many intra- and inter-circuit procedural 
conflicts and substantially reduced the number of consumers who can 
sue lenders and insurers in federal and state courts. 
1. Inter- and Intra-Circuit Conflicts Over Whether Lenders' 
Activities are the "Business of Insurance" 
Before the Supreme Court decided Group Life & Health Insurance Co. 
v. Royal Drug3°8 and Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,309 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits were divided over whether finance 
companies' lending activities were the business of insurance. For 
example, in Lowe v. AARCO-American, Inc.,310 the company would 
only finance the credit-insurance premiums for persons who purchased 
new automobiles. Members of a class of consumers accused the finance 
company of practicing fraudulent nondisclosures.311 The Court of 
... purchase ... a 'cash value' life insurance policy .... "). 
306. See 15 U.S.C. § I 012(a) which states in relevant part: "The business of 
insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several 
States ... ," See also Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance 
Industry: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to 
Harmonize Federal Antitn,st, Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-
Ferguson Act-1941-1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 399, 411-13 (1994) (outlining the Act's 
allocation of power among states, federal agencies, and courts). 
307. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458-59 (1969) ("The legislative 
history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act offers no real assistance . . . . The debates 
centered on [other] issues, and the Committee reports shed little light on the meaning of 
the words 'business of insurance."') 
308. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). 
309. 458 U.S. 119 {1982). 
310. 536 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1976), overruled by NAACP v. American Family 
Mutual Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297 (7th Cir. 1992). 
3 1 I. Id. at 1 16 I. Among other allegations, the class action alleged that the finance 
company "failed ... to clearly, conspicuously and meaningfully disclose the amount of 
the finance charge, the total number of payments required, the deferred payment price, 
... and the annual percentage rate ... in violation of the Truth in Lending Act." Id. 
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a class-action suit could not 
proceed against the lender because "the transaction . . . [was] the 
'business of insurance' [and was, therefore,] beyond the reach of the 
Truth in Lending Act."312 The Fifth Circuit, however, adopted a 
contrary view. In early 1979, this circuit decided Cochran v. Paco, 
Jnc. 313 and its companion case, Cody v. Community Loan Corp. of 
Richmond County.314 In both cases, the court held that a finance 
company's premium financing "does not constitute the 'business of 
insurance' for purposes of the McCarran Act."315 
Attempting to resolve the conflicts among the circuits, the Supreme 
Court decided Royal Drug and stated in dictum that "the core of 
'business of insurance"' encompasses: 1) A contractual agreement 
"between the insurer and the insured;"316 2) ongoing relationships 
between insurers and policyholders;317 and 3) the issuance of reliable 
and enforceable insurance policies. 318 Clearly, this test does not 
concern the "business of insurers."319 More important, the test may be 
used to assess whether financial institutions' as well as insurance 
companies' activities are the business of insurance, because the Supreme 
Court did not explain the meaning of the phrase "insurers and policy-
holders." Therefore, in Independent Bankers Ass 'n of America v. 
Heimann,320 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied 
the Royal-Drug test and concluded that national banks were not in the 
business of insurance.321 This holding is truly remarkable because the 
312. Id. at 1162. 
313. 606 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1979). 
314. 606 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1979). 
315. Cochran, 606 F.2d at 467 (concluding that "the McCarran Act does not 
preclude the application of [the Truth in Lending Act's] disclosure requirements to the 
transactions in the cases before us."). See also Cody, 606 F.2d at 508 (holding that the 
"McCarran Act is no bar to [the Truth in Lending Act's] application here, since the 
lending activities of Community do not constitute the 'business of insurance."'). 
316. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. 205,215 (1979). 
317. Id. at 216 (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,460 (1969)). 
318. 440 U.S. at 215-16 (quoting National Sec., 393 U.S. at 460). 
319. See 440 U.S. at 210-11 ("It is important ... to observe ... that the statutory 
... exemption is for the 'business of insurance,' not the 'business of insurers.'"). 
320. 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
321. Id. at 11 70. 
While it is true that the [McCarran] Act preserves to the states authority to 
regulate the relationship between the insurance company and its policyholder, 
... a rule affecting the disposition of credit life insurance income received by 
national bank insiders does not fall within the strictures of the statute. Nothing 
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financial institutions' activities satisfied each prong of the "business of 
insurance" test. The banks sold enforceable, "credit life insurance"322 
contracts to borrowers-policyholders and maintained ongoing relation-
ships with those customers. The Fifth Circuit reached a slightly similar 
conclusion in First National Bank of LaMarque v. Smith.323 
Recognizing that Royal-Drugs definition was generating unduly 
strained decisions, the Court decided Pireno and tried to develop a less 
complex definition of business of insurance. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Brennan held that an activity is a part of the business of 
insurance if the activity "transfer[s] or spread[s] a policyholder's 
risk."324 In addition, the activity must be "an integral part" of the 
insurer's and the insured 's relationship and "limited to entities within the 
insurance industry."325 The Associate Justice also inserted a proviso: 
"[NJ one of these criteria is necessarily determinative in itself. "326 Did 
the new test improve matters? Bluntly put, it did not. The Pireno 
standard also is inexact. Consequently, it has exacerbated inter-circuit 
divisions over whether a lender's activity is the business of insurance. 
For example, the Fifth Circuit decided Federal Trade Commission v. 
Dixie Finance Co., Inc. 327 after Pireno. The finance companies in 
Dixie Finance sold "life[,] health[,] and accident insurance to their loan 
customers;"328 they argued that the FTC could not subject the company 
to a consumer-fraud investigation. From the lenders' perspective, only 
states could regulate their activity because they were practicing the 
business of insurance.329 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the 
relationship between the finance companies and their customers could 
not be characterized as "a relationship between insurer and insured."330 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Manufacturers Hanover Consumer 
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act was intended to affect the power of the 
Comptroller . . . to regulate "unsafe and unsound" banking practices of 
national banks .... 
Id. ( citation omitted). 
322. Id. at 1168 n.9 ("The term 'credit life insurance' encompasses health, accident 
or life insurance coverage issued as protection for a loan."). 
323. 610 F.2d 1258, 1263 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980) (accepting without deciding that the 
Comptroller of the Currency's informal directive and national banks' credit life insurance 
sales were not the business of insurance). 
324. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). 
325. Id. 
326. Id. ( emphasis added). 
327. 695 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1983). 
328. Id. at 928. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 930 ("The 'business of insurance' intrudes upon the business of financing 
only [when] the borrower or his lender deal[s] with [an] insurer [about] the particulars 
of [a] policy [that is] purchased."). 
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Services, Jnc., 331 a federal district court in the Third Circuit also ruled 
in favor of the FTC. But the reasoning was different. The lower court 
noted that even though the finance companies' activity involved "risk 
spreading," the conduct could not be characterized as the business of 
insurance because the .remaining Pireno elements were absent.332 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to 
adopt the Fifth Circuit's Pireno analysis, although reaching a similar 
outcome. In General Finance Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,333 
the FTC informed several finance companies that it would investigate 
their businesses to determine if they were using deceptive trade practices. 
FTC's evidence suggested that the lenders deceived customers and 
encouraged then to purchase unnecessary credit life insurance as a 
condition to obtaining credit. 334 The lenders sued, asking for declara-
tory relief and arguing that the scheduled investigation was improper 
because they were engaged in the business of insurance. The Seventh 
Circuit did not accept this argument. But unlike the Fifth Circuit, the 
Seventh Circuit applied Royal Drug's rather than Pireno 's test. The court 
observed that Royal Drug gives the Commission some authority to 
investigate finance companies that use "misrepresentations to [generate] 
finance business rather than ... insurance business."335 
To further complicate matters, the Third and Sixth Circuits have held: 
Although a state statute may regulate banks that sell insurance, one may 
not conclude that the banks' activities are the business of insurance.336 
331. 567 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
332. Id. at 995 ("Risk spreading is an indispensable element ... but its presence 
is not determinative. Both the other criteria strongly suggest that this activity is not the 
business of insurance .... The fact that insurance is mentioned does not make ... the 
transactions to be investigated ... the business of insurance.") (citations omitted). See 
also First Nat'! Bank of E. Ark. v. Eubanks, 740 F. Supp. 1427, 1432-33 (E.D. Ark. 
I 989) (holding that the bank's cancellation agreement~redit life insurance 
contracts---did not constitute the business of insurance because the purpose of the 
agreements was incidental to traditional banking business), ajf'd, 907 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 
1990). 
333. 700 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1983). 
334. Id. at 367. 
335. Id. at 370 (emphasis added). It also is important to note that even after Pireno, 
the Seventh Circuit reached an incredible conclusion: "The meaning of the 'the business 
of insurance, 'the operative phrase in both the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the amended 
section 6 of the FTC Act, is unsettled. " Id. ( emphasis added). 
336. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 1986) 
( concluding that state law forbidding banks from being licensed as insurers "ha[ d] no 
part in the business of insurance under McCarran-Ferguson"); Owensboro Nat'! Bank v. 
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But the Sixth Circuit cited Pireno and ruled that determining "[w]hether 
a particular activity is part of the 'business of insurance' is ... [different 
from determining] whether a state law was 'enacted ... for the purpose 
of regulating the business of insurance. "'337 The Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit, however, refused to adopt this view. In Barnett 
Bank of Marion County v. Gallagher,338 the Eleventh Circuit accepted 
without deciding that national banks' subsidiaries and affiliates are 
insurers if they sell insurance products. This appellate court then cited 
National Securities' "relationship" test rather than Pireno/Royal Drug 
criteria and concluded that Florida designed the disputed statute "to 
regulate the relationship between insurers and potential policyhold-
ers."339 Therefore, the enactment of the statute, itself, is part of the 
business of insurance.340 
2. Inter- and Intra-Circuit Conflicts Over Whether Insurers' 
Activities are the "Business of Insurance" 
Consider an ordinary, unsuccessful applicant who applied for either 
title, life, mortgage, or property insurance. If you were to ask the 
applicant to explain her decision to purchase either one of those products 
from an insurance company rather than from, say, a major department 
store, the question would probably extract a perplexed expression. More 
important, the consumer would probably say: The insurance company is 
in the business of selling insurance and the department store is not. 
On the other hand, if you asked the federal courts of appeals the same 
question, you are likely to get convoluted and conflicting responses. In 
other words, it appears that the federal circuits are not really sure if 
insurance companies are truly in the business of insurance. In fact, 
uncertainty abounds, even when "insurance company" appears in the 
companies' names. To be fair, one can understand lower courts' 
confusion before the Supreme Court decided Royal Drug and Pireno. 
But, as of this writing, federal courts are still confused and the confusion 
is continuing to generate intra- and inter-circuit divisions. 
Stephens, 44 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the disputed statute "was 
enacted for the purpose of regulating certain conduct by bank holding companies, [ and] 
not the business of insurance"). 
337. 44 F.3d at 392. 
338. 43 F.3d 631 (I !th Cir. 1995). 
339. Id. at 635 (emphasis omitted). 
340. Id. ("Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or 
indirectly, are laws regulating the 'business of insurance.'" (quoting SEC v. National 
Sec., Inc. 393 U.S. 453, 460 (I 969))). 
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For example, during the pre-Royal Drug/Pireno era, the Fifth Circuit 
and a district court in the Seventh Circuit decided that life insurance 
companies were not in the business of insurance if their activities 
involved 1) premium financing agreements, 341 2) the merger of 
subsidiaries that benefited insureds, investors, and parent companies;342 
and 3) conspiracies to steal other companies' policy and marketing 
information.343 From these tribunals' perspective, the enumerated 
activities simply do not involve an insurer-insured relationship, even 
when the phrase "life insurance" appears in a parent company's or in a 
subsidiary's name.344 But during the same period, the Tenth Circuit 
and lower courts in the Third and Fifth Circuits decided that automobile 
and title insurance companies were in the business of insurance because 
those companies and their customers formed close relationships.345 
Among post-Royal Drug/Pireno cases, we find similar inter-circuit 
conflicts. Moreover, upon careful examination of decisions involving 
title, life, credit-life, and premium-financing insurance companies, it 
341. See Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(holding that "premium financing by an insurance company does not constitute the 
'business of insurance' within the meaning of the McCarran Act."). 
342. See American Gen'! Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887, 896 (S.D. Tex. 1973) 
(concluding that merger activity was not the business of insurance), ajf'd, 496 F.2d 197, 
201 (5th Cir. 1974). The court also observed: "American General is a Texas corporation 
. . . . It is primarily a holding company: its subsidiaries include life insurance 
companies, property-liability insurance companies and financial noninsurance institutions. 
Fidelity and Deposit is a Maryland corporation . . . . It is engaged in the business of 
writing property-liability insurance, primarily for commercial customers .... " Id. at 
889 (emphasis added). 
343. See Center Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Colony Charter Life Ins. Co., No. 75 C 1289, 
1976 WL 1273, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 1976) (concluding "that the ... challenged 
activities ... did not involve the 'business of insurance"'). 
344. See 606 F.2d at 470-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that "[p]remium financing 
has virtually nothing to do with a company's reliability as an insurer, a factor that stands 
at the center of the insurer-insured relationship"); American Gen'/, 359 F.Supp. at 896 
(stating that a merger "[does) not involve the relationship between the insurance 
company and its policyholders"); Center Ins., 1976 WL 1273, *4 (ruling that "[t]he 
relationship between the insurance company and its policyholders was not involved."). 
345. See, e.g., Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 
78, 86 (10th Cir. 1973) (concluding that "in our view the business of title insurance is 
included in the phrase 'business of insurance' .... "); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (concluding that the close 
relationship between realty sellers and realty conveyance--which includes title 
insurance--"is part of the 'business of insurance."'); Sanborn v. Palm, 336 F. Supp. 222, 
227-28 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (holding that automobile tying contracts between the insurer 
and a purchaser of a "tying [insurance) product" is the business of insurance). 
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appears that the Supreme Court's "business of insurance" definitions 
have exacerbated the confusion. For instance, citing the Pireno/Royal 
Drug criteria, the Third and Ninth Circuits held that title insurance 
companies are not engaged in the business of insurance when performing 
escrow or title-search services.346 A similar conclusion is found in 
another district court case that originated in the Third Circuit. For 
example, in First National Bank of Pennsylvania v. Sedgwick James of 
Minnesota, Inc., the District Court for Western Pennsylvania held that 
credit-life insurance companies' fraudulent scheme to sell worthless, 
credit guaranty policies "[was] not ... the business of insurance under 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act."347 To buttress its holding, the district 
court observed that "[a] scheme to defraud plays no role in the typical 
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured."348 
To be blunt, the Western Pennsylvania District Court's reasoning is 
both remarkable and strained, because this same court reached a very 
different conclusion in another case without even mentioning the 
allegedly important relationship between insurers and policyholders. In 
Senich v. Transamerica Premier Insurance Co.,349 the district court 
simply concluded that the business of insurance encompasses any 
scheme that includes fraud, fraudulent misrepresentations, "illegal 
commissions and kickbacks," excessive premium charges, and "the 
fixing of premium rates."350 More important, in Richart v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co.,351 the District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania 
embraced a similar position without making any reference to the insured-
insurer relationship. This latter court merely held that activity designed 
to defraud life-insurance consumers is the business of insurance and, 
therefore, subject to state regulation. 352 
To truly appreciate the severity of the confusion surrounding cases 
involving fraudulent insurance practices, one need only review a fairly 
346. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 998 F.2d 1129, 1138 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that "(a]lthough some insurance companies ... provide title search and examination 
services, such services can be described ... as the 'business of insurance companies' 
instead of the actual 'business of insurance' as determined by application of the Pireno 
factors."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1292 (1994); United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau 
of Ariz., Inc., 700 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding "that the application of 
the Pireno-Royal Drug criteria clearly indicates that performance of escrow services is 
not the 'business of insurance' for the purpose of the McCarran Act exemption."), cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1240 (1984). 
347. 792 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Pa. 1992). 
348. Id. at 419 ( emphasis added). 
349. 766 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Pa. 1990). 
350. Id. at 341 (citing SEC v. Nat'! Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969)). 
351. Civ. A. No. 89-1725, 1990 WL 39268 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 1990). 
352. Id. at *1-*3 (concluding that "(p]laintiffs' RICO claims must be dismissed 
[because] they are barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act."). 
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recent appellate court decision. In Merchants Homes Delivery Service, 
Inc. v. Reliance Group Holding, Inc. ,353 the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that "[o]vercharging for premiums on actual policies 
is part of the business of insurance. "354 Conversely, "collect[ing] . . 
premium[s] ... for nonexistent polices [and] for false claims ... [is not] 
... the business of insurance."355 Simply put, from the Ninth Circuit's 
point of view, an activity cannot be part of the business of insurance 
unless it satisfies the spreading-of-risk prong of the Pireno/Royal Drug 
test. 356 
A final important issue must be discussed at this juncture. Both 
disgruntled loan applicants and defending companies should give this 
matter serious consideration before asking federal courts to resolve 
claims and counter claims involving auto and mortgage loans or credit 
financing. As mentioned earlier, most life insurance companies and 
financial institutions lend money. Some of these entities also employ 
"tie-in arrangements," a system requiring borrowers to purchase 
insurance from the lender as a condition to obtaining a loan.357 Still 
other lenders employ "force-placed insurance" practices: A lender 
procures and charges the borrower for additional insurance and conceals 
the excessive coverages and charges from the borrower.358 
Before Pireno and Royal Drug, the Second and Ninth Circuits held 
that a tying arrangement is the business of insurance.359 To the 
353. 50 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1995). 
354. Id. at 1490. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. (asserting that "[t]he Supreme Court has made it clear that the transfer or 
spreading of the risk is the primary or even 'indispensable' characteristic of the business 
of insurance ... " and observing that its "own cases ... 'emphasize that the primary 
characteristic of the business of insurance is the transferring or spreading of risk."'). 
357. See, e.g., Fry v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins., 355 F. Supp 1151, 1152-53 
(N.D. Tex. 1973) (defining "tie-in" as defendants' "requiring members of [a] class to 
purchase ... life insurance policies from defendant as condition of obtaining farm loans 
from defendant."). 
358. See, e.g., Gordon v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 862 F. Supp. 1191, 1192 n.2 (N.D. 
Cal. 1992) (observing that the lender did "not inform borrowers of the existence of, the 
terms of, or the premium charges attributable to the additional insurance coverages."). 
359. See, e.g., Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 
1975) ("agree[ing] with the Ninth Circuit that the challenged tying arrangement is part 
of the 'business of insurance' within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act."); 
Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(finding tie-in practices and concluding that "Equitable ... engage[s] in the real estate 
loan business ... as an adjunct to its business of insurance."). But see DeVoto v. Pacific 
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contrary, the District Court for Northern Texas decided that such tie-in 
plans are not part of the insurance business.360 Among post-
Pireno/Royal Drug cases, it appears that the conflict over lenders' tie-in 
activity is over. Two federal district courts have examined this issue and 
determined that tying activities are not the business of insurance. 361 
But arguably, an even more serious conflict is developing among federal 
courts. In Bermudez v. First of America Bank Champion,362 the District 
Court of Northern Illinois held: If a bank obtains and charges borrowers 
for unauthorized "force-placed insurance" to cover a borrower's potential 
default on a loan, the bank is not engaged in the business of insur-
ance.363 The District Court of Northern California, however, does not 
embrace this proposition. In Gordon v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,364 the 
court held that a lender engages in the business of insurance if the lender 
surreptitiously procures excessive collateral-protection insurance and 
forces a naive borrower to pay undisclosed insurance premiums to the 
lender's subsidiary.365 
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 516 F.2d l, 2-3 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the "sale to 
mortgagors of mortgage protection insurance that guarantees payment of the mortgage 
[loan] ... [is] peripheral to the 'business of insurance."'). 
360. Fry, 355 F. Supp. at 1153 (concluding that tie-in arrangements "are not" the 
business of insurance). 
361. See, e.g,. Homestead Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Foremost Corp., 603 F. Supp. 767, 
772 (N.D. Tex. l 985) (observing that "[tJhe tying arrangement ... does not ... 
transfer[] or spread[] a policyholder's risk[;] ... is not an integral part of the policy 
relationship between the insurer and the insured[;] ... [and] is not limited to entities 
within the insurance industry."); Elliott v. ITT Corp., 764 F. Supp. 102, 104-05 (N.D. 
Ill. I 991) (stating that "the alleged misrepresentation that credit will be extended only 
when certain insurance is . . . purchased, . . . is not the business of insurance ... 
[because] the [alleged] conduct ... does not relate to ... defendants 'as insurers, but 
as finance companies."'). 
362. 860 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
363. Id. at 591. According to the court, the challenged practices did not spread or 
transfer risk, were not an integral part of the insured-insurer relationship, and were not 
"limited to entities within the insurance industry." Id. at 590-91. 
364. 868 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
365. Id. at 1192 n.2. See also Martha Brannigan, Why a Mississippi Jury Found a 
Small Dispute Worth $38 Million, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1995, at Al, A6: 
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Trustmark Bank [is] ... a unit of Trustmark Corp., a regional bank-holding 
company with total assets of $4.76 billion. But the way the bank treated this 
family turned out to be one of the most costly things it ever did . 
. . . [P]resident of Trustmark's Laurel branch ... warned management that 
the "collateral protection insurance" premiums it was charging were "extreme-
ly high, almost to the point of being ridiculous [ and that they would find 
themselves] in the middle of a class-action suit .... " But Trustmark bosses 
never paid attention .... 
Perhaps they should have. Other companies have found that sticking people 
with high-priced insurance payments isn't such a great idea. In 1993, Ford 
Motor Credit Co. paid $58.3 million to settle class-action claims that it had 
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B. Private Redlining Actions Commenced Against Lenders and 
Insurers 
Assume that a federal district court accepts complainant's argument 
that a lender's or an insurer's activity is not the business of insurance, 
because the state insurance commissioner does not regulate the practice, 
or the activity does not conform to the Pireno/Royal Drug criteria. At 
that point, should the federal court permit the private action to proceed 
if the complainant accuses the insurer or lender of violating Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968? Among courts that have considered this 
question, a major division exists over whether Title VIII allows 
aggrieved consumers to commence private actions against lenders or 
insurers who allegedly practice mortgage or insurance redlining. The 
most critical issues surrounding this debate are presented in the next two 
sections. 
I. Inter- and Intra-Circuit Conflicts Over Whether Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 Permits Mortgage-Redlining Actions Against 
Lenders 
Perhaps Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co. 366 is the earliest 
reported mortgage-redlining case where, "[t]he complaint allege[d] that 
. . . defendants refused to lend the Laufmans money to purchase a house 
in ... a racially integrated area of Cincinnati."367 The unsuccessful 
borrowers sued under sections 3604 and 3605 of the 1968 Civil Rights 
Act (Title VIII).368 The lenders argued that these sections did not 
explicitly prohibit mortgage redlining;369 therefore, the suit should be 
overcharged customers for collateral protection inusrance in California. That 
same year, Barnett Banks, Inc. agreed to pay $ I 9 million to Florida customers 
in a similar class-action suit. In February, NationsBank Corp., based in 
Charlotte, N.C., agreed to settle a class-action claim in federal court in Miami 
for $6.2 million. 
366. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
367. Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116, 119 (S.D. Ohio 
1976) ("Plaintiffs also allege[d] that ... defendants [were] engaged in the practice of 
refusing to lend money, or requiring stricter terms for such loans, for the purchase of 
houses in racially integrated neighborhoods."). 
368. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
369. 408 F. Supp. at 492 ("Plaintiffs contend that 'redlining' is prohibited by the 
plain language of these provisions . . . . Defendants agree . . . but ... read these 
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dismissed. The district court disagreed, ruling that the complaint stated 
a valid claim for relief.370 Nearly twenty years after Laufman, the 
Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Ring v. First Interstate 
Mortgage, Inc. 371 In Ring, the aggrieved applicant alleged that lenders 
violated federal fair-housing laws when they refused "to provide long-
term mortgage financing for seven apartment buildings [located] in 
predominantly minority St. Louis neighborhoods."372 The Eighth 
Circuit agreed, finding that the lenders' "decision was based on the racial 
composition of ... the neighborhood."373 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that "Ring ... stated a basis for relief under § 3605."374 
Other courts, however, have decided this controversy very differently, 
even to the point of generating intra-circuit confusion and amazingly 
poorly reasoned opinions. For example, in Evans v. First Federal 
Savings Bank of Indiana,375 the loan applicants were African-Ameri-
cans who resided in a predominantly minority neighborhood. They ap-
proached First Federal and applied for a home-equity loan to finance a 
college education and to purchase an automobile.376 The bank denied 
the loan and the borrowers sued, accusing the bank of practicing 
mortgage redlining. The District Court of Northern Indiana dismissed the 
complaint, stating that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under either 
§ 3604 or§ 3605. The court declared that§ 3604 did not apply because 
"the allegations concern[ ed] the availability of additional financing 
[rather than] the availability of housing[.]"377 And, § 3605 was inap-
propriate since it only covers "housing-related matters" rather than a 
college education.378 
Without doubt, Evans s equity-loan holding is incredibly strained, 
because one finds little, if any, support for the district court's reasoning 
in § 3605. A careful reading of the statute reveals that any discrimina-
provisions not to prohibit 'redlining."'). 
370. 408 F. Supp. at 493 (concluding that "[w]hether or not§ 3604(a) is applicable, 
§ 3605 is applicable .... [T]he practice of 'redlining' ... fall[s] under the proscription 
against denial of loans and financial assistance on the basis of race . . . where the 
purpose of the loan was to finance the purchase of a home in an integrated neighbor-
hood."). 
371. 984 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1993). 
372. Id. at 925. 
373. Id. at 927. 
374. Id. at 928 ("[T]he Second Amended Complaint pleads, ... in general terms, 
the elements of a Fair Housing Act cause of action."). 
375. 669 F. Supp 915 (N.D. Ind. 1987). 
376. Id. at 917 
377. Id. at 923. 
378. Id. at 924 ([This section] "covers loans made 'for the purpose of purchasing, 
constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling."'). 
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tion in the "terms or conditions of [mortgage] loans" is outlawed.379 
More important, the District Court of Northern Indiana reached a 
different conclusion in Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank of 
Indiana,380 although the facts were similar to those reported in Evans. 
The borrowers in Thomas also sued First Federal who again refused to 
approve a home-mortgage loan.381 But the court allowed the action to 
proceed rather than dismissing it for failure to state a claim. Quite 
frankly, attempting to explain the divergent outcomes in these two cases 
is difficult, because complainants in both Evans and Thomas alleged 
mortgage redlining. More disturbing, in Cartwright v. American Savings 
& Loans Ass 'n,382 the Seventh Circuit had an excellent opportunity to 
outline a simple test to help district courts determine when a mortgage-
redlining complaint should be dismissed for failing to state a claim. It 
did not. Consequently, confusion persists within the Seventh Circuit and 
inter-circuit disagreements continue between the Eighth and Seventh 
Circuits. 
2. Inter-Circuit Conflicts Over Whether Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 Permits Insurance-Redlining Actions Against Insurers 
In Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Mid-American Fire & Casualty 
Co.,383 several African-American homeowners sued an insurer for 
allegedly practicing insurance redlining. The insurer decided to stop 
selling a line of hazard insurance "'to a significant portion of black 
homeowners and/or persons residing in predominantly black neighbor-
hoods. "'384 The complainants argued that the insurer's decision 
violated Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio concluded that 1) "insurance 
379. Again, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 states in relevant part that "it shall be unlawful for 
any bank ... whose business consists [ of] making ... commercial real estate loans, to 
deny a loan or other financial assistance ... or to [ discriminate in] other terms or 
conditions of such loan ... because of ... race." (emphasis added). 
380. 653 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1987). 
381. Id. at 1336-37 ("[P]laintiffs alleged that defendants discriminated . . . by 
denying their loan application on the basis of ... race [ and] ... denied the Thomases' 
loan ... because of 'red-lining' .... "). 
382. 880 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1989) The African-American complainants alleged that 
the lender refused to approve an application for a home construction loan on the basis 
of race and gender and that the lender practiced mortgage redlining. Id. at 913. 
383. 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979). 
384. Id. at 1107. 
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redlining [violates]§ 3604(a) and§ 3617 of the Fair Housing Act" and 
2) "plaintiffs [had] stated a claim upon which relief [ could] be grant-
ed."1ss 
Five years after Dunn, this same court decided McDiarmid v. Economy 
Fire & Casualty Co.386 and reached a similar conclusion. McDiarmid's 
complainants alleged that the insurer "engaged in a pattern of 'insurance 
redlining"' and refused to sell homeowners insurance to willing 
purchasers on the basis of race.387 The insurer asked the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio to dismiss the action because 
"the McCarran-Ferguson Act ... [prevented the court] from considering 
... [p]laintiffs' Title VIII claims."388 The district judge refused to 
accept this argument and determined that allowing the Title VIII claims 
to proceed would not "invalidate, impair or supersede" the state's ability 
to regulate the business of insurance.389 
Just recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit formally 
embraced Dunn's Title VIII decision. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Cisneros,390 a female consumer filed a housing-discrimination 
suit with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, claiming 
that Nationwide Insurance Company practiced insurance redlining as 
well as gender and race discrimination.391 The insurer filed an action 
for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that HUD had no authority 
to commence an investigation. From Nationwide's perspective, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act preempts Title VIII. Once more, the District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio disagreed, and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed, stating that the insurer "failed to [present] any evidence of 
[c]ongressional intent to preclude the application of the Fair Housing Act 
to insurance underwriting practices."392 The Court of Appeals for the 
385. Id. at 1112. 
386. 604 F. Supp. I 05 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
387. Id. at 106. 
388. Id. 
389. Id. at 109 ("Even assuming ... that§ 3901.21 regulates insurance redlining, 
... Title VIII does not pennit anything that § 3901.21 prohibits and Title VIII does not 
prohibit anything that§ 3901.21 pennits.") 
390. 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 973 (1996). 
391. Id. at 1354 (alleging that the insurer "refused ... to reinstate her insurance 
policy on a residential building that was located in a predominantly black area of 
Toledo" because of gender, "race, and the racial make of the area."). 
392. Id. at 1359. The court also concluded "that the presence of additional remedies 
in the Fair Housing Act does not cause the Act to invalidate, impair or supersede Ohio 
insurance law. [Therefore], we hold that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude 
HUD's interpretation of the Fair Housing Act." Id. at 1363. 
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Seventh Circuit also has held that disgruntled insurance consumers may 
commence private, anti-redlining actions under Title VIII, 393 
For a decade, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to embrace 
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' position, In 1984, the Fourth Circuit 
decided Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Cos .. 394 Mackey, a former 
Nationwide agent, accused Nationwide of arbitrarily refusing to sell 
hazard insurance to consumers who resided in predominantly African-
American neighborhoods,395 From Mackey's perspective, Nationwide's 
redlining activities violated §§ 3604 and 3617 of the Fair Housing Act. 
The Fourth Circuit disagreed and ruled that the Act does not permit 
aggrieved consumers to file private, anti-insurance redlining actions. 396 
Of course, the problems that these decisions have produced should be 
obvious: Complainants residing in the Sixth Circuit may sue Nationwide 
Insurance Company under the Fair Housing Act for allegedly practicing 
insurance redlining. But Nationwide is protected from such suits in the 
Fourth Circuit. What compels such an unwarranted outcome? Is the 
culprit "judicial bias?" Clearly, neither the Fair Housing Act nor its 
legislative history commands such circuit-specific rulings. Considering 
that insurance redlining is a national problem and that the Fair Housing 
Act is national law, this particular intra-circuit conflict must be resolved 
in the very near future. Without doubt, such confusion produces an 
unfair level of uncertainty for national carriers who are likely to be sued 
in various circuits. More disturbing, it heightens insurance consumers' 
393. See NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 301 (7th Cir. 
1992) (holding that "[s]ection 3604 applies to discriminatroy denials of insurance, and 
discriminatroy pricing, that effectively preclude ownership of housing because of the race 
of the applicant."). 
Id. 
394. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984). 
395. Id. at 420. 
396. Id. at 423-25. The court observed: 
While the statute ... specifically prohibits discrimination in providing 
financial assistance, there is no mention in the Fair Housing Act of insurance. 
The legislative history contains no discussion of a barrier to fair housing 
created by the insurance industry .... 
For these reasons, we conclude that Mackey's claim[] [is] not within the Fair 
Housing Act. 
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cynicism about the administration of justice in state and federal courts 
and generates anger toward federal judges.397 
C. Private Actions, Procedural Barriers and Inter-Circuit Conflicts 
Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
To be sure, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its regulations 
prohibit "creditors"-savings and loans, savings banks, commercial 
banks, credit unions, finance companies, and private mortgage compa-
nies----from practicing unfair lending. However, as we have seen, some 
insurance companies are creditors too; but, whether the ECOA regulates 
insurers' lending activities is extremely unclear. For example, the Fifth 
Circuit has held that "[w]hen an insurance company offers financing as 
an inducement for persons to purchase policies, ... the company is a 
creditor."398 Therefore, it appears that the ECOA would govern these 
types of insurers' lending activities. On the other hand, the Second 
Circuit has intimated that an insurance company is not a lender when 
that company requires a consumer to J'urchase life insurance as a 
condition for granting a mortgage loan.3 Correspondingly, the ECOA 
and its regulations would not apply. Certainly, this inter-circuit 
ambiguity must be resolved. 
However, there are two procedural issues which are seriously dividing 
federal courts of appeals. First, under the ECOA, only "applicants" have 
standing to sue "creditors" or "lenders"--either financial institutions or 
insurance companies----who lend money or extend credit. But, this 
generates a pressing question: Is every disgruntled borrower an 
"applicant?" Second, some lenders require females and spouses to secure 
a third-party's signature before approving an application or lending 
money. ls this legal? Simply put, the answer is unclear. Some federal 
courts apply the Act's language and get one answer. Still other courts 
397. Cf Rob Schlegel, There's Something Very Wrong Here, LAS VEGAS BUGLE, 
Apr./May 1995, at 13. 
[T]here is something intrinsically wrong with a state which allows a minimum 
wage of $4.35 [and] ... requires auto insurance .... What of the individual, 
perhaps, a single parent, who must drive to work at a low paying job----a job 
which doesn't pay enough to put food on the table for their children and pay 
the car insurance? The state fines that same person hundreds of dollars because 
[ s/he chose] to feed their family rather than pay the car insurance. The state 
then arrests that person [ and] . . . confines this person in jail for ... 
"contempt" of the law .... It's no wonder our courts have to have metal 
detectors to protect the "justice system" .... 
398. See Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1979). 
399. See, e.g., Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 527 F.2d 233,234 (2d Cir. 
1975) (holding that such tie-in arrangements are the business of insurance and are, 
therefore, governed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act). 
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examine words and phrases appearing in the Act's regulations and obtain 
a different answer. Brief discussions of these final issues appear below. 
I. Inter-Circuit Conflict Over Whether Aggrieved "Applicants" Have 
Standing to Sue Creditors Under the ECOA and Under the Acts 
Regulations 
To reiterate, the ECOA states in pertinent part that "[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant ... on 
the basis ofrace, color, religion, national origin, sex[,] ... marital status, 
or age."400 The Act defines "applicant" as "any person who applies 
to a creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, 
or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for 
an amount exceeding a previously established credit limit."401 But, by 
authority granted under the ECOA, the Federal Reserve Board estab-
lished Regulation B and defined the term differently: "'Applicant' 
means any person who requests or who has received an extension of 
credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become 
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit . ... [T]he term 
[also] includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers and similar parties."402 
Must an aggrieved "applicant" prove she has standing to sue an 
allegedly discriminatory lender under both the Act and Regulation B? 
Among federal courts that have considered this question, only the Ninth 
Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has declared that the ECOA, itself, 
determines whether a complainant has standing to sue.403 A majority 
of courts have adopted the view that an aggrieved borrower may 
commence a private action if the borrower proves that she has standing 
under either the Act or the regulation.404 Of course, there is an 
400. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(l) (1994). 
401. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (1994) (emphasis added). 
402. Regulation B of 1978, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e) (1995) (emphasis added). 
403. See Jordan v. Delon Olds Co., No. 88-3833, 1989 WL 123647, at *I (9th Cir. 
Oct. 3, I 989) ("Appellant argues we should adopt the more expansive definition of 
'Applicant' found in 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(e). We decline to follow this regulation as 
'applicant' is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) itself."). See also Cragin v. First Fed. 
Sav. and Loan Assoc., 498 F. Supp. 379, 383 (D. Nev. 1980) ("The real determinant of 
plaintiffs standing is his status as an 'applicant' within the meaning of the Act."). 
404. See. e.g .. Riggs Nat'! Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Linch, 829 F. Supp. I 63, 168 
(E.D. Va. 1993) (observing that the "language of the statute and regulations demonstrates 
Congress' clear intent to endow credit applicants with a cause of action against 
discriminatory lenders" and concluding that complainant were "applicants"), affd, 36 
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important corollary question: Do federal courts employ a sound 
procedure or test to determine whether a complainant is a bona fide 
"applicant" under either the Act's restrictive or Regulation B's more 
expansive definition? The short answer is "no." And the failure to 
apply a sound methodology has generated some very strained and 
conflicting rulings among federal courts. 
For example, the Federal Reserve Board implemented Regulation Bin 
1978, which clearly states that guarantors, sureties and endorsers are 
"applicants." Yet, years after the regulation's enactment, the Ninth 
Circuit405 and courts in the Third406 and Seventh407 Circuits contin-
ue to hold that guarantors and endorsers are not bona fide "applicants." 
More astonishingly, one court reached this conclusion even though the 
court cited the unambiguous language appearing in Regulation B s 
definition.408 On the other hand, at least two courts in the First409 
and Fourth41° Circuits have applied the latter definition and concluded 
that "guarantors, sureties, endorsers and similar parties" are "applicants," 
and, therefore, have standing to initiate private actions. To be certain, 
this confusion will persist until federal courts acknowledge the severity 
of the problem and develop a reliable scheme to help determine who has 
standing to sue under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 
F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 1994). 
405. See Jordan, No. 88-3833, 1989 WL 123647, at *1 (holding that the cosigner 
on the application was not an "applicant" under the Act, itself). 
406. See Comas v. Equibank, Adv. No. 80-0612, I 989 WL 69857, at *2 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. June 9, I 989) (concluding that the guarantor was "implicitly excluded from the 
statutory definition [of applicant]"). 
407. See Incor Properties, Inc. v. Newton, No. 90C 6228, 1991 WL 60585, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 1991) (holding that the guarantor ofa purchase money loan was "not 
an applicant under the Act because she never made an application for credit."). 
408. See, e.g., Comas, 1989 WL 69857, at *1-*2. 
There is no dispute that Mrs. Comas is obligated on the Saline loan [under] 
a guaranty and suretyship agreement which she signed .... [But] [t]he issue 
as framed by the parties is whether [she] was a loan "applicant" under 
Regulation B of 1978 ... , based solely upon her status as the spouse of Mr. 
Comas .... 
. . . Although [she] was required to sign the guarantee, she was not the 
applicant for the loan. As the guarantor, she was specifically excluded from the 
regulatory definition of applicant . ... 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
409. See, e.g., Sharnmas v. Merchants Nat'! Bank, No. Civ. A. 90-12217N, 1990 
WL 354452, at *3 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 1990) (observing that under the regulation 
"[a]pplicant is defined to include 'guarantors, sureties, endorsers and similar parties,"' 
and holding that the guarantor was "an applicant within this definition."). 
410. See, e.g., Riggs Nat'! Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Linch, 839 F. Supp. 163, 165-68 
(E.D. Va. 1993) ( observing that the "Linches personally guaranteed the promissory note" 
and concluding that they were "applicants" under the regulation). 
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2. Inter- and Intra-Circuit Conflicts Over Whether Requiring Single 
or Married "Applicants" to Secure Co-Signatures Violates the ECOA 
or its Regulation 
[P]erhaps "the main ... purpose of the [ECOA is] to eradicate credit 
discrimination waged against women, especially married women whom 
creditors traditionally refused to consider apart from their husbands as 
individually worthy of credit."411 To help accomplish this end, the 
Feds instituted Regulation B which states in relevant part: "Except as 
provided in this paragraph, a creditor shall not require the signature of 
an applicants spouse or other person, other than a joint applicant, on 
any credit instrument if the applicant qualifies under the creditor's 
standards of creditworthiness for the amount and terms of the credit 
requested."412 But discrimination on the basis of gender and marital 
status continues because of an alarming truth: Under some circumstanc-
es, Congress, the Federal Reserve Board as well as federal courts 
continue to encourage egregious gender- and spousal-based discrimina-
tion when they allow lenders to secure third-party signatures under the 
ECOA.413 
Briefly, Regulation B allows creditors to obtain a third party's or a 
spouse's signature, 1) if an applicant requests unsecured credit and uses 
jointly-owned property as collateral,414 2) if "a married applicant 
requests unsecured credit and resides in a community property 
state,"415 or 3) if a secured creditor wants to perfect collateral property 
agreements so that she can attach collateral property in the event of a 
default.416 More relevant, Regulation B states in several places that a 
secured or an unsecured creditor may require a third party to sign any 
instrument that the lender "reasonably believe[s] [is] ... necessary" to 
411. See Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., Assoc. Inc., 605 F.2d 566, 569 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) ("But granting such an assumption does not negate the clear language 
of the Act itself that discrimination against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of 
a credit transaction, which is based on marital status is outlawed."). 
412. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(l) (1995) (emphasis added). 
413. Cf Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) 
("The Federal Reserve Board ... held ... that a violation of§ 202.7(d) of regulation 
B is considered to be a serious violation of the ECOA."). 
414. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(2) (1995). 
415. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(3) (1995). 
416. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4) (1995). 
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satisfy sound lending procedures.417 Of course, the regulation does not 
define "reasonable beliefs." Consequently, some frustrated applicants 
have sued, seeking clarification and arguing that lenders' co-signature 
polices were unreasonable. However, the federal circuits' "reasonable-
beliefs" rulings have been exceedingly unhelpful. In fact, among co-
signature cases that involve community property, the decisions are highly 
strained and contradictory. 
To illustrate, in United States v. American Future Systems, Jnc.,418 
the Third Circuit decided: It is unreasonable for a "national" creditor to 
require only minority parents' signatures before extending credit to 
unemancipated, unmarried female college students.419 But, in 
McKenzie v. U.S. Home Corp.,420 the Fifth Circuit held that it was 
quite reasonable for the lender to require an emancipated woman to 
secure the signature of her estranged husband before approving a 
mortgage loan, even though the woman had filed for divorce.421 Now 
clearly, as long as lenders and creditors are allowed to extend or deny 
credit on the basis of some subjective, reasonable or unreasonable belief 
about females' creditworthiness, we will continue to uncover bizarre and 
417. Forexample,RegulationB, 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(2)(1995)states: "Unsecured 
credit. . . . [T]he creditor may require the signatre of the other person only on the 
instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary .... "; 
and 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4) (1995) states: "Secured credit ... . [A] creditor may require 
the signature of the applicant's spouse or other person on any instrument necessary, or 
reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary .... " 
418. 743 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1984). 
419. 743 F.2d at 182 ("The district court found and we agree that the credit terms 
offered to minorities, married persons and males were less favorable than those credit 
terms offered to single white females."). 
420. 704 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983). 
421. Id. 
At that time she was separated from her husband and divorce proceedings were 
pending. U.S. Home Mortgage ... on the advice of counsel, told McKenzie 
that the loan could not be made unless either the divorce became final or 
McKenzie's husband joined in signing the deed of trust. [The lender] did this 
... to insure a valid lien on the property under Texas [community property] 
law. 
Id. at 779. See also Evans v. Centralfed Mortagage Co., 815 F.2d 348, 351-52 (5th Cir. 
1987) ("Texas is a community property state .... What is significant is that Centralfed 
reasonably believed that its policy was necessary to perfect its security interest.") 
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conflicting inter-circuit and intra-circuit422 rulings involving Regulation 
B's co-signature exceptions. 
VI. A CASE STUDY: AN HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
VICTIMS WHO SUED LENDERS AND INSURERS IN FEDERAL AND STATE 
COURTS BETWEEN 1950 AND 1995 
To repeat, federal and state anti-discrimination and equal-access-to-
credit-and-insurance laws prohibit insurers and creditors from discrimi-
nating solely on the basis of consumers' race, gender, or place of 
residence. In addition, lenders and insurers cannot discriminate against 
insurance or credit applicants solely on the basis of any impermissible 
factors such as region of country, gender, or an applicant's educational 
status. In most instances, both state and federal courts are likely to 
condemn such discriminatory behavior and award appropriate damages 
to disgruntled consumers when financial institutions and insurance 
companies allow such impermissible variables to influence otherwise 
legitimate business decisions. 
But in this part, we raise a fundamental question: Do federal and state 
judges, themselves, allow immaterial factors like a consumer's race, 
ethnicity, gender, neighborhood, years of formal educational, or religion 
to influence procedural or substantive rulings in cases involving 
insurance and financial redlining, unequal access to credit, and discrimi-
natory access to affordable insurance? An analysis of the findings 
appearing below suggests that they do. 
Furthermore, should the type of federal circuit or the region of country 
in which complainants commence their actions determine whether 
insurers, lenders or consumers prevail in redlining, unequal-access, or 
fair-lending cases? Or stated differently, should one expect credit 
applicants to prevail consistently on procedural grounds in, say, the 
Second Circuit, but lose regularly in, say, the Eleventh Circuit? Or 
422. Compare Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(a community property case where the court decided that the lender discriminated against 
the female applicant when the lender reasonably believed that the husband's signature 
was required on a promissory note) with United States v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 
F.2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (a community property case where the court held that the 
creditors were reasonable and did not discriminate against female applicants when they 
required "a co-signer for married applicants who rely on a spouse's future earnings to 
qualify for unsecured credit"). 
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should one expect insurers to succeed more often in the Midwest than 
in the South? Of course, the answer to these questions is "no." Yet, as 
reported earlier, federal- and state-court judges often allow these and 
other demographic factors to undermine predictably sound and unbiased 
rulings. Assuredly, such unwarranted practices partially explain the high 
incidence of inter- and intra-circuit conflicts among fair-lending and 
unequal-access-to-insurance decisions. 
A. Source of Data, Methodological Procedures and Demographic 
Attributes of Litigants 
To help support the argument that federal- and state-court judges are 
permitting irrelevant but damaging factors to influence their rulings, the 
author tried to locate every reported state and federal case that concerned 
either discriminatory access to insurance, unequal access to credit and 
loans, fair lending, insurance redlining, or financial redlining. Using both 
WESTLAW and LEXIS computer-assisted data retrieval systems, the 
search identified 134 federal-court and 65 state-court cases that were 
resolved between 1950 and 1995.423 
For purposes discussed below,424 the study includes an additional 
sample of IOI administrative decisions.425 In these latter cases, con-
flicts involving redlining, fair-lending, access to credit, and loans also 
appear. Therefore, the following discussion is based on the analysis of 
300 administrative and judicial rulings.426 
Table I presents litigants' demographic attributes. Briefly put, one, 
two or three asterisks denote comparisons which are statistically 
significant.427 For example, near the bottom of Table 1, two compel-
ling findings are presented. It is clear that complainants are generally 
more likely to receive unfavorable rulings in all forums. But their 
probability of success is worse in federal administrative proceedings 
(83.2%). On the other hand, aggrieved persons are somewhat more 
423. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, COURTS File (May 12, 1995); search of 
WESTLAW, SCT and CTA databases (May 14, 1995). 
424. See infra notes 438-39 and accompanying text. 
425. Search of LEXIS, Banking library, FED RB, FDIC, FHLBB and OCCBJ, OTS 
and THRIFT files (September 9, 1994); Search ofWESTLAW, FAIRHOU, FFIN-FDIC, 
FFIN-FDICED and FFIN-FRB databases (October 16, 1994). As reported in Table I, the 
searches generated the following: One (1.0%) Department of Housing & Urban 
Development's ruling; three (3.0%) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's rulings; 53 
(52.5%) Federal Reserve Board's decisions; and 44 (43.6%) Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency's holdings. 
426. Willy E. Rice, Empirical Analysis of the Disposition of Fair-Lending, 
Redlining, Insurance-Discrimination and Unequal-Access Claims in Federal Administra-
tive Proceedings and in State and Federal Courts, 1950-1995 (on file with author). 
427. See infra note 435 and accompanying text. 
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TABI.E I. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLAINANTS WHOSE INSURANCE-
DISCRIMINATION AND FAIR-I.ENDING CIAIMS WERE RESOLVED IN 
STATE COURTS AND IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 






















Types of Plaintiffs: 
Aggrieved Individuals 
Grassroot Organizations 
Human-Civil Rights Commissions 
Small Businesses 
Department of Justice 
Department of Housing & 
Urban Development 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
Federal Reserve Board 
Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency 
State Insurance Commissioners 
Types of Defendants: 




Private Mortgage Companies 
Insurance Companies 
Investment Firms 




Hispanic or Latino 
Jewish, Asian & Others 
Aggrieveds' Gender: 
only Female Complainants 
Only Male Complainants 
Both Females & Males 




























































































































Aggrieved&' Community Size: 
One Million Plus 
One Million - 500,000 
499,999 - 250,000 
249,999 - 100,000 
99,999 - 50,000 
Less than 50,000 






Types of Alleged Discrimination: 
No Access to Credit 






















Community Redevelopment Act 99.0 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 4.0 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(Title VIII), § 42 U.S.C. 3612 3.0 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
42 u.s.c. §§ 1981, 1982 & 1985 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 2.0 
State Anti-Discrimination Statutes 
State Insurance Statutes 
Disposition of Complaints in 
Federal & State Proceedings 
From Complainants' Perspectives: 
Favorable outcome 
Unfavorable outcome 
Ground for Disposing 







Levels of sig11ifica11ce J/,r Chi Square teit: "''-"" JI < _()()/ 




































55. , ••• 32.1 
44. 6 67.9••· 
[VOL. 33: 583, 1996] Consumers 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
successful when they seek relief in state and federal courts-4 7. 7% and 
42.5%, respectively. 
More surprisingly, fair-lending, redlining, and equal-access conflicts 
are significantly more likely to be decided on the merits in state courts. 
But, in federal district and appellate courts, these types of claims are 
substantially more likely to be disposed of on procedural grounds. The 
percentages are 55.4% and 67.9%, respectively. 
Near the top of Table 1, other meaningful findings appear. First, 
region of country has a modest influence on whether complainants 
initiated their actions in state courts, or in federal administrative or 
judicial proceedings. To illustrate, among both federal-administrative and 
state-court cases, a statistically significant larger percentage of complain-
ants resided in the Midwest428-33.0% and 38.0%, respectively-than 
in either the East,429 South,430 Southwest,431 or West.432 But we 
should note: The majority offederal-court complainants lived in the East 
and Midwest. The percentages are 25.4% and 28.0%, respectively. 
Furthermore, among claims originating in federal agencies and in state 
courts, a significant proportion of the litigants lived in or claimed they 
were injured in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits-20.0% and 24.5%, 
respectively. However, among federal-court cases, nearly an equal 
number of claims originated in these circuits. 
To continue, among both state- and federal-court cases, plaintiffs were 
significantly more likely to be aggrieved individuals. The proportions are 
66.2% and 88.8%, respectively. Just as important, a significant number 
of human and civil-rights commissions and small businesses were 
plaintiffs in state courts. Those groups' respective proportions are 21.5% 
and 23.1 % On the other hand, grassroots organizations, the Fed, and 
428. The Midwest encompasses the following states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota; West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
429. The East encompasses the following states: Connecticut, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. 
430. The South encompasses the following states: Alabama, Georgia, Florida, 
Mississippi, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina Tennessee and Virginia. 
43 I. The Southwest encompasses the following states: Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma and Texas. 
432. The West encompasses the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, 
and Wyoming. 
683 
the OCC represented the largest group of plaintiffs in the federal 
administrative proceedings. Their respective percentages are 39.6%, 
52.5%, and 43.6%. 
Table 1 also presents some important data on the aggrieved person's 
race, gender, neighborhood, and legal status. First, African-Americans are 
significantly more likely to be complainants in federal-administrative 
proceedings. Conversely, Anglo-Americans are more likely to be 
plaintiffs in federal courts. The respective percentages are 63.4% and 
53.7%. However, among state-court cases, about an equal number of African-
and Anglo-American litigants sought redress in state-courts. The 
percentages are 43.l % and 40.0%, respectively. 
Second, among administrative cases, one finds no meaningful 
distinction between the number of female and male claimants. But 
among both state- and federal-court cases, a significant majority of the 
complaints listed only males as the alleged victims of discrimination; the 
respective percentages are 43.1% and 35.8%. Nearly a fourth of both 
state and federal complaints involved only female consumers who 
claimed that they were victims of insurers' and lenders' gender-based 
discrimination. The corresponding percentages are 21.5% and 25.4%. 
Third, the data on aggrieved persons' neighborhoods433 are rather 
revealing. All too often, jurists, commentators, lawyers, and judges 
suggest or conclude that "poor people"---particularly, "the poor residing 
in predominantly Hispanic and African-American neighborhoods"-are 
the "true" victims of various forms of redlining, discriminatory-lending 
practices, and insurance discrimination. Certainly, that proposition cannot 
be adequately tested here, because the present study only includes 
consumers who decided to do something about their alleged victimiza-
tion.434 Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of the percentages appearing in 
Table l shows that "middle-class" consumers-regardless of race or 
ethnicity--also complained about lenders' and insurers' discriminatory 
policies and practices. More important, as these numbers show, "middle-
class" and "upper class" consumers are significantly more likely to seek 
relief in state and federal courts. 
For example, among both state- and federal-court cases, nearly half 
of the complainants lived in lower-middle-class neighborhoods. The 
percentages are 49.2% and 49.3%, respectively. Furthermore, nearly a 
433. Determining whether a consumer or a consumer's neighborhood was, say, 
"upper-middle class," or "lower-middle class" was not too difficult. In many decisions, 
the opinion reported this information. In other situations, the author used complainant's 
reported incomes or salaries-those reported in the decisions-to help decide their class 
status. 
434. See infra notes 438-39 and accompanying text. 
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third of the alleged v1ct1ms lived in upper-middle-class neighbor-
hoods-32.3% and 29.9%, respectively. Conversely, the overwhelming 
majority of upper-lower- and lower-lower-income complainants are 
concentrated among the administrative cases. The reported percentages 
are 48.5% and 25.7%, respectively. 
Lastly, among federal administrative and judicial cases, most 
complainants are credit applicant~34.7% versus 20.9%----and loan 
applicants-58.4% versus 47.0%. But among state-court cases, the 
aggrieved are more likely to be insurance applicants (13.8%) and 
employees (38.5%). This latter group sued either lenders or insurers for 
practicing discriminatory hiring and promotions. 
B. Cross-tabulations: The Disposition of Fair-Lending, Redlining 
and Insurance Discrimination Actions in State and Federal Courts by 
Immaterial Demographic Factors 
Table 2 presents cross tabulations of demographic and other variables 
with the disposition of fair-lending, redlining, and unequal-access claims 
in federal and state courts. Without doubt, the statistically significant Chi 
square435 coefficients reported in Table 2 are quite disturbing. Simply 
put, those statistics strongly suggest that federal and state courts are 
permitting irrelevant or extra-legal criteria to influence the disposition of 
these types of claims. For example, among "state- and federal-court 
decisions, " plaintiffs are significantly more likely to receive favorable 
outcomes (60.6%) when defendants are mortgage companies. By 
contrast, complainants are less likely to obtain a favorable decision when 
defendants are either commercial banks (66.2%), insurance companies 
(51.3%), or "other"436 lenders (65.2%). 
Of course, when examining "only federal-court decisions," we 
discover that the type of defendant continues to influence the resolution 
of claims. But more surprisingly, the effects are not completely 
consistent. Assuredly, aggrieved persons still are more likely to be 
435. See Willy E. Rice, Judicial Eriforcement of Fair Housing Laws: An Analysis 
of Some Unexamined Problems that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983 Would 
Eliminate, 27 How. L.J. 227, 253-55 & nn.161-62 (presenting a brief explanation of 
"statistically significant" and a fairly simple method to compute a Chi-square statistic). 
436. This category comprises a few auto finance companies, credit-card banks, 
savings banks, investment firms and savings and loans. See Table I and the categories 




TABI.E Z. DISPOSITION OF INSURANCE-DISCRIMINATION & FAIR-LENDING CU/MS IN STATE & 
FEDERAL COURTS BY SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
---------- ---
Disposil.ion of Actions from AU 




Both State & Federal-Court Decisions 
Defendants Commercial Banks 33. 8 66.2• 
Mortgage Companies 60, 6* 39 .4 
Insurers 48. 7 51. 3* 
Others 34.8 65.2* 
Complaints "Redlining" 27.6 72, ,. 
Other Claims 47.1 52, 9 
Only State-Court Decisions 
Federal Seventh Circuit 01. s•• 12. 5 
Circuits Other Circuits 42.1 57, 9*• 
Complaints Sex Discrimination 20.0 00. o• 
Other Cla.ims 52.7• 47. 3 
Only Federal-Court Decisions 
Sta.tutes 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981 
& 1982 28. 9 71.1• 
State Insurance Statute 00. o• 20. 0 
Others 27 .5 72. 5• 
Defendants Commercial Banks 28. 3 71. 7••· 
Mortgage Companies 60. , ••• 39 .3 
Insurers 57.6••· 42 .4 
Others 30.0 70.0••· 
Consumer Insurance 59 .4•• 40 .6 
Services Financial 37.3 62, 7*• 
Levels of .~tatistical significance: n* p .5 .001 
**p.5.0l 
*PS .05 
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unsuccessful when they sue commercial banks and "other" lenders in 
federal courts. The percentages are 71.1 % and 70.5%, respectively. 
Additionally, they are still more likely to receive favorable decisions in 
federal courts when defendants are mortgage companies (60.7%). 
However, a review of just federal-court dispositions reveals that 
aggrieved persons are significantly more likely to prevail when defen-
dants are insurance companies (57.6%). This is a significant switch. 
Certainly, one may argue that these findings are mere flukes, considering 
that they are based on a relatively small number of cases. But again, the 
results are statistically significant and the sample size has been 
"considered" or "weighed" when the Chi square statistics were generat-
ed. Additionally, Table 2 presents additional evidence supporting the 
notion that these effects are not just aberrations. For example, among 
federal-court cases, disgruntled consumers are more likely to succeed 
when they complain about insurance-related services (59.4%); however, 
when their complaints involve financial services, they are less likely to 
prevail (62. 7%). 
One other observation is warranted at this point. There is little if any 
reason for an objective, disinterested jurist to be alarmed or jubilant 
when plaintiffs lose or win actions involving insurance redlining, 
mortgage redlining, insurance discrimination, or unfair lending. Quite 
simply, some complainants will be successful and others will not. Table 
2, however, contains three other findings that compel the attention of 
both plaintiffs and defendants who would use federal and state courts to 
resolve their conflicts. 
Among "state-court decisions, " unsatisfied consumers are less likely 
to succeed when they complain about gender or sex discrimination 
(80.0%). On the contrary, they are more likely to receive favorable 
rulings if they complain about "other" forms of discrimination (52. 7%). 
Finally, among "both state- and federal-court decisions" and without 
controlling for the influence of race, gender, region of country, or type 
of neighborhood, consumers are less likely to prevail, especially when 
their complaints concern "redlining" (7 2. 4%). 
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C. Cross-Tabulations: The Disposition of Claims by Immaterial 
Factors, While Controlling for the Influence of Complainants' Race or 
Ethnicity 
To reiterate, a painstaking survey of case law, treatises, statutes and 
various legislative histories failed to produce any support for the 
supposition: Federal and state courts must consider immaterial demo-
graphic attributes or litigants' legal status when resolving fair-lending, 
insurance-discrimination, or redlining claims. Yet, the present findings 
suggest that they do. There is, however, a more compelling question: 
Does race matter? Or stated differently, do federal- and state-court 
judges allow complainants' race to influence the disposition of claims? 
In light of the results illustrated in Table 3, the answer is "yes." 
For instance, in Table 3, the relationship between litigants' legal status 
and the disposition of claims is presented among African-American and 
Anglo-American complainants who filed actions in state and federal 
courts, respectively. First, examine all the percentages appearing under 
the heading, "state-court decisions. " The statistically significant 
percentages reveal the following: (1) African-American plaintiffs who 
own small businesses are substantially less likely to prevail in state 
courts (85.7%); but "other" types of African-American plaintiffs have 
a greater likelihood of succeeding (61.9%); and, (2) African-Americans 
are less likely to achieve a favorable outcome when state-court defen-
dants are insurance companies (66.7%). But if "other" defendants are, 
say, financial institutions, African Americans' probability of succeeding 
is fairly substantial (69.2%). 
As it should be and as the information in Table 3 shows, immaterial 
factors have no significant bearing on the disposition of Anglo-American 
claims in state courts. Similarly, litigants' legal status does not affect the 
outcome of Anglo-American actions in federal courts. On the other hand, 
a statistically significant relationship exists between legal status and 
disposition among federal claims involving African-Americans. 
For example, if African-Americans are credit applicants or "oth-
er "437 types of consumers, they are substantially more likely to prevail 
in federal courts---66.7% and 88.9%, respectively. But if they are loan 
applicants or lenders' and insurers' employees, they are less likely to 
receive favorable results in federal courts--86.7% and 55.6%, respective-
ly. Moreover, African-Americans are more likely to "lose" in federal 
437. Here, "others" would be independent agents, soliciting agents, brokers or 
representatives who had established contractual relationships with various lenders and 
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Disposition of Actions From Anglo• 
American Complainants' Perspectives 
(N=98) 
Number Favorable Unfavorable 
•I 
Cases (Percent) (Percent) 
(N=28) State-Court Decisions 
(N=7) 50. 0 50. 0 
(N=21) 45. 0 55 .0 
(Ncl5) 45. 5 54. 5 
(N=l3) 50. 0 so. 0 
(N=lO) 61. 5 38. 5 
(N=18) 30. 8 69. 2 
(N=45) Federal-Court Decisions+ 
(N=3) 47.8 52 .2 
(N=15) 40.0 60.0 
(N•18) 40. 0 60.0 
{N;9) 25.0 75 .o 
(N=9) 31.4 68 .6 
(N•3) 56.5 43 .5 
(N;26) 40 .o 60 .o 
(N=7) 44.4 55 .6 
Levels of statistical significance for respective (unreported) Chi square statistics: *"'*"' p .:5. .00/ (degrees of freedom = 3) 
*** p .:5. .0/ (degrees of freedom= 3) 
** p .:5. .Of (degrees of freedom = l) 
• p .:5. .05 (degrees of freedom= I) 
+ None of these findings were statistically 
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courts when defendants are commercial banks (88.9%) or "other" 
financial institutions (85.7%). However, when defendants are mortgage 
companies or insurers, African-Americans are more likely to succeed. 
The percentages are 66.7% and 61.5%, respectively. 
D. Cross-Tabulations: The Disposition of Claims By Immaterial 
Factors, Among "Middle-Class" African- and 
Anglo-American Complainants 
Undeniably, it is extremely troublesome to discover that federal and 
state courts knowingly or unwittingly allow the previously mentioned 
factors to influence the disposition of fair-lending, redlining, and 
unequal-access-to-insurance claims. But to learn that the aggrieved 
persons' race or ethnicity also controls whether they will prevail or lose 
is quite disquieting. Of course, as stated earlier, these findings could be 
mere aberrations. Also, if these results are not statistical flukes, the "race 
effect" may be nothing more than the effect of, say, one's class. Without 
doubt, African Americans are significantly more likely to be lower-class 
than upper- or middle-class. Of course, the converse is true for Anglo-
Americans. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that the greater ones 
financial resources, the greater the likelihood of ones ability to purchase 
effective legal representation and minimize the egregious effects of 
extralegal variables on the disposition of claims. 
Considering the general, unequal economic status of African- and 
Anglo-Americans, the author of the study decided to evaluate the 
relationship between outcome and extralegal factors only among 
"middle-class" African- and Anglo-American complainants. Arguably, 
this procedure can help remove or significantly reduce the influence of 
race, per se. Table 4 presents the comparisons and they are truly 
astounding. 
To repeat, these findings only concern "middle-class" blacks and 
whites who sued in state and federal courts. More important, the reported 
percentages represent cases that were decided both procedurally and on 
the merits. Among African-American cases that were resolved on 
procedural grounds, only one statistically significant relationship 
appears. But that finding does not involve an extralegal factor. Instead, 
the percentage tells us that "middle-class" African-Americans are less 
likely to succeed procedurally when they file actions under states' 
insurance statutes (75.0%). Of course, the converse is true when they 
proceed under "other" state and federal statutes (80.0%). 
What are the findings among "middle-class" Anglo-Americans whose 
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Regrettably, the answer is "yes." First, "middle-class" whites are more 
likely to prevail when defendants are mortgage companies (69.2%) and 
less likely to triumph when defendants are "other" lenders or insurers 
( 67 .5% ). Second, "middle-class" Anglo-Americans who live in the South 
are more likely to "win " on procedural grounds in state and federal 
courts (83.3%). But "middle-class" Anglo-American are less likely to 
prevail procedurally in federal and state courts if they reside in "other" 
regions of the country (63.8%). 
What are the findings among cases decided on the merits? Among the 
conflicts involving "middle-class" Anglo-Americans, Table 4 reveals no 
statistically meaningful associations between outcome and extralegal 
variables. But it is disappointing that the same cannot be said about the 
disposition of African-Americans' complaints. First, among cases 
decided on the merits, "middle-class" African-Americans are substantial-
ly more likely to secure favorable decisions if they are 1) credit 
applicants (75.0%), 2) initiate their actions in the Seventh Circuit 
(66.7%), and 3) reside in a community of less than fifty thousands 
inhabitants (75.0%). Of course, the c;onverse is true if "middle-class" 
African-Americans are, say, loan applicants, who live in communities 
with more than 50,000 residents and attempt to secure relief in, say, the 
Fifth or Eleventh Circuit. Again, we must ask: Should state and federal 
courts decide "middle-class" or any class of consumers' meritorious 
claims this way? Obviously, the correct response is "no." 
E. Multivariate Probit, Two-Stage Statistical Approach: The 
Disposition of Fair-Lending, Insurance-Discrimination and Redlining 
Complaints in State and Federal Courts, 1950-1995 
The statistically significant findings reported in the preceding sections 
would likely lure any fair-minded jurist, practicing attorney, or consumer 
into believing that state- and federal-court judges are truly biased toward 
either aggrieved consumers, lenders, or insurers. Or stated another way, 
those results may be viewed as conclusive evidence of invidious or 
unintentional discrimination. Again, it is fairly clear that judges do allow 
litigants' demographic characteristics to affect the resolution of fair-
lending, redlining, and insurance-discrimination claims. But using simple 
Chi square statistics and cross-tabulations to reach either conclusion is 
less than sound. Why? 
Although a Chi square coefficient can reveal whether a significant 
relationship exits between a single immaterial factor and outcomes, it 
cannot test for the simultaneous and multiple effects of demographic 
variables on the disposition of cases. More important, Chi square cannot 
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test for a condition that is commonly called "self-selectivity bias. "438 
Therefore, to help uncover whether judges are really misbehaving, we 
must use a more powerful statistical tool, one that l) tests for the 
presence of selectivity bias in sample data, and 2) measures the 
combined and simultaneous influences of demographic attributes on 
outcome. 
All too often, researchers assume that random sampling removes, 
cancels, or minimizes the influence of various types of errors or biases 
in sample data. Although this assumption is fairly valid under many 
settings, the assumption does not apply when sampling reported or 
unreported judicial cases. Why? Some aggrieved loan and insurance 
applicants, for instance, decide to commence legal actions; but others do 
not. In addition, among complainants who decide to do something about 
their alleged injuries, some might choose an administrative forum; but 
others may decide to use state or federal trial court to secure relief. 
Indisputably, these various choices often can be a source of selectivity 
bias, thereby destroying the random-sampling assumption. Consequently, 
an investigator must examine judicial data extremely carefully and try 
to determine whether any meaningful self-selection bias is present. 
Failure to test for such bias will undermine anything one says about 
either the simultaneous or multiple effects of demographic factors on the 
disposition of state- and federal-court cases. 
Table 5 reports the findings of a multivariate probit two-stage 
438. Much has been written about "self-selectivity bias" and "other-selectivity bias" 
in econometrics journals and texts. See, e.g., G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND 
QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS, 257-71 & 278-83 (1983). More relevant, 
the author of the present study also has published legal articles discussing and outlining 
statistical procedures that test the hypothesis: Self-selectivity bias does not appear in the 
sample data. See, e.g., Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the 
Insurance Industry: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts 
to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration, and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-
Ferguson Act--1941-1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399, 446-48 (1994) [hereinafter Rice, 
Federal Courts and the Insurance Industry]; Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance 
Industry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme Courts ' 
Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment 
Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 371-75 (1992) [hereinafter Rice, 
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analysis.439 This statistical technique helps answer two relevant ques-
tions: I) whether self-selection bias appears in the sample data, and if 
not, 2) whether the simultaneous and multiple effects of demographic 
and other factors explain the judicial disposition of fair-lending, 
insurance-discrimination, and unequal-access claims. 
To reiterate, a total of 300 cases (N=300) appear in the study-101 
(N=l0I) administrative and 199 (N=l99)judicial cases. Of course, none 
of the administrative complainants decided to commence further actions 
in state and federal courts. Therefore, we should ask: Are there any 
statistically significant differences between those who commenced 
actions in state and federal courts and those who did not? Or stated 
differently, do any demographic factors explain who is more likely to 
initiate court actions? The answer is "yes." 
Examine the "decision-to-initiate-an-action" column in Table 5. The 
statistically significant positive probit coefficient (1.2516) suggests that 
upper-middle class applicants are more likely to initiate actions in state 
and federal courts. On the other hand, the statistically meaningful 
negative -1.6444 coefficient implies that, in general, complainants are 
less likely to seek redress in federal and state courts when defendants are 
bankers. This latter finding is consistent with what we know: The Fed, 
OCC, OTS, and FDIC are more likely to represent aggrieved consumers' 
interests and complaints administratively, thereby decreasing the need 
for, or the likelihood of, consumers suing bankers in federal courts. 
It is clear, therefore, that some difference exits between those who 
decided not to go to court and those who did. But does this difference 
produce enough bias to warrant our concern? An examination of the four 
Lambda terms in Table 5 strongly suggests that no meaningful selectivity 
bias appears in the sample data. Each Lambda coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. This leads to the next question: Do state and federal judges 
439. The author of the present study has discussed this statistical procedure 
elsewhere. See Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Individual 
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act and Under the Labor-Management 
Relations Act Between 1935 and 199<J--An Historical and Empirical Analysis of 
Unsettled Intercircuit and Intracircuit Conflicts, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 653, 733-34 & 
n.491 (1991) [hereinafter Rice, Enforcement of Individual Rights]; and Willy E. Rice, 
Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX and Section 504: A Pre-
and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219, 286-87 (I 986) [hereinafter Rice, 
Grove-City Analysis]. 
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permit irrelevant demographic variables to influence the disposition of 
cases? 
First, consider the statistically significant probit coefficients appearing 
under the heading, "Disposition of Claims Among Complainants Who 
Filed Under States' Anti-Discrimination Statutes. " The findings are 
clear: The positive 4.4100 and 4.1953 probit values indicate that 
complainants are more likely to prevail when defendants are bankers and 
private mortgage companies. Conversely, the negative -4. 0470 probit 
coefficient reveals that aggrieved consumers are less likely to succeed 
when defendants are insurance companies. 
Second, we return to an earlier question: Does race matter? Again, the 
answer is "yes." Consider, for example, the findings reported under the 
heading, "Disposition of Claims Among African-American Complain-
ants. " The only statistically significant probit coefficient is negative (-
2. 0640); and it means that African Americans are less likely to win when 
defendants are insurance companies. However, an analysis of the values 
reported under the column labeled, "Disposition of Claims Among 
Anglo-American Complainants, " reveals very different results. Anglo-
Americans also are less likely to win when defendants are insurance 
companies. The relevant probit coefficient is the negative -3.9866. The 
positive 3. 6967 coefficient, however, indicates that Anglo-Americans are 
substantially more likely to prevail in state and federal courts when they 
complain about lenders' discriminatory financial practices or services. 
Finally, Table 5 also helps answer the question: Do courts allow 
gender to influence the disposition of cases? Sadly, the answer is "yes"; 
the supporting evidence appears in the column entitled, "Disposition of 
Claims Among Female Complainants." The negative -3. 7413 probit 
value means that female consumers are extremely less likely to triumph 
when defendants are insurance companies. However, female complain-
ants---regardless of race or ethnicity-are more likely to succeed 
(4.2157) when they accuse lenders of awarding financial services in a 
discriminatory manner. And it is important to stress: These statistical 
results did not appear among males in general or among African- and 
Anglo-American males in particular. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At the outset, we disclosed that the purpose of this Article is not to 
broaden the debates over two disputed issues: 1) Whether financial 
institutions only redline certain ethnic and minority communities and 
discriminate against creditworthy consumers on the basis ofrace, gender, 
or marital status; and 2) whether insurers practice insurance redlining 
and allow racial characteristics, gender, and marital status to determine 
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consumers' access to affordable mortgage, property, or homeowners' 
insurance. But evidence continues to support a disturbing truth: 
Unacceptable numbers of middle-class and creditworthy consumers 
continue to complain viscerally about lenders '440 and insurers '441 
discriminatory business practices. 
Over the past twenty years, much has been written about these 
problems and about ways to alleviate them. For instance, some 
commentators maintain that state and federal agencies should vigorously 
enforce fair-lending and anti-discrimination laws.442 Still others argue 
that governments should encourage lenders and insurers to adopt 
voluntary measures443 as a way of reducing intentional or unintentional 
discrimination against racial minorities, women, unmarried persons, and 
spouses. 
440. See generally John R. Wilke, Race is Key Factor in Some Loan Denials: 
Chicago Fed Study Targets Marginal Risks, Backs Earlier Disputed Report, WALL ST. 
J., July I 3, I 995, at A2. 
441. See generally Tony Mauro, Insurance Settlement Good News for Minorities, 
USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 1995, at 3A. 
442. See, e.g., Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen 
Years: It Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 293, 308 (1993) ("For much of its history, the CRA has been administered by 
regulators who have been hostile or indifferent to carrying out the law's intent .... 
Much of what is needed is tougher, more aggressive enforcement of the existing CRA 
law."); Stephen A. Fuchs, Discriminatory Lending Practices: Recent Developments, 
Causes and Solutions, IO ANN. REV. BANKING L. 46 I, 482-83 (I 99 I) ("(We need to 
consolidate] the lending laws so that one law would cover every aspect [ of lending]. ... 
A consolidated statute would provide the public and the regulators with a single, 
powerful tool to ensure fair lending, and would also make compliance easier for financial 
institutions."); Paul A. Renne, Eliminating Redlining By Judicial Action: Are Erasers 
Available?, 29 VAND. L. REv. 987, 1014 (1976) ("[]Judicial decrees are not the most 
satisfactory methods of accomplishing the elimination of redlining. Unfortunately, the 
lending institutions have made it clear that they are not prepared to invest in [minority 
communities] absent either compulsion or some reward for what they deem to be the 
greatest risks involved.") ( emphasis added). 
443. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the 
Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349, 360, 368 (1993) ("On the issue of 
maximizing CRA investment, it is far from clear that protests under the current regime 
succeed in generating significant amounts of new investment . . . . ( A Jntidiscrimination 
suits seem similarly unsuited to achieve the corrective and affirmative goals of CRA."); 
Margaret S. Pfunder, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. U. 
L. REV. 463, 495 ( 1991) ("It seems necessary to weigh the benefits to be gained from 
applying antidiscrimination statutes in situations when lending institutions have failed 
to loan on racial grounds against the risks involved in labeling the actions of a lender 
discriminatory .... "). 
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Clearly, aggrieved applicants do not think the implemented recommen-
dations have helped them to secure either affordable insurance or loans 
and credit. Yet, they observe politicians spending billions of taxpayers 
dollars to "bail out" insurers444 and lenders445 who have either em-
bezzled money, insured under-performing properties, approved unsecured 
loans for friends and family members, or underwritten highly question-
able commercial loans. Consequently, disgruntled consumers have filed 
and are likely to file hundreds of private actions to end lenders' and 
insurers' discriminatory practices. 
Some private efforts have been quite successful: Several large insurers 
and lenders have settled some lawsuits involving thousands of consumers 
and millions of dollars.446 But, among complaints that have been 
resolved in state and federal courts, the results are mixed. Moreover, 
outcomes have not been consistent---either for consumers or defen-
dants--because of an unwarranted judicial practice: Courts, themselves, 
allow race, gender and other impermissible variables to influence both 
procedural and substantive rulings. 
Therefore, we ask: What should be done to end insurers' and lenders' 
discriminatory conduct without violating their constitutional and statutory 
rights? Unlike some commentators, this writer does not believe that the 
entire responsibility for enforcing fair-lending and anti-insurance 
discrimination laws should fall on the shoulders of federal and state 
agencies.447 Why? Because those entities often are inefficient, lethar-
gic, poorly funded, under-staffed, and highly exposed to varying political 
whims. But in light of the findings reported in this paper, neither 
444. See, e.g., Susan Harrigan, STUCK: Despite a Record Bailout, the Collapse of 
Executive Life Has Few Happy Endings, NEWSDAY, May I, 1994, at A92: 
Regulators are putting the finishing touches on what has quietly become the 
biggest insurance bailout in U.S. history-paid for by taxpayers and 
consumers, but orchestrated by the insurance industry. And as policyholders 
cope with the aftermath, it is becoming clear that despite the bailout's $2 
billion price tag, tens of thousands of Americans, including many New York 
customers of Executive Life, will end up with losses as a result of the insurer's 
failure. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
445. See, e.g., Paulette Thomas, S&L Agency May Donate Some Homes Seized in 
Bailout of Failed Institutions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1991, at AS (''The Resolution 
Trust Corp. will launch a new set of initiatives next week to dispose of its roughly $150 
billion in assets from failed S&Ls. ") ( emphasis added). 
446. See generally Jeff Bailey, Northern Trust Settles Federal Claims That It 
Showed Bias in Mortgage Loans, WALL ST. J., Jun. 2, 1995, at B4; Mauro, supra note 
440. See also supra notes 210-24 and accompanying text. 
447. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 442, at 483 ("[l]t may be more effective to create 
an entirely new agency whose sole responsibility is to enforce the fair[-]lending laws. 
A single federal agency would ensure consistent application of guidelines, regulations, 
investigation procedures, enforcement and penalties."). 
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aggrieved persons, insurers, nor lenders should be encouraged to resolve 
their disputes in state and federal courts. By now, it should be fairly 
obvious why these tribunals are inferior forums. 
Here, we present two recommendations: One is for state and federal 
officials who regulate financial institutions and insurance companies; the 
other is for lawyers who represent either consumer advocates, loan and 
insurance applicants, insurers, or lenders. First, state and federal 
regulators should use their political power and acumen and lobby for the 
creation of specialized courts. These tribunals may be state, federal, or 
both; but they would resolve only claims and controversies involving 
insurance and financial redlining, fair lending, insurance discrimination, 
and unequal access to credit and loans. Ideally, the special courts would 
operate and exercise authority like the federal tax courts. At this 
juncture, it is clear that lack of political will is the major bar to the 
establishment of these tribunals. 
Second, attorneys who represent aggrieved applicants and defend 
lenders and insurers must accept an inescapable fact: State and federal 
judges are truly permitting race, gender, geographic origin, and other 
immaterial factors to determine outcome in these types of discrimination 
suits. Therefore, attorneys must communicate this knowledge to their 
respective clients and encourage them to settle their disputes as quickly 
as possible, or 2) select alternative forums to resolve their differences. 
From this writer's perspective, to do less would constitute a serious 
violation of lawyers' professional responsibility and moral obligations. 
But more important, it is fairly obvious that a failure to adopt these or 
other effective remedies will only nourish more racial and gender 
animus; more intended or unintended gender and race discrimination; 
more highly embittered consumers of financial and insurance products; 
and waves and waves of fair-lending, mortgage-redlining, insurance-
discrimination and insurance-redlining suits. 
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